

Dialogue:

A JOURNAL OF MORMON THOUGHT

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Dialogue:

A JOURNAL OF MORMON THOUGHT

VOLUME I, NUMBER 2. SUMMER, 1966

Dialogue: *A Journal of Mormon Thought* is an independent national quarterly established to express Mormon culture and examine the relevance of religion to secular life. It is edited by Mormons who wish to bring their faith into dialogue with human experience as a whole and to foster artistic and scholarly achievement based on their cultural heritage. The journal encourages a variety of viewpoints; although every effort is made to insure accurate scholarship and responsible judgment, the views expressed are those of the individual authors and are not necessarily those of the Mormon Church or of the editors.

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Dialogue wishes to thank Fred Ensign *for the sketches he created for the Review section of this issue.*

IN THIS ISSUE

Dialogue's second issue goes to press amid much optimism. The fifteen hundred pre-publication subscriptions encouraged us to believe that many Latter-day Saints and others felt a need for a journal of Mormon thought, and the more than one thousand additional subscriptions received since the first issue appeared suggests that *Dialogue* is beginning to satisfy that need. With what seemed to be foolhardy confidence, we printed twice as many copies of the first issue as we had orders for. But our faith proved to be too little; the supply was exhausted in a few weeks, and many who specifically requested the first issue have had to be turned down until a possible reprinting. The press run is much larger this time, and we hope to supply everyone who wishes a copy of *Dialogue* number two.

This early success is gratifying to the editors, who conceived the idea of the journal with high hopes, but no funds. Most successful quarterlies are subsidized by organizations or institutions. *Dialogue* has depended and will continue to depend upon subscriptions and gifts from individuals and upon the voluntary efforts of contributors and staff.

From the beginning we envisioned one of *Dialogue's* functions as providing a forum for examining the encounter of the Gospel and the Church with the major issues of contemporary society. In this issue J. D. Williams traces the Church's relationship to politics from the Missouri and Illinois period through April Conference, 1966, and examines closely the issues raised by the impingement of ecclesiastical authorities and their pronouncements on the democratic process. Although based upon historical research and the analysis of a professional political scientist, the essay also reflects Professor Williams's personal concern for reconciling the roles of institutional action and individual responsibility. In a very different kind of essay, Karl Keller relates his L.D.S. faith and experience to the struggle for civil rights in the South; he responds to the summer he spent developing Freedom Schools for Negroes in Tennessee and to events and feelings that led him to be there, in the process revealing how his specific ideals both make him part of the civil rights struggle and cause him to be critical of some of its effects.

Our lead article for this issue looks at the Church's involvement in yet another area of secular activity — the visual arts. James Haseltine, Director of the Salt Lake Art Center, has examined diaries, letters, and other historical sources in order to give a picture of official Church support of the arts in the nineteenth century and to compare it with the situation of Mormon artists today, a situation which he describes as a "Gentile" at home in Utah, with understanding, some praise, and some strong recommendations.

Letters to the Editors

Dear Sirs:

I have just finished reading the First Presidency's statement in the April *Era* against pornography and obscenity. As a widow with three young boys to raise I am concerned about the possible dangers that lie ahead of them and certainly don't advocate a diet of hardcore pornography. As a librarian, however, I am also concerned about the dangers of censorship. In September I shall start a new job as a high school librarian, and in my book buying I shall follow certain recognized criteria of selection, e.g., the overall purpose of the book, its timeliness, accuracy and objectivity, readability, and literary value. What I am concerned about are those people who suspiciously look in every book for obscenity or frankness in dealing with sexual matters. Are we to exclude *Catcher in the Rye* or *Brave New World* or *Go Tell It on the Mountain* because of certain passages that might offend a puritanical soul? The freedom to read is too precious to be bound by censors. In one school library in Marin County, a timid librarian removed E. B. White's great book *Charlotte's Web* from the shelf because some parents complained about the use of the word "manure." There is just as much danger, I feel, in a steady diet of the easy-to-read, clean and pure "Junior Novel" that presents a false and distorted view of life: the characters and plots are stereotypes and there is frequently an overemphasis on popularity, material possessions, and the happy ending with no problems. . . . Is there a possibility of an article about pornography and censorship in a future issue of *Dialogue*. . . .

(Mrs.) Mary W. Wallmann
Albany, California

A Roundtable on pornography and censorship is planned for an issue in the near future. [Ed.]

Dear Sirs:

People often say, "He has lost the glow and enthusiasm he once had as a new convert." I feel that for some of us the excitement of inquiry and discovery gave us part of that "alive" quality. As membership wears on and any real inquiry is stifled, the new convert becomes discouraged and some of the light dims. This has been my personal experience.

Dialogue is like a refreshing drink of water "in our lovely Deseret." I have properly devoured the first issue and it has revived a near dead spiritual awareness. The doubts that had gone "underground" and the seeking

that had become self-conscious and stilted are uniting in a responsible spirit of re-investigation. I think that the active membership I have maintained with effort will be be much more honest now.

(Mrs.) Lucretia A. Petersen
Salt Lake City, Utah

Dear Sirs:

I was interested in Dr. Burtenshaw's article, "The Student: His University and His Church" (Spring, 1966). Although he described four methods which students used to approach conflicts between their church and university experience, I had difficulty feeling that many students would fit consistently into any one category.

In fact, I'm wondering if the most appropriate approach to one's religion and university experience may not be found in a wholesome amalgamation of at least the four methods he describes. Would there not be times when almost any active, struggling Latter-day Saint student would find it wise to place the Church in a superior role with sincere trust and confidence being placed in the scriptures and the Lord's prophets? The same individual may find other times when a candid recognition of the different roles the university and Church play in his life could be most constructive.

Even the third category (which appeared to me to be the weakest approach), wherein the human and non-supernatural were emphasized in religion, may be helpful. It's my opinion that a testimony of the validity of the Book of Mormon, the Welfare Plan, or the Word of Wisdom which is based on external evidence (whether archeological, sociological, or medical) is a poor second choice for a foundation. Nevertheless, almost anyone's spiritual, intuitive testimony can be reinforced by human and empirical evidence.

Finally, one of the most important tools to help solve the dilemma of conflict situations is the capacity in certain areas to question evidence in both the university and church settings and — where all the facts are not in — a "tolerance for ambiguity."

When this happy amalgamation occurs, I'm convinced that thoughtful students can move successfully through their university experience and grow intellectually as well as spiritually without feeling the effects of excessively painful conflict.

Joe J. Christensen
Director, Institute of Religion
Salt Lake City, Utah

Dear Sirs:

It was indeed heartening to read Robert Christmas's report of the lecture series on the Watts riots, sponsored by the L.D.S. Institute of Religion at the University of Southern California. Hopefully, such concern for social and racial issues will in time spread beyond the confines of the "Mormon intellectual community."

At present, however, it appears that the "national misunderstanding on this issue" (the Mormon attitude towards the Negro), to which Bishop Kent Lloyd reportedly referred, is more wishful thinking than reality. Although Mormon scriptures clearly enjoin Latter-day Saints to treat Negroes with the same Christian love as their own church members, practice falls discouragingly short of this ideal. Having lived in several urban centers with heavy Negro populations, we have found an embarrassingly large number of our church members unprejudiced against Negroes only as

long as the latter attended different schools and did not move into white neighborhoods.

We believe that if there were, indeed, a serious misunderstanding of the Mormon position, at least as *practiced* by those who claim membership in the Church, it would be a sign of tremendous encouragement. We are afraid, however, that our actions — or perhaps lack of involvement — speak so loud the nation cannot hear our apologetics. For every George Romney there are ten "Latter-day Saints" who believe that Negroes are their brothers only as long as they "stay in their place."

Joan and Klaus Hansen
Anne and Blythe Ahlstrom
Logan, Utah

Dear Sirs:

I should like to enter into dialogue with R. A. Christmas regarding his condescending attitude toward what he calls "the pure remove of fiction." Though I can certainly agree with him, and with Bernard De Voto, who said God had already written the Mormon story better than any novelist could, I must point out some basic fallacies in Mr. Christmas's thinking.

I too feel that nothing has quite surpassed Pratt's autobiography and admire it for the strong work it is. But, though Mormon fiction has not yet come into its own, there is something unfair about comparing fiction to autobiography. Mr. Christmas seems confused as to truth and fiction, as if the two were grossly different, a mistake often made (but not usually by English majors). He seems to imply that facts are more important than the kind of truth to be found in fiction. I wish to assert that fiction *can* and the best *does* pertain to those things which are most deeply true in human nature; and the novelist is successful because he more deeply *sees* into truths that the common person misses. To expect the truths of Parley Pratt's journal to be the same as the truths of fiction is not quite straight thinking. Though aims may often overlap, the fictional artist sees things differently. The artist of fiction, like other artists, works from different premises than the biographer or the historian. Although their tools can and often may be the same, the artist must have some "remove" from his material, must let it pass through him and his sensitivity into a form which is, finally, outside himself and his immediate experience. He creates, and the result is a "thing" which has a separate being from the artist himself. For this reason the creative work of art does have an objectivity and a "remove" from the everyday lives of most of us, even when our experiences are exciting ones. One does not choose to read a piece of history over a piece of fiction (though many think they must). They are two different things. Samuel Taylor should not be compared to Pratt, either, since *Family Kingdom* is not an autobiography but a memoir, which has its own rules.

I also resent Mr. Christmas's facetiousness in choosing what he considers "by no means the worst" of Mormon fiction to compare with the best of Mormon journals. Though Mormon fiction has a long way to go, many admirable things have appeared, such as the works of Virginia Sorensen, Maureen Whipple, Frank Robertson, etc.

(Mrs.) Mary L. Bradford
Alexandria, Virginia

The following is quoted from a personal letter to Frances Lee Menlove. [Ed.]

Dear Mrs. Menlove:

I wanted to tell you not only how much I have admired and profited

from the first issue of *Dialogue* (to which I regret I could not contribute) but to say especially that your own essay, "The Challenge of Honesty," seemed to me a wonderfully fine and moving discourse. I liked what you said about both religious liberals and religious conservatives, and what their attitudes might hide. . . .

David Riesman
Harvard University

Dear Sirs:

Congratulations on the first issue of *Dialogue*. It is all I expected and more. Such a journal has been sorely needed by students and others seeking to reconcile their religion with secular life. . . .

Deana Astle
Pembroke College
Providence, Rhode Island

Dear Sirs:

During the weeks since my copy of Vol. 1 No. 1 arrived, I've had an opportunity to read or skim most of what it contains. There is sufficient diversity to make a general evaluation rather difficult. Several articles I thoroughly appreciated, such as Arrington's bibliographical study — a valuable contribution indeed — and Cline's declaration of faith. The inclusion of others in what you identify as a "Journal of Mormon Thought" I found rather puzzling, particularly De Pillis's essay. I even failed to see in this instance what "useful insight" members of the Church might hope to gain from it, unless it be one into the kind of tendentious historical writing that has been characteristic of so many of those outside the Church. . . .

Another feature that surprised me was the Roundtable discussion of Sterling McMurrin's book, *The Theological Foundations of the Mormon Religion.* I was nonplussed that you would have taken the work seriously enough to give it such an elaborate treatment. It obviously rests on a false premise to begin with, since the religion of the Latter-day Saints does not have its foundations in theology in the traditional sense in which McMurrin treats it, but in revelation, as he should very well know. There's surely something ironical, if not comical, in the stance he takes in taxing present-day Mormon "theology" with being "timid and academic," as he then attempts to tug and pull at gospel principles until they somehow fit into the tired and worn terminology of traditional philosophy. The feeling seems to be, if I have correctly understood the reviewers, that a work of this kind will make L.D.S. theology accessible, and maybe even acceptable, to the trained theological minds of other faiths. And in fact, Mr. Brown views it as the "beginning of a new direction." I, for one, sincerely hope that this is not the case, because the direction is far from new and is one which has proved to be fraught with insuperable dangers. The Gospel of Jesus Christ had an encounter with philosophy already once in the past, beginning in the first centuries of the Christian era, and was completely transformed in the process. Hopefully, the lesson of history will serve us here. Members of the Church with intellectual interests, particularly if those interests lie in the field of philosophy, should recognize that the epistemology of the Gospel is vastly different from that utilized by traditional philosophy and her theological stepchild; for the latter, dialectic or logic is the key, but for the former it is revelation, the epistemology of the spirit. Obviously the academically-trained mind is not very comfortable with the Gospel's way of knowing because it eludes analysis, cannot be controlled, and has its source in the su-

pernatural. There is no need for the philosopher's tools of dialectic — or rhetoric, as the case may be — for the precept is preceded by the overriding authority of the statement, "thus saith the Lord." I submit this is the kind of thing that does not readily lend itself to a "dialogue," at least not one of the kind for which Mr. Brown seems to hope on the basis of McMurrin's book. . . .

What disturbed me most about the first issue, as well as the announcements about its appearance, was the reflection of some of the ingrown attitudes of Utah Mormons which I feel to be parochial and short-sighted. Perhaps the most annoying of all these is the over-weening pride in what is vaguely referred to as "Mormon culture." This appears to be based on the notion that such a thing exists, and that it is a fairly standardized and homogeneous commodity, created and given the highest polish in the Mountain West. Such a point of view denotes a lack of humility that is sadly out of keeping with our religious principles, since it fails to take cognizance of the fact that aside from the revealed religion and its social concomitants, "Mormon culture" is almost entirely derivative. What could be more pretentious than to assert that today "Los Angeles and New York are as important subsidiary centers of Mormon culture . . . as St. George and Nephi were fifty years ago"? That these cities are centers of culture, no one will deny, that there are Mormons there participating in, even contributing to that culture is likewise true, but that said culture is specifically Mormon is a patent exaggeration to say the least.

Members of the Church born in the western part of the U.S.A. do have an historical tradition of which they can be justly proud, that of the pioneers, and that tradition is intimately tied to their Church and their faith. There is even a detectable tendency to identify with that faith certain political institutions — and parties — and to make a heady blend of religious loyalty and patriotism. To do so is natural, but not entirely excusable. The logical conclusion to such a viewpoint is that the Church is an American organization which can function properly only within the framework of American society and government, and the remarks of many, including, unfortunately, General Authorities of the Church speaking in General Conference, would lead one to believe that such a conclusion had already been reached. Yet we proudly preach that the Church is universal in its scope, that the Gospel will be carried to "every nation. . . ." It's perhaps time we recognized that members of the Church in Europe and elsewhere have cultural and historical traditions which are not necessarily those of the Mountain West, but which are every bit as valid. They too are part of the total picture of "Mormon culture," and they may not care a fig for the pioneers or the Constitution of the U.S. Somehow their point of view, their political aspirations, and their historical traditions ought to be considered with the same respect that we accord our own. Maybe a little dialogue between those in the center stakes of Zion and some of the outposts of the Church community would prove at least as fruitful as a courtship of the American intellectual community.

Leeman L. Perkins
Yale University

Dear Sirs:

. . . *Dialogue* is encouraging. The best alternative to abject cynicism that some of us have had is our hope for meaningful exchange with older, more experienced Church members —

virtuous and sensitive — who have confronted and are confronting, with faith as well as honesty, the intellectual issues of Mormon life. Too often our hope has been disappointed as such dialogue has been impeded by 1) our reluctance to reveal to people apparently committed to a much simpler definition of "testimony" than our own our concern with fundamental doubts, 2) the spiritual inaccessibility of many of those who outwardly give indication of perhaps having "arrived," and 3) lack of confidence in many of Mormondom's liberal college professors, who have often seemed to know less about Christian theology in general and Mormon doctrine in particular than the students to whom they would presume to give orientation. Your publication makes an effort to remove the above mentioned impediments. Herein lies its greatest contribution. . . .

Elder G. Benson Whittle
Curitiba, Parana
Brazil

Dear Sirs:

In the hope that Dr. Victor Cline's article, "The Faith of a Psychologist: A Personal Document," does not enjoy editorial immunity from criticism due to the author's expressed reticence to publicly air his private views, I submit a few critical comments.

Cline introduces his first point by indicating that psychologists tend to be a godless lot, typically given either to apathy toward religion or to rebellion against authority and religion, substituting the pseudo-religion of behaviorism or psychoanalysis for the faith of their childhood. Cline then laments that psychology, "as a field," carefully avoids religion. "The silence was deafening," he stated.

That many psychologists are agnostic is freely granted. That religion has no monopoly on zealots and dogmatists is also admitted. However, the claim that psychology, "as a field," carefully avoids and is indifferent to religion is preposterous. Among the fathers of modern psychology, William James, Sigmund Freud, and Carl Jung all made important contributions to the development of a psychological view of religion. George Kelly, D. P. Ausubel, Abraham Maslow, Erich Fromm, and O. H. Mowrer are but a few of numerous current psychological theorists who have produced impressive commentaries on psychology and religion or closely related topics such as the origin of guilt.

Piaget's *The Moral Judgment of the Child, The Open and Closed Mind* by M. Rokeach, *When Prophecy Fails* by Festinger, Rieken and Schachter, and the Peck and Havinghurst volume, *The Psychology of Character Development,* all contain a wealth of implications for religion. Even John B. Watson and B. F. Skinner could hardly be classified as indifferent toward religion — unsympathetic, perhaps, but not apathetic.

While casting about for an explanation of the deafening silence reported by Dr. Cline, it occurred to me that placing one's index fingers securely in one's ears can result in a deafening silence of sorts. Indeed, some of the most serious problems which psychology poses for Mormonism were not even mentioned by Cline, e.g., naturalistic explanations of *conscience* and *testimony.*

Not succumbing to the temptation to comment in detail on other points made by Dr. Cline, I conclude with a few observations concerning the approach toward science and religion which Cline seems to be advocating.

It is my impression that a major consideration governing Dr. Cline's *attempt* at reconciliation is the search for subjective certainty. After hav-

ing pointed up the tentativeness of science, he concluded, "Science proves nothing absolutely; something more is needed," implying an uneasiness with tentative conclusions. This "something more," which provides Mr. Cline with his absolute is, of course, the Mormon religion, the validity of which he has ascertained through positive affective experiences and an act of faith. Now this is a legitimate approach and a legitimate conclusion; however, for the benefit of those who may have believed that Dr. Cline had reconciled psychology with religion, I would like to stress that when one juxtaposes an absolute system and a tentative one, subordination is the upshot, not reconciliation. One accepts the tentative system only insofar as it is congruent with the absolute system; the elements of the tentative system which are incongruent with the absolutes are rejected. When seeming inconsistencies arise within the absolute system, they are, like Dr. Cline's scriptural inconsistencies, ". . . sometimes painful to face," and are frequently shelved, pending evidence which would justify the definite classification of the problem as an *apparent* contradiction; thus the system and its underlying premises are preserved intact. *Reconciliation* of two systems whose domains overlap, such as psychology and religion, is possible only if both are viewed as being tentative, open systems, allowing for rejection of components of *either* system if the evidence indicates that it is warranted. With this approach, incongruities within the religious system may be resolved by tentatively concluding that one incongruous element is incorrect.

Glenn M. White
Department of Psychology
(Graduate student)
Princeton University

Dr. Cline replies:

With regard to Mr. White's first point (that my statement about psychology being indifferent to religion is "preposterous") let me respond as follows: first, if he will carefully reread what I wrote again, he will note that my statement referred only to my experiences while I was a graduate student (in the early '50's); and second — to let the reader know that my perception is shared by others — I cite Dr. Gordon Allport (professor of psychology at Harvard and former president of the American Psychological Association), who in 1950 wrote at the beginning of *The Individual and His Religion,* "The subject of religion seems to have gone into hiding . . . and the persistence of religion in the modern world appears an embarrassment to the scholars of today." Glock and Stark in the introduction to their *Religion and Society in Tension* have recently commented, "The study of religion from the point of view of social science was a major concern of scholars in the 19th century. The most seminal figures in the development of psychology, sociology, and anthropology are closely identified with the study of religion. . . . But for a variety of reasons, scholarly interest in religion all but vanished in the 20th Century." F. H. Page, in 1951, surveyed the previous fifty years of the study of the psychology of religion in an article in *The Canadian Journal of Psychology* (Vol. V, pp. 60-67); he wrote, "Today it would not perhaps be untrue to say that the subject is regarded by many psychologists with almost complete indifference and by some with positive suspicion and even disfavor. Thus one studies tribal ceremonies of primitive cultures, religious delusions of psychotics, conversion experiences of adolescents, but not the religious behavior of normal adults of our own culture."

A department of psychology which today offers even a single course in the psychology of religion is an extreme rarity. If a person attends regional or national meetings of the American Psychological Association, he is lucky to find even a single symposium dealing with religion, and individual papers dealing with the subject are quite rare. There is an occasional individual (as Mr. White's letter suggests) who has an interest in this area and writes about it and, as Glock and Stark point out, "during the past decade there has been increasing research activity into the social sources and consequences of religion." But psychology as a field pays little attention to religion.

With regard to Mr. White's comment that many issues were not discussed in my paper — alas, I'm afraid this is most true. Since I wrote just a brief essay, not a book, I had to take the author's prerogative of choosing just a few of the issues which were for me important.

I liked the way Mr. White delineated the problems involved in reconciling an absolute system (religion) with a tentative one (psychology/science). However, I must insist that the way I perceive the Mormon faith, I think it an injustice to label it as an "absolute." At least in my experience, it is growing and evolving in a quite dynamic way and it is indeed an "open system," which means that it continually has to meet tests of logic and reason as well as faith.

Both my profession and my religion have a major common concern, the freedom, dignity, and welfare of men, as well as a common interest in searching out truth. With these kinds of common goals I find it not too difficult to endure a lot of poor sermons as well as to tolerate the continuing dissonances of conflicting research results — and even a murky lecture or two by some of my colleagues.

Victor Cline
University of Utah

Dear Sirs:

In his "Reflections on the Writing of Mormon History," which appeared in the first issue of *Dialogue,* Klaus J. Hansen expressed "hope" that there would be discussion and even vigorous disagreement with his ideas. Common courtesy demands that the university community hosting Professor Hansen this year avoid offense to him. Therefore, as a member of that community I join issue out of duty.

Professor Hansen suggests that Mormon historians too often "have tried to assume the role of priest and prophet," that they may have done this under the aegis of Carl Becker, Charles A. Beard, and James Harvey Robinson, and that the result is propaganda, not history. If Mormon historians have attempted to play "priest and prophet" (Whitney may qualify; it is doubtful if Roberts would, and certainly Arrington and Brooks do not), it has not been under the aegis of the "New History" school, "presentism," "historican relativism," "progressive historiography," or any other appellation attaching to the innovations of Becker, Beard, and Robinson. First, it is doubtful if this triumvirate has had any influence on the writing of Mormon history. Second, allowing that there might have been some influence, it should not have had the unwholesome effect claimed by Professor Hansen. As Cushing Strout has thoughtfully demonstrated, Becker and Beard were not propagandists — Samuel Eliot Morison, Professor Hansen (by implication), and other critics to the contrary notwithstanding. They also had a more sophisticated conception of their craft than Morton

White and Robert E. Brown are willing to allow.

More directly, Mr. Hansen is guilty of an implicit but very serious mixing of metaphors. In the first few paragraphs of his "Reflections" he admonishes Mormon historians to "relax a little and take themselves and their investigations less seriously," to be less defensive about their commitments, in short, to write with more *tongue in cheek*. Yet, in his remaining remarks he implies that the Mormon historian should get his tongue out of his cheek and his *teeth on the bit* and assume the role of moral critic. The tenor of his later remarks is precisely that of John Higham in his article "Beyond Consensus: The Historian as a Moral Critic" in *The American Historical Review* (April, 1962). Whether Hansen realizes it or not, what he is asking for is what Higham pleaded for — not less commitment but a greater degree of it, not that historians should take "their investigations less seriously" but more seriously.

No one, I think, can quarrel with Professor Hansen about the historian's need to view himself with buoyant perspective. But when he challenges Mormon historians to arrogate to themselves the role of moral critics, he demands of them a seriousness about their investigations that will be sobering indeed if the challenge is accepted. They must face among other manifold problems those of causal analysis and the criteria to be used by the critic in his evaluations. As Higham views it, ". . . the historian commits to moral criticism all the resources of his human condition. He derives from moral criticism an enlarged and disciplined sensitivity to what men ought to have done, what they might have done, and what they achieved. His history becomes an intensive, concrete reflection upon life, freed from academic primness, and offering itself as one of the noblest, if also one of the most difficult and imperfect, of the arts." If historians can "relax" in the face of that responsibility then they misread the role of a historian.

Stanford Cazier
Department of History
Utah State University

Dear Sirs:

I was fascinated by the initial *Dialogue* and read rapaciously Johnson through Jeppson while my family endured frozen pizza and canned soup. It is well-written, well-edited, and thoroughly interesting. But alas, . . . is a communication among that small coterie of tenaciously "believing" Ph.D's . . . who can see the problems within their own disciplines and are therefore compelled to write back and forth to each other for comfort and reinforcement. . . .

(Mrs.) Barbara Williams
Salt Lake City, Utah

Dear Sirs:

It is about time that we as a people produced a satisfactory quarterly — something more scholarly than the *Improvement Era* and less parochial than *Brigham Young University Studies,* something along the lines of *The Hibbert Journal, Judaism, Blackfriars,* or the *Baptist, Lutheran,* and *Friends' Quarterlies.* Why this has never been done before is difficult to understand considering the fact that from the beginning we, as a people, have established all kinds of journals and newspapers to propagandize the world, to explain our doctrine, and to communicate among ourselves.

It is also about time that some group consciousness was effected and some *esprit de corps* developed among general church membership, especially among our scholars and artists,

for the learned defense, propagation, fostering, and improving of the Mormon faith and culture, which would not only benefit the Mormon Church and society, but also lead to a better public image of us as a people. Many more members of the Church could then be more anxiously and effectively engaged in a good cause, could become a force to be reckoned with in and out of the Mormon imperium, and become a more dynamic contributing power. . . .

There are some in the Church who are embarrassed by the fact that, collectively, Mormon intellectuals have made no particular impression upon themselves or upon others, that there is no recognized cadre of Mormon intellectuals. That such a situation will change, that group consciousness will be effected, that Mormons interested in the arts and in scholarship will ever more completely fulfill the measure of their creation or ever more effectively lend their talents to the furthering of truth and the betterment of the Lord's Vineyard, or that the intellectual force of the Mormon faith will be better organized and utilized without a good journal is unlikely.

Since at least the eighteenth century every significant group wishing to unite, to express itself, to foster certain goals and ideals, and to communicate has founded journals and newspapers. More than a dozen, for example, were founded by members of the Church during the lifetime of Joseph Smith, and during the first century the Church founded more than fifty journals and newspapers to propagate its message. But today, in spite of the scores of church and church related publications by and about Mormons, there has been no adequate journal of Mormon thought, no organ to provide Mormons with book reviews, bibliographies, notes, lists of periodical literature, and other such features regularly found in scholarly journals, or to provide a channel through which Mormons may better communicate with each other and exchange ideas.

Now that *Dialogue* exists, its pages ought to carry the best possible reviews, not only of books about and by Mormons, but of all major creative activity about and by Mormons. Such a service properly provided would tend to restrain writers, publishers, and artists of all kinds from prematurely rushing into print and production. It would also result in better works by and through which the non-Mormon world could judge us.

Dialogue can and should assume the role of critic of our society. As I have said before ("Mormon Culture: A Letter to the Editor," *Brigham Young University Studies,* Winter, 1964), one of the greatest intellectual lacuna in our society is (still is) the fact that Mormon *culture* has no effective and comprehensive judge, jury, or police system, no journal to point out the frequent disparity between the idea, the dream, the concept, and the realization, the production and the result. The best and worst of Mormon writers and artists face no Mormon critic of their work. The most unqualified amateur with scissors and paste can throw together a poorly conceived, half researched, carelessly written, and popularized book, find a publisher, and be acclaimed throughout Mormonism as an authority. . . .

There are still other dimensions to *Dialogue.* One of its greatest contributions would be to encourage — Mormon intellectuals in our society suffer as much from lack of encouragement as they do from complacency — to encourage and help support more Mormon scholars and artists to create more and better things based on Mormon themes for use within and without the Church. Our creative

writers, for example, could be encouraged, even commissioned, to exploit properly the dramatic potential of the Book of Mormon and early church history for distribution through the mass media of press, radio, stage, television, and cinema. . . .

I am not preparing a brief for secularization, nor a plea for the lowering of any religious principles or standards. Rather the contrary. This is an argument for us as a people to produce the finest culture possible, one commensurate with the import of the Restoration. We are a chosen people; we bear the restored gospel and have been commissioned to take it to the world. Can we not do it better by more properly marshaling the forces of culture, the talents of artist and scholar?

Mormon culture is potentially strong. The talent is available and faithful men stand by. What is lacking is a climate, an atmosphere in which the intellectual becomes as necessary and as useful as the pioneer of the past and the administrator of the present. . . . The time has come to create a climate wherein Mormon intellectuals may more fully serve, may be more fully engaged in a good cause, and may more effectively build up Zion and glorify God.

Stanley B. Kimball
Southern Illinois University



HENRI MOSER: *Self Portrait, Paris, 1909*

Dialogue: A JOURNAL OF MORMON THOUGHT

MORMONS AND THE VISUAL ARTS

James L. Haseltine

This essay is the third in a continuing series, "An Assessment of Mormon Culture." The author, himself not a Mormon, examines the influence of the L.D.S. Church on the visual arts in Utah from pioneer times. Mr. Haseltine is Director of the Salt Lake Art Center and the author of numerous reviews and articles for professional journals; he recently produced a retrospective exhibit of Utah painting at the Art Center and did much of the research used in this essay in preparing the exhibition catalogue, "100 Years of Utah Painting."

It seems curious to ask, "What support has the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints given to the visual arts in Utah?" One would hardly consider as fields for fruitful exploration Baptist support of the arts in Mississippi, Lutheran encouragement in Oregon, or Methodist patronage in Kansas. Yet in Utah perhaps such a question can be asked, for seldom has one religion been so intertwined with other aspects of life.

There is little doubt that Brigham Young felt a need for artists in the Salt Lake Valley very soon after the arrival of the first pioneers. By the mid-1850's he was instructing missionaries in foreign lands to devote special attention to the conversion of skilled artists, artisans, and architects. That many came to Utah is implied by C. C. A. Christensen, the fine pioneer painter, who remarked in 1872, after visiting the Utah Territorial Fair, "I would never have believed so

much talent could be found among us as a people who are nearly all gathered from among the most downtrodden classes of mankind."[1] Almost too many came, for none, by art alone, could make the income necessary to support himself and his family. There was appreciation of art but seldom sufficient means to purchase it. Pioneer artists often noted this problem in the diaries and journals. Danquart A. Weggeland[2] states that he could occasionally dispose of a painting or a lesson for a few home-knit sox or a basket of onions, but that without commissions for his work in the Salt Lake Theatre, he would never have been able to pay his rent. Alfred Lambourne remarks in the 1870's that his paintings had been "traded for a pair of boots . . . framed and then sold for what the canvas cost . . . [traded] for canary and cage . . . sold at a ruinously low price . . . raffled at $8.00, won by Briggy Young" (apparently Brigham Young, Jr.).[3]

George M. Ottinger says, "In the last 8 years I have up to this day, June 30, 1872, painted 223 pictures which have been sold for $3413.00 or a little over fifteen dollars apiece. Now deducting . . . seven dollars from each picture for cost of paint, canvas, stretchers and framing leaves me $1752.00 or a little over half . . . or $219.00 a year. Would not the heart of the strongest quail. When I look around at my family and our wants, I seem to myself a coward, a slave. *Why don't I stick pallet and brush into the fire.* I certainly must have no talent, no, nothing requisite to me that is needed for a successful painter."[4]

Yet, as Ottinger also notes, people "as a general thing like pictures and admire them but they have no money to spend for them, unless some stranger like Mr. Perry comes to the Valley."[5] (Ottinger refers to Enoch Wood Perry, Jr., who maintained a studio in New York. From 1862 to 1866 he lived in California, making trips to Utah and Hawaii. Another pioneer Utah artist regrets in a diary note of April 1866 that "a gentile artist" had received $1000 in gold for a portrait of Brigham Young. The gentile artist was most likely Perry, for Ottinger states in another 1872 entry that Brigham Young, whose portrait he was then painting, remarked to him that the Ottinger work was a much better likeness than the Perry portrait done six years earlier.) Edward W. Tullidge, the Utah historian, confirms this observation, speaking of the "early taste and love for pictures

[1] William Mulder, *Homeward to Zion* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957), p. 113.

[2] An alphabetical listing (with dates) of all artists cited in the text is provided at the end of the essay.

[3] Alfred Lambourne, "Journal of Works of Art," 1869-1899.

[4] George M. Ottinger, "Personal Journal," 1833-1899.

[5] *Ibid.*



GEORGE M. OTTINGER: *The Ideal . .* *. . . . The Real*

GEORGE M. OTTINGER: *Painting Scenery for Salt Lake Theatre*

in the community, far in advance of that in surrounding territories and greater than the newness of the country would seem to promise."[6] He cites two reasons for this phenomenon: a larger than average proportion of citizens very recently from the Old World, where they were in the habit of visiting galleries, and the fact that these citizens were "the reverse of a floating population."[7] Some of the pioneers brought pictures across the plains; a number of works by William Warner Major, who was active in Nauvoo and Winter Quarters, and by itinerant artists who visited the early Mormon settlements survive today in Utah collections.

A love of art apparently existed, and Brigham Young apparently encouraged it. He took delight in pointing out to visiting dignitaries the Weggeland painting of his estate, hanging above his fireplace. Trained as a carpenter, Young understood craftsmanship and could appreciate a well-wrought painting. He evidently approved of the sculpture of the lion, which still crouches over the Lion House entrance, carved by William Ward in 1855, and admired the wood carvings of Ralph Ramsey which embellished the Tabernacle, Salt Lake Theatre, Beehive House and Eagle Gate. Beauty for Brigham Young was "a natural and necessary accompaniment of productive work."[8]

The performing arts, however, received much stronger support from the Church and its leaders. That this was so, and that the pattern thus set continues to this day, is not too difficult to understand. Performing arts — music, drama, dance — are essentially group arts. And the solidity of the group, of the gathered people, is essential to Mormonism. In pioneer days a song, a skit, a dance served to unite the flock as well as provide much needed recreation and diversion from the hostility of nature and, often, the hostility of other men.

But the visual arts of painting and sculpture are essentially individual arts. The heart of the esthetic experience is the quiet contemplation by one individual of one object created by one man. It is often a demanding experience and usually affords less recreational or entertainment value than its sister arts. The continuing interest of the Mormon Church in performing arts has done much to enrich our culture. It has helped create a climate in which a fine choir, an excellent symphony, and extraordinary modern dance and ballet companies can flourish. Its less active encouragement of the visual arts has been a serious deterrent to artistic growth.

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[6] Edward W. Tullidge, *History of Salt Lake* (Salt Lake City: Star Printing Co., 1886), p. 810.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] Mrs. Kenneth Smith, "Utah Artists." Unpublished, undated typescript.

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints no doubt feels that it has been, throughout its history, a strong supporter of the painter, sculptor and architect. In a sense this is quite true. Few churches or their members in the last century have commissioned as many works of art. Utah may have more portraits per capita than any other state, as a result of the Mormon's intense interest in visual recordkeeping and of orders for several identical portraits during the days of polygamy. The Salt Lake Theatre, built by Brigham Young, furnished welcome employment for almost all the pioneer artists as scenery painters. And the Mormon temples abound with murals, paintings and sculpture.

The painting of the Salt Lake Temple murals may be, in fact, a unique episode in religious art of America. The story begins as the second generation of Utah painters were studying under the pioneer artists Dan Weggeland and George M. Ottinger. Both instructors, feeling perhaps a growing provincialism in Utah art, urged their students to study abroad. The first to take their advice was James H. Harwood, who in 1888 enrolled at the Academie Julian in Paris; the sculptor Cyrus E. Dallin arrived two weeks later. As a result of this precedent, Weggeland and others were able to persuade George Q. Cannon of the First Presidency of the Church to send John Hafen, John B. Fairbanks, and Lorus Pratt on "a mission to Paris to study painting,"[9] with the understanding that they would decorate the Salt Lake Temple upon their return. In a letter to Lorus Pratt, who was selected to preside over the mission, Apostle Heber J. Grant stated, "We bless you that you may take joy in your labor and delight in your studies, that you may become proficient, and fitted and qualified and prepared through your labors and studies to beautify and decorate the House of God that shall be erected and the Temple of the Lord for the administering therein of the living and the dead."[10]

The three landed in Liverpool on July 2, 1890, and were in Paris by August, commencing their studies at the Academie Julian. Edwin Evans joined the mission in the fall. Two others were later to receive official church sanction and support for their studies: Herman Haag, who began his Paris training in 1889 and John W. Clawson, who studied abroad from 1890 to 1896. These "pioneers

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[9] "BLESSINGS upon the head of LORUS PRATT, given by Apostle Heber J. Grant, June 4, 1890. Reported by John M. Whitaker." In the possession of Alton M. Pratt, Salt Lake City, Utah.

[10] *Ibid.*

Facing page: "Portrait of Alfred Lambourne," Mahonri M. Young


A.M. YOUNG

in reverse" were followed by many others who were not on explicit church missions: Lewis A. Ramsey about 1897; Mary Teasdel, Lee Greene Richards, and Mahonri M. Young in 1901; Alma B. Wright in 1902; Donald Beauregard in 1906; Henri Moser in 1908; and by Rose Hartwell and Myra Sawyer.

In later years B. F. Larsen, J. A. F. Everett, Gordon N. Cope, J. Leo Fairbanks, Avard Fairbanks, Lynn Fausett, Calvin Fletcher, Mabel Frazer and Waldo Midgley were among those who made the pilgrimage.

The results of this training on the shape of Utah art were formidable. Though there is not space here to analyze the effects in detail, it may be said that a pattern of academic figure drawing and conservative landscape painting was set that largely continues to this day. Only a few — Evans, Beauregard, Moser, Larsen, and Frank Zimbeaux — rebelled and developed more or less personal styles.

FURTHER CHURCH SUPPORT

But let us now return to the story of the French mission of 1890 by hearing from the First Presidency of the Church, Wilford Woodruff, George Q. Cannon, and Joseph F. Smith. On May 20, 1892, they wrote to Elders Pratt, Fairbanks, Clawson, Haag and Evans, then all studying art in Paris (Hafen had left the group after one year) :

> When we receive a reply to ours of April 28th, we expect to be able to write you with a better understanding of your several views on the mural decoration of the Salt Lake Temple. Today we simply suggest the way in which the $1500.00 sent you, in these two remittances, should be divided, our suggestions being based on the information given us in Bro. Pratt's letters. He states that he and Bro. Fairbanks intend to return home next July, and to do so he will require $450.00 and Bro. Fairbanks $350.00 . . . . This leaves a balance of $700.00 which we suggest should be equally divided among Elders Haag, Evans, and Clawson, for their maintenance and current expenses during the next few months. . . .[11]

After the Salt Lake Temple was completed in 1893, the group fulfilled their obligation to the Church. John Hafen painted the murals in the "Garden of Eden" room; Edwin Evans and John B.

[11] Hafen in a letter to his wife Thora from Paris, August 8, 1890, says, "I have a testimony that the Lord will enable me to accomplish all that is necessary in the year allotted to me to stay here. I do not believe that He will require any faithful servant of His to dwell in the midst of such wickedness any longer than is absolutely necessary. Brother Lorus Pratt often says, 'we may have to remain two or even three years in order to accomplish our mission.' But I tell him that he may entertain such ideas but I do not. I am booked for 1 year and more than that, God's servants have blessed me with power to accomplish my mission and get all the knowledge of art required. . . ."

Fairbanks decorated the "World" room. Lorus Pratt and Dan Weggeland were also involved, the former painting foliage and the latter specializing in animals and acting as foreman.

Other examples of support of individual artists exist. In May, 1901, John Hafen signed a contract with the Church to enable him to study in the East. "He was paid $100 per month for one year and, as security until such time when the artist could return the money advanced, the Church became the owner of all sketches and paintings produced during the year. John Hafen was never able to redeem his pictures."[12] President Heber J. Grant lent J. Leo Fairbanks, who had been living on ten dollars a month, enough money to continue his studies in Paris. Fairbanks later repaid the loan. President Grant also employed Joseph A. F. Everett to instruct his children in watercolor painting. And throughout this century the Church has continued to employ artists to design monumental and portable sculpture, to paint and restore murals in temples, tabernacles, and chapels, to portray church leaders in official portraits, and to illustrate and embellish church publications.

The record is clear: there has been solid and continuing, though somewhat waning, employment of artists by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. We must now ask what has been the nature and quality of this support, what has been the effect of the Church on the climate of art generally, and what attitudes have arisen in Utah artists.

First, it must certainly be said that no critic in command of his senses would today expect a church to be in the vanguard of art patronage. Though traditionally the church and state have been the two great patrons of the arts, we must agree that the enlightened, affluent individual, the corporation or foundation, and the state — either directly through grants or indirectly through tax relief — are the great patrons today.

Churches are by nature conservative, and their interest in art is almost always oriented toward function (how the art will directly serve the liturgy) rather than toward esthetics (how the art will move an individual). We cannot, therefore, too strenuously condemn the Mormon Church for the rather drab uniformity of its current architecture; we *can* regret that the precedents set by such sensitive local tabernacles as that in Coalville and such virile and

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[12] Thomas A. Leek, "A Circumspection of Ten Formulators of Early Utah Art History." Unpublished Master's thesis, Department of Art, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah 1961.

[13] George D. Pyper, "President Grant: Patron of Drama, Literature, Art and Music," *The Improvement Era*, Vol. 39 (Nov. 1936), pp. 671-79.

original structures as the Salt Lake Tabernacle were not continued. We cannot expect the Mormons' rather sparse liturgy to make use of a panoply of wondrous objects; we *can* regret that standard, "mail-order" objects of architectural decoration too often substitute for the skilled creations of a master craftsman in the tradition of the pioneer, Ralph Ramsey. We cannot blame the Church for tacitly permitting its heritage to be tortured by the unfortunate pastiche of the Pioneer Memorial Theatre, or the new Eagle Gate, which straddles a historic intersection like a giant tarantula, mocking the beautifully restored Beehive House and destroying the scale and breathing space it needs; we can hope that all of us who care about what Salt Lake City looks like and who care about the proper and tasteful preservation of great monuments of the past will be alert and energetic enough to influence certain design decisions in the future.

Let us not place the burden of blame on the Church for the fact that Utah has been so often cited for its cultural backwardness. The reasons are many, complex, and self-feeding. As R. Joseph Monsen, Jr., has pointed out, the area's great wealth has traditionally been its mineral wealth:

> The extractive industries, which have been owned largely by non-residents, have made wealthy individuals. But the wealth of these individuals has benefitted other areas than the Great Basin where their wealth was obtained. The Mormon Church, on the other hand, has only in recent decades assumed the posture of wealth. The cultural developments for which Utah is noted, basically in music with her Tabernacle Choir and Utah State Symphony, have both established national reputations with amazingly little private or public financial support. Typically, the Tabernacle Choir has been developed without much financial outlay by the Mormon Church. The very fact that a choir, which gives its time free, is the first cultural institution to achieve national recognition for the area is indicative of the scarcity of financial resources for cultural affairs.[14]

The state's parsimony may be partially explained by its small industrial base and its already high taxes. Yet, a modest increase in the amount now given to the visual arts could be a great stimulus to artists and museums.

The demands of time and tithing placed upon its members by the Church partially explain why giving to the arts is at a relatively low level among individual Mormons. Yet, why do so few non-

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[14] R. Joseph Monsen, Jr., in a talk delivered before the Utah Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters, April 12, 1963. Spirit duplicated ms., p. 1.

Mormons support the arts? Perhaps Dr. Monsen, in the speech quoted from above, has the answer:

> What about the non-Mormon families of wealth? How do we account for the fact that so little philanthropy exists there? Possibly part of this reluctance is due to the feeling of estrangement between the major institution of the area, the Mormon Church, and the wealthier non-Mormons. The "Gentiles," feeling themselves a minority, whether true or not, are reluctant frequently to give if they feel that their Mormon brethren and the Church are giving nothing publicly. Further, wealth even in these families has not had a tradition or the experience of giving or of philanthropy — with a very few notable exceptions.[15]

As Dr. Monsen also observes, "The Great Basin is as dry of good public and private art collections as it is of water."[16] If we had had an important museum of art during our first century, the exposure, the education, the encouragement which such an institution could have offered would have elevated the taste of our citizens, made them demand better architecture for their money, stimulated collecting of significant art, fostered greater respect for the professional artist and engendered much civic pride. Not having had such a museum and not having had great works of art to refresh, excite, challenge and educate us, we have exposed ourselves to the risks of confusing accumulations of curiosities with collections, depositories with museums, cleverness with creativity, quantity with quality, mechanical precision with technique, the gigantic with the truly monumental, the sentimental with the noble, the historical with the esthetic, prettiness with beauty, and subject matter with form.

Throughout Utah's history, as a matter of fact, the appreciation of art has been seriously hurt by inadequate exhibition space. The Utah Writers Project's "Guide to the State" tells us that:

> Painters of this early period were hampered by a lack of organized exhibits and public interest. Paintings were normally shown in jewelers' shops, department stores, and recreation halls, where space was restricted and the lighting poor. About 1869, the Deseret Agricultural and Manufacturing Society, forerunner of the State Fair, was persuaded to exhibit and to award medals for paintings as well as Durham bulls, insuring at least one comprehensive annual show. . . .[17]

The preference shown by the Mormon Church for the performing arts over the visual arts is vividly apparent in the new Harris

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[15] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[17] Utah Writers' Project. *Utah, A Guide to the State* (New York: Hastings House, 1941), pp. 164-165.

JOHN HAFEN: *Pasture*

WILLIAM M. MAJOR: *Brigham Young, Mary Ann Angel Young and Family*

Fine Arts Center at Brigham Young University. Art thrives by its separate dignity, not by being made part of an open lobby. When art is finally liberated from the society and entertainment sections of newspapers, and when it comes off the walls of converted tearooms, top floors, or basements of other structures and is installed in a properly designed, humidity-controlled, air-conditioned, properly lighted modern museum, then shall we have come of age in the arts.

And then, we can hope, the rich collections of Brigham Young University will have the professional attention — documentation, interpretation, exhibition, and conservation — they deserve. It is all very well to say that art should be integrated with life. That it should. But the scholarly responsibilities must be met if the culture is to be more than a superficial or transitory one. The quixotic remark of the contemporary American painter, Ad Reinhardt, "Art is art and everything else is everything else," has much relevance.

Another hinderance to the full development of art in Utah, one which has most likely been influenced by Mormon attitudes, is the denial of the use of the nude model in all but one of the art departments of our institutions of higher learning, although other educational institutions have sporadically employed nude models, for instance, Brigham Young University, for a brief period in the late 1930's. How preposterous such proscription can be is best illustrated by a recent student exhibition of figure drawings, arranged by an art professor in one of Utah's universities. The female model was drawn attired in a sou'wester, long raincoat and rubber boots. The exhibition's wry title was "This is how we learn human anatomy."

It is ironical that such attitudes should persist. All Utah students in Paris art schools drew little except the male and female nude. Their Paris sketches are used today as instructional devices in schools where students have never seen a gluteus maximus in its natural state.

Another difficulty faced by art instructors is the problem of having to tell the student that the official, spectacular art commissioned by the Church, or the architecture it now espouses, are not often of significant quality. The Church has implied they are; therefore, the devout young student believes they are. The Mormon instructor does not like to contradict his Church, yet he must often do so if he is to be true to himself and academically responsible.

ADVANCES IN RELIGIOUS COMMERCIAL ART

In commercial art one can see glimmerings of hope in the employment by the Church of artists of stature and imagination. *The Improvement Era,* tastefully redesigned by Ralph Reynolds, comes

immediately to mind, as do the issues of *The Children's Friend* during the six months that Reynolds and Ed Maryon introduced style and grace to its pages. Distinguished illustrations and layout design by Maryon, V. Douglas Snow, F. Anthony Smith, Pete Lefon, Warren and Phyllis Luch, Gerald Purdy, Martha Estus, Sherman Martin, Ted Nagata, Paul Hasegawa, Keith Montague, Keith Eddington and others are more frequently being used in Church publications. Much remains to be done to elevate the quality of art in some fields of commercial design, especially that of book jackets, but encouraging progress has been made and fewer restrictions seem to be now placed on the artist, with non-Mormon artists frequently hired. I am tempted to hope that such progress augurs well for the abandonment, or at least the mellowing, of Utah's traditional suspicion of the professional. Such distrust has been another great hinderance to the visual arts.

We have never quite understood, even though the Church sent artists to Paris for study, that, as August Heckscher has said:

> Art is a matter for professionals. Its practice requires training, discipline and the most unflagging dedication. Nothing is more appealing in the United States today than the enthusiasm with which do-it-yourself culture is followed by the people. The activities of Sunday painters, amateur actors, weavers, wood-workers, musicians, etc. — all have their value. They are part of the constructive use of leisure . . . . But they do not attain, except in the most exceptional cases, the level of true art. The line between the professional and the amateur, between the artist and the audience, is one that any first-rate culture must maintain.[18]

The Mormon Church — with its emphasis on self-sufficiency, donated services, and on an amateur rather than a paid, professional clergy — has no doubt reinforced the typical pioneer admiration of the man capable of doing any task himself and the pioneer notion of art as a kind of frill, or, at best, a fancy sort of recreation. The difficulty is that "art is not self-evident nor of necessity immediately enjoyable. It requires in the spectator an effort of the spirit and of the mind, sufficient to put himself in harmony with a vision other than his own . . . ."[19] During the hard first decade of the building of Zion, few had time, energy, or the educational resources to make the effort; too few of us even today are willing to try.

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[18] August Heckscher, "The Quality of American Culture." Chapter 5, p. 135, of *Goals for Americans, Comprising the Report of the President's Commission on National Goals and Chapters Submitted for Consideration of the Commission* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960).

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 135.

Dozens of Mormon artists stand ready to use their considerable talent in the service of the Church, though many have been disillusioned by what Dr. Monsen (who among Mormons possesses the greatest private art collections) has called the "generally low esthetic appreciation on the part of the church leaders."[20] In recent years a number of devout Mormons have expressed to me concern that many of their fellow artists will be leaving the Church if such lack of appreciation continues. Others have complained that the demands of the Church for their services in other areas have left them with little time to paint. Another was deeply hurt when church officials scorned his unorthodox, but powerfully conceived, abstract paintings in an exhibition of religious art. One of Utah's most sensitive architects tells of the rejection in thirty seconds by high church officials of designs he had spent months to develop.

In other religions and sects — particularly among the Catholics, the Jews, the Lutherans, and occasionally the Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and Unitarians — we see the acceptance of the best artists, architects, and craftsmen as co-workers in the realm of the spirit.

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints — with its numerous building projects, extensive publication program, and proliferating radio, motion picture and television activities — has a unique opportunity to bring the creative artist and the Church into productive partnership. A simple experiment, administered perhaps by the Department of Art of Brigham Young University, might provide the encouragement and impetus artists are waiting for and would enable church officials to see and evaluate the wealth of talent available to them. With the outlay of modest funds, the Church could sponsor a design competition, open to Mormons and non-Mormons alike, for the design of, say, a chapel, a mural, a sculpture, a fountain, a mosaic, a stained glass window, a series of illustrations of Book of Mormon subjects, a book, a folder, a pamphlet, a magazine cover, a filmstrip, a short motion picture, an exhibition catalog, an exhibition design. The prospectus would detail only the technical limitations and would not delimit style or mode. A jury, composed of nationally recognized professionals, would award monetary prizes in each field; prize winners might be assured of future commissions by the Church. The winners' designs would be on exhibition for an appropriate period of time.

If the Church had had the benefit of viewing the work of some of its more creative members and non-members in this context, the artistic level of the Mormon Pavilion at the New York World's Fair might have been greatly elevated.

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[20] Monsen, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

Such a competition might also bring to light contemporary artists with zeal comparable to that of C. C. A. Christensen, whose solid and sensitive interpretations of church history still stand as the best of Mormon art. Writing in his diary during his student days in Copenhagen over a century ago, he remarked, "I looked forward to the day when I could be released from my apprenticeship and get promoted as a painter, not so much because I wanted material gain but because I wanted the liberty so I could work among my countrymen as a missionary. I knew that in many parts of my native country my people were in perfect ignorance as to the wonderful things the Lord had given to mankind in these latter days."



ALPHABETICAL LIST OF ARTISTS

The following list includes not only the artists cited in the preceding article, but those as well who appeared in the exhibit "100 Years of Utah Painting," compiled by the author.

Willis A. Adams, 1854-1932
George Beard, 1855-1944
Donald Beauregard, 1884-1914
G. Wesley Browning, 1868-1951
Orson D. Campbell, 1876-1933
Michael Riter Cannon, 1913-
Carl C. A. Christensen, 1831-1912
John W. Clawson, 1858-1936
Gordon N. Cope, 1906-
Henry L. A. Culmer, 1854-1914
Cyrus E. Dallin, 1861-1944
George Smith Dibble, 1904-
Elbert H. Eastmond, 1876-1936
Keith Eddington, 1923-
Martha Estus, 1934-
Edwin Evans, 1860-1946
J. A. F. Everett, 1883-1945
Avard Fairbanks, 1897-
John B. Fairbanks, 1855-1940
J. Leo Fairbanks, 1878-1946
Lynn Fausett, 1894-
William Dean Fausett, 1913-
John Fery, 1865-1934
Calvin Fletcher, 1882-1963
Irene T. Fletcher, 1900-
Mabel P. Frazer, 1887-
Herman H. Haag, 1871-1895
John Hafen, 1856-1910
Rose Hartwell,
J. T. Harwood, 1860-1940
Paul Hasegawa, 1927-
Samuel H. Jepperson, 1855-1931
Joseph Kerby, 1857-1911
Ranch S. Kimball, 1894-
Reuben Kirkham, 1866-1886
Pete Lafon, 1929-
Alfred Lambourne, 1850-1926
B. F. Larsen, 1882-
Warren Luch, 1937-
Phyllis Luch, 1935-
William Warner Major, 1804-1854
Sherman Martin, 1928-
Edward Maryon, 1931-
Waldo Midgley, 1888-
Keith Montague, 1921-
Henri Moser, 1876-1951
Ted Nagata, 1935-
George M. Ottinger, 1833-1917
Herman Palmer
William J. Parkinson, 1899-
E. W. Perry, Jr., 1831-1915
Lorus Pratt, 1855-1923
Gerald Purdy, 1930-
Lewis A. Ramsey, 1875-1941
Ralph Ramsey, 1824-1905
H. Reuben Reynolds, 1898-
Ralph Reynolds, 1916-
Lee Greene Richards, 1878-1950
David H. Rosenbaum, Jr., 1908-
Cornelius Salisbury, 1882-
Rosine Howard Salisbury, 1887-
Myra Louise Sawyer, d. 1956
F. Anthony Smith, 1939-
Ruth Wolf Smith, 1912-
S. Paul Smith, 1904-
V. Douglas Snow, 1927-
Nathaniel Spens, 1838-1916
Harry Squires, 1850-1928
Lawrence Squires, 1887-1928
John Heber Stansfield, 1878-1953
LeConte Stewart, 1891-
Mary Teasdel, 1863-1937
Everett Clark Thorpe, 1907-
John Tullidge, 1836-1899
Florence Ware, 1891-
Danquart A. Weggland, 1827-1918
Alma B. Wright, 1875-1952
Mahonri M. Young, 1877-1957
Phineas Howe Young, 1847-1868
Frank Zimbeaux, 1861-1935

THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN MORMON THEORY AND PRACTICE

J. D. Williams

Continuing Dialogue's *"Assessment of Mormon Culture," this article reviews and evaluates the history of the Church's position and practices with regard to politics. J. D. Williams, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hinckley Institute of Politics at the University of Utah, received the B'nai B'rith Human Brotherhood Award in 1963, is a former bishop and is presently a member of a stake high council in Salt Lake City.*

When the Savior said it, it seemed simple enough — to "render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's."[1] But when the demands of Caesar's world encroach on the spiritual sphere, or when the oracles of God feel obliged to intervene in politics, separating church and state becomes a truly troublesome and frustrating task.

Where do loyalty and duty lie, for example, when your Stake President asks you as president of a Mormon Elders' Quorum to have your quorum distribute campaign pamphlets for a one-senator-per-county reapportionment measure — a proposal you strongly disapprove? How should you vote in High Council meeting when the question is raised, "Should petitions for an anti-pornography ordinance be available in the ward chapels for signing on the Sabbath day?" And what should your reaction be when an Apostle of your

Church uses the pulpit at General Conference to charge the President of the United States, whom you worked to elect, with unconstitutional programs which are leading the nation to socialism?

Such are the kinds of personal dilemmas which confront the lay member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, but they pale in comparison alongside those affecting the Church as a whole. 1965-66 was a year of such dilemmas for the Church: Opposing a "miniature-bottle" liquor bill being considered in the State Legislature, the Church found itself in March, 1965, with a civil rights picket line in front of its headquarters demanding the Church speak out for a fair housing bill before the same Legislature; and while the First Presidency was publicly petitioning Mormon Congressmen during June, 1965, to protect "right-to-work" laws, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People was resolving to petition countries in the U. N. to deny visas to Mormon missionaries because of the Church's Negro doctrines.

In the cacaphony of these voices, one thing was certainly clear: That the Mormon Church, in trying to administer the Kingdom of God on Earth, was deeply immersed in the politics of the kingdom of men on Earth.

Viewed against the activities of other churches, these Mormon forays into the arroyos of politics seem but part of an American pattern. The National Council of Churches endorses school integration, the Salt Lake Ministerial Association declares war on Sunday operation of grocery stores, Episcopal Bishop James Pike raises questions about a Catholic President, and Archbishop Rummel of New Orleans bluntly tells Catholic legislators in Baton Rouge to vote against a bill threatening their racially-integrated parochial schools.

All of which leads one, in this day and age, to wonder what kind of a wall Thomas Jefferson had in mind when he wrote to the Danbury Baptist Association in 1802. The First Amendment in the Bill of Rights, he told them, had created "a wall of separation between church and state."[2] But the question arises: A wall that restricts only what government may do to churches? Or a wall that restrains in both directions, restricting governmental encroachments on religion and also limiting what churches may do in politics?

Our law books are filled with cases protecting churches from governmental interference. But the "other side of the wall" presents a different picture. Writers from de Tocqueville to Paul Blanshard have raised questions about the propriety of church involvement in

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[1] New Testament, Matthew, 22:21.

[2] Letter of January 1, 1802. *Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (New York, 1853), vol. 8, p. 113.

politics; but this author knows of only two actual restrictions on church political activity in modern American history. The first was Utah's constitutional prohibition (Art. I, Section 4) — "There shall be no union of church and state, nor shall any church dominate the state or interfere with its functions." The second was an ominous warning from the Salt Lake City office of the U. S. Internal Revenue Service in the midst of a 1954 reapportionment contest in which some Church leaders were heavily involved, a warning which said that "Tax-exempt organizations cannot participate in political campaigns without losing their tax status."[3]

To this day, the perplexing question remains, how far may a church and its leaders invade the political arena without seriously breaching the separation of church and state? With that question in mind, we shall focus here on four aspects of the problem within the framework of Mormon experience: (a) The major constructs of Mormonism which bear on politics, (b) the struggle-for-statehood period which shaped latter-day political thinking and practice, (c) the forms of L.D.S. Church involvement in politics, and (d) the issues and dilemmas which are posed by such involvement.

Four aspects of Mormonism seem particularly significant in understanding the Church's stance in regard to the political world. The first of these is the key theological concept of *continuing, modern-day revelation.* The accepted notion is that Church leaders enjoy inspiration from God in the conduct of their religious affairs. The political significance of the doctrine lies in the belief of many Mormons that divine inspiration may be transferable when Church leaders speak out on secular (including political) affairs.

The second construct consists of the *strong, hierarchical lines* from general church authorities through regional leaders (stake presidents) down to neighborhood officers of the Church (the ward bishops). The hierarchical system provides a network which can be used to communicate policy statements and decisions of any sort (including political) with almost no questioning in the ranks.

Third is the *superb organization* of the Church at the neighborhood level. Organized down to family units, with a visiting system that reaches every L.D.S. home at least monthly, a Mormon ward is ready for united action on very short notice. As a case in point, one bishop a few years ago was able to get over a hundred of his parishioners to the State Capitol in Salt Lake City on two hours' notice to protest the opening of a liquor store in their neighborhood.

Fourth and most complicated is the *ambivalence in Mormon*

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[3] *Deseret News* (Salt Lake City), October 22, 1954.

theory and practice which permits the contemporary Church to find precedents either for involvement or against involvement in politics. Note on the one hand theocratic elements (which support church political activity): The Book of Mormon is filled with chronicles of men who were both high priest and king (or chief judge). The first Church president, Joseph Smith, held three sceptres: Head of the Church, Mayor of Nauvoo, and General of the Nauvoo Legion. In Utah's pioneer period, Brigham Young was President of the Church and Territorial Governor from 1850-58. And like most Christians, Mormons anticipate the establishment of a religious monarchy upon the second coming of Jesus Christ: "And the government shall be upon His shoulders; and His name shall be called Wonderful, Counselor, the mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace."[4]

Pitted against that theocratic tradition is another one in Mormonism which supports separation of church and state, not government by church leaders. Note, for example, the powerful defense of government by majority rule in the Book of Mormon.[5] Beyond that is the strong L. D. S. commitment to the U. S. Constitution (with its First Amendment separation of church and state) as a divinely-inspired document.[6]

Most impressive of all is the open and announced dedication of the Church to separation of church and state in the 134th section of the Doctrine and Covenants. Written by early Church leader Oliver Cowdery and officially ratified as doctrine by a general conference of the Church on August 17, 1835, the 134th section recognizes the necessity of government in the lives of men, holds that government must respect the free exercise of conscience, and then marks out the respective domains of church and state:

> v. 4. We believe that religion is instituted of God; and that men are amenable to Him, and to Him only, for the exercise of it, unless their religious opinions prompt them to infringe upon the rights and liberties of others; but we do not believe that human law has a right to interfere in prescribing rules of worship to bind the consciences of men, nor dictate forms for public or private devotion; that the civil magistrate should restrain crime, but never control conscience; should punish guilt, but never suppress the freedom of the soul.

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[4] Isaiah 9:6.

[5] Book of Mormon, Mosiah 29:25-32. Some may say that majority rule would not necessarily preclude either an established church or the election of church officials to public office. But recognition of that fact must not obscure the critical difference between majoritarian democracy and theocracy: In the former, government rests on the consent of the governed; in theocracy, *imperium in imperio ex cathedra.*

[6] Doctrine and Covenants, 98:5-7, 101:80.

v. 5. We believe that all men are bound to sustain and uphold the the respective governments in which they reside, while protected in their inherent and inalienable rights by the laws of such governments; and that sedition and rebellion are unbecoming every citizen thus protected, and should be punished accordingly; *and that all governments have a right to enact such laws as in their own judgments are best calculated to secure the public interest;*[7] at the same time, however, holding sacred the freedom of conscience.

v. 9. We do not believe it just to mingle religious influence with civil government, whereby one religious society is fostered and another proscribed in its spiritual privileges, and the individual rights of its members, as citizens, denied.

Despite the apparent clarity of that doctrine, the ambivalence in Church practice remains.[8] The hostility of governments to the Church and the indifference of governments to mob action against the Church in early days in Missouri and Illinois propelled the Church into politics for self-protection. And today, with the normal power imperatives of any large organization with much at stake, the L.D.S. Church remains in politics.

In understanding why the Church is as involved politically as it is, one must turn to the long struggle for Utah statehood, 1850-1896, to see the formative influences as they began to take shape after the migration to Utah in 1847.

POLITICAL GESTATION, 1850-1896

Three years after an ailing Brigham Young had looked down on the valley of the Great Salt Lake and proclaimed, "This is the Place," the Mormons of Deseret had achieved territorial status under the laws of Congress. Six attempts and forty-six years later, their children and grandchildren finally achieved statehood.

Between 1850 and 1896 lay a wasteland of fear, ill-will, and conflict between "the Saints" and the federal government. On that wasteland was fought the abortive Utah War of 1857-1858, which led to the occupation of Deseret by a federal army under an officer who was later to become famous in the Civil War, General Albert Sydney Johnston. And from that wasteland were to grow the weeds of distrust that would delay statehood for almost five decades.

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[7] (Italics added.) In the author's judgment, this key phrase of verse 5 precludes church dictation or directives to public office holders. But the language would not seem to prohibit the expression of church views on public questions in the manner of any other interest group in a free society.

[8] Brigham Young could say in 1844 in the face of the 134th Section, "No man can draw the dividing line between the government of God and the government of the children of men." Joseph Smith, *History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints* (hereinafter cited as *Documentary History*) (Salt Lake City: Deseret News, 1950), vol. 6, p. 322.

Three things in particular contributed to Congressional hostility toward the Mormons: polygamy, theocracy (no separation of church and state), and the absence of a normal-looking, major two-party system.[9] Congressional reaction to polygamy was especially stern and undoubtedly served as one of the most lasting influences in shaping the defensive attitude of Mormons against government.

Congress Outlaws Polygamy

The first of three anti-polygamy statutes was the Merrill Act of 1862. A straight penal law, it forbade the practice of plural marriage in the territories.[10] Conviction of a group of Mormons, and the constitutionality of the Act itself, were sustained in Reynolds v. U. S., 1878.[11]

A tougher statute followed in 1882, the Edmunds Act.[12] Not only imposing five-year imprisonments on convicted polygamists, the new law deprived them thereafter of the right to vote and hold office. The Utah Commission appointed by President Chester A. Arthur to enforce the law's electoral provisions imposed a test oath on potential voters (to the effect that they did not practice polygamy) and made the oath retroactive.[13]

Still seeking the extirpation of plural marriage, Congress moved its attack in 1887 from the *practice* to the *organization* behind the practice, the L.D.S. Church itself. The Edmunds-Tucker Act of that year[14] disincorporated the Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints as a legal entitity chartered under territorial law and escheated all its properties to the federal government which were not used for worship or cemeteries. The act abolished the Perpetual Emigrating Fund Company, which had subsidized the immigration of Mormon converts from Europe. The statute then annulled Utah's woman suffrage laws, abolished the existing apportionment of the Territorial Legislature and

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[9] Other variants of these which concerned the Congress were a Church-dominated school system and the absence of the secret ballot in elections.

[10] 12 Stat. 501, July 1, 1862. It is interesting to note that the Act forbade cohabitation among the married but not among the unmarried. Mining camps like Park City and Alta were to have plenty of the unprohibited kind! See Orma Linford, "The Mormons and the Law," *Utah Law Review,* Winter, 1964, v. 9:308-371, and Summer, 1965 v. 9:543-592.

[11] 98 U. S. 145 (1878). Note that this decision preceded by twelve years the 1890 Manifesto of Church President Wilford Woodruff abandoning polygamy.

[12] 22 Stat. 30, March 22, 1882.

[13] A procedure which a modern-day Supreme Court might possibly find unconstitutional (see *U. S.* v. *Brown,* 381 US 237, 456-8, 1965)."

[14] 24 Stat. 635, March 3, 1887. The words of the First Amendment in the Bill of Rights should be borne in mind as one reads the provisions of this law: "Congress shall make *no* law respecting an establishment of religion or abridging the free exercise thereof."

(shades of Earl Warren) ordered equal representation in both chambers. The law retained the test oath for voting and the criminal penalties of the two earlier statutes.[15]

With its leaders facing imprisonment (some of whom were in hiding on "the Underground") and the Church facing bankruptcy, Church President Wilford Woodruff announced the end of plural marriages on September 29, 1890.[16]

> It is not wisdom for us to go forth and carry out this principle (polygamy) against the laws of the nation. . . . The Lord has given us commandments concerning many things and we have carried them out as far as we could; but when we cannot do it, we are justified. . . .[17]

To a substantial degree, the Manifesto and the L.D.S. leaders' plea for amnesty removed the obstacle of polygamy to statehood (although plural marriage — or the spectre of it — later resulted in the unseating of one Utah Congressman, Brigham H. Roberts, and the near expulsion of a U. S. Senator, Reed Smoot).

But the Congress still needed convincing that another face of Mormonism, Brigham Young's theocracy, had also had a face-lifting before "those Mormons" could be admitted to the Union.

THEOCRACY AND THE PARTY SYSTEM[18]

Statehood for Utah was delayed because Congress was convinced that the Mormons had too many wives and too few political parties.

Prior to 1870, the parties were few enough, all right — just one. Called the "People's Party," it was the political vehicle of the Mormon leaders for such tasks as electing the territorial legislature and Utah's Delegate to Congress. But this one-party system came under challenge in 1869, when a group of Brigham Young's critics (headed by William Godbe) were excommunicated from the Church and moved almost at once to set up a party of their own.

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[15] Edmunds-Tucker, undoubtedly the closest law in our history to disestablishing a church, was upheld by the Supreme Court in the *Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ v. U. S.*, 136 U. S. 1, 1890. The Court held that the plenary powers of Congress to regulate the territories were ample enough to prohibit all means of carrying on the practice of polygamy. Even the "Establishment Clause" would not prevent the disestablishment of the corporate arm of the Church (because the Church could carry on its legitimate religious activities without corporate status). That same year, the Court upheld an Idaho statute which denied the vote to members of any church which espoused polygamy. *Davis v. Beason*, 133 U. S. 333, 1890.

[16] The "Manifesto" was voted upon and accepted by the General Conference of the Church in October, 1890. It is to be found at the end of the Doctrine and Covenants.

[17] General Conference remarks, as quoted in Joseph Fielding Smith, *Essentials in Church History* (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book Co., 1961), pp. 608-9.

[18] We are indebted to the able master's thesis of R. J. Snow, *The American Party in Utah* (University of Utah, 1964) for the historical tracing of the party struggle in Utah prior to statehood.

But the Godbeites were not dealing with political novices. In calling their mass meeting of independents to order in February, 1870, they found the hall filled with infiltrators from the People's Party who proceeded to install their own chairman and nominate a slate of pro-Church candidates.

Later that year, the independents succeeded in forming the Liberal Party, spokesman for the Gentile (non-Mormon) segment of the population in Utah. With the *Salt Lake Tribune* (founded in 1869) as the Liberal trumpet and the *Deseret News* speaking for the People's Party, the two parties went forth into a quarter-century battle of the worst kind — political warfare fought on religious lines.

The absence of the Democratic and Republican parties on the Utah scene puzzled many in the Congress. The presence instead of a "Church Party" could be taken as proof that church and state had not yet been separated. And there was not much Congressional stomach for admitting a polygamous theocracy to the Union.

Sensing that the atypical nature of their party system was an obstacle to statehood, some Utahns began to take steps in the 1880's toward the establishment of Democratic and Republican Clubs. By April of 1890, a nucleus of the Democratic Party had been formed and, a year later, the Central Republican Club was in being.

Then came the dramatic, now humorous, sequence of events in which theocracy served as midwife for the birth of democracy in Utah. Sometime in 1891 (a day uncertain) at a meeting of the leaders of the People's Party (the Church party), the First Counselor in the Church Presidency, George Q. Cannon, made an appearance. President Cannon informed the party officials that the First Presidency of the Church wanted the existing parties scrapped and the national parties instituted in their place. He then warned that the old religious warfare would be perpetuated under new labels if all the People's Party became Democrats and the Liberals became Republicans.[19]

So the word went forth from that meeting that Mormons should join both national parties. And as the word moved down the hierarchy, some imaginative bishops at the ward level gave "practical translation" to the advice: They stood at the head of the chapel aisle and indicated that the Saints on one side (dare we say "right"?) should become Republicans and those on the other (left?) should become Democrats.[20]

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[19] Gordon B. Hinckley, *James Henry Moyle* (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book Co., 1951), pp. 213-14.

[20] Mr. Joseph Nelson, later head of the Saltair Corporation, was present when his ward was divided politically in this fashion (as personally related years ago to Wallace F. Bennett, later U. S. Senator, and then related to this author).

The People's Party disbanded in 1891 as President Cannon had requested and the Liberal Party followed suit in December, 1893. Ecclesiastical edict had produced a two-party system which Congress could understand.

Statehood

Congress passed the Enabling Act in 1894, which permitted the writing of a draft constitution. Remnants of the old Liberal Party opposed statehood, lest a fully-empowered state legislature under the 10th Amendment of the Federal Constitution lift the ban on polygamy. But the proposed Constitution specifically prohibited polygamy (Article III). And as a further persuader to Congress, the document also contained the prohibition (noted above) in Article I, Section 4, against any union of church and state.

In a popular referendum, the Constitution was approved 31,305 to 7,687 opposed. On the proclamation of President Grover Cleveland, Utah entered the Union on January 4, 1896.

It had been a long struggle — a federal occupation, crushing statutes, imprisonment of Church leaders, alteration of a Church doctrine and marital pattern, and the reformation of a party system. Strains and memories cast up during this gestation period were to shape for years to come the Mormon attitude toward, and posture in, politics.

FORMS OF MORMON INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS[21]

Setting the Metes and Bounds of the Political Arena in Mormonism

Whenever one church claims the membership (in fact or nominally) of 72% of the people of a state, as the Mormon Church does in Utah, its doctrines and practices are certain to have a pervasive influence on the folkways of the state. In so doing, even if it never took a stand on a political question, the Mormon Church would still significantly influence the metes and bounds of the political struggle in Utah.

Sale of liquor by the drink, taxation of church welfare properties (farms, clothing mills, etc.), pari-mutuel betting and legalized gambling are all probably among the political questions which lie "beyond the pale" in Utah because of the folkways of its predominant Mormon population.

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[21] A caveat is in order: The phrase "*Church* involvement in politics" is often a generic slur describing what is really only individual conduct. Both author and reader would do well to keep the distinction in mind.

Church Leaders as Candidates and Public Officeholders

A far more visible hand in politics than setting the metes and bounds is apparent when Church leaders become candidates for election to office or accept high-level appointive positions in government.

The practice of Church leaders' standing as candidates for political office had a dramatic beginning in 1844. The Mormons had been embittered against the Democratic Party ever since President Martin Van Buren's statement that "Your cause is just, but I can do nothing for you" (during the Missouri travail of the Church). Van Buren's successors, William Henry Harrison and John Tyler, had not secured them relief, either.

As the 1844 elections neared, the L.D.S. authorities queried the announced candidates for the Presidency as to their views on the "Mormon question."[22] Highly dissatisfied with the responses, the Quorum of Twelve Apostles nominated Joseph Smith as candidate for the Presidency of the United States on January 29, 1844.

Smith told them that every speaker in Nauvoo would have to campaign throughout the land, advocating "the 'Mormon' religion, purity of elections and call upon the people to stand by the law and put down mobocracy."[23] Having published his views on the issues of the day,[24] Smith then explained why he had become a candidate: The Saints had been deprived of their rights in state after state; Presidents and Governors had turned deaf ears on their pleas. "In view of these things, I feel it to be my right and privilege to obtain what influence and power I can, lawfully, in the United States, for the protection of injured innocence. . . ."[25]

But Smith's martyrdom on June 27, 1844, ended his hopes of using a Presidential campaign as a kind of national "soap box" to dramatize Mormon woes. Nevertheless, the precedent had been set of Church leaders running for political office.

The Moses Thatcher Candidacy, 1895

At the time when Church leaders were trying to "force feed" the Republican Party,[26] three General Authorities ignored orders and campaigned strenuously for the Democratic ticket in 1892 — Elders Moses Thatcher (an Apostle), Brigham H. Roberts, and

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[22] *Documentary History,* vol. 6, pp. 64-65, 187-88.

[23] *Ibid.,* p. 188.

[24] *Ibid.,* pp. 197-209.

[25] *Ibid.,* pp. 210-11 (February 8, 1844).

[26] But see Wilford Woodruff's and Joseph F. Smith's published denial, *Deseret News,* March 17, 1892.

Charles W. Penrose. The sanction of excluding them from the long-awaited dedication of the Salt Lake Temple brought them to "repentance" and back into good graces once again.

But not for long. Elders Thatcher and Roberts ran as Democrats in 1895 for the forthcoming U. S. Senate and House seats, respectively, anticipating Utah's entry into the Union. They lost the election and were again rebuked by Church leaders. A "Political Manifesto" was drafted which attested that the Church had not been involved in politics and required henceforth that all high officeholders in the Church should obtain prior clearance from their ecclesiastical superiors before ever running for political office.[27] For his refusal to sign, Elder Thatcher was dropped from the Quorum of the Twelve for insubordination and apostasy — a classic case in the use of church discipline against an Apostle who violated the established rules.[28]

Frank Cannon and the "will of the Lord"

It was a time of trouble for Republican as well as Democratic candidates as Utah entered the Union. Republican Frank Cannon, son of George Q. Cannon of the First Presidency, had been Utah's Territorial Delegate in Congress, and became in 1896 one of the state's first two Senators. Almost immediately, he bolted the Republican Party in the 1896 election for their national platform's rejection of bimetallism. Having supported the local Democratic ticket both in 1896 and 1898, he hoped the Democratic Legislature would re-elect him as U. S. Senator early in 1899.

Finding himself opposed by another Democrat, whose candidacy was championed by an Apostle, Heber J. Grant, Senator Cannon rented the Salt Lake Theater and delivered a tirade against church interference in politics. The Senator was then called to Church President Lorenzo Snow's home. The Prophet told the Senator that it was the "will of the Lord" that he should step aside gracefully to permit his father, George Q. Cannon, President Snow's first counselor, *and a Republican,* to be elected to Cannon's seat.[29] The Senator refused to follow the dictate; the Democratic Legislature refused to

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[27] Thus the origin of the practice still observed by some Mormon candidates of "clearing with 47 East South Temple" before filing for public office.

[28] The L.D.S. First Presidency published a "white paper" at the time of Thatcher's dismissal. *The Thatcher Episode* (Salt Lake City; Deseret News Publishing Co., 1896), 47 pp. See also Stanley S. Ivins, *The Moses Thatcher Case* (Salt Lake City: Modern Microfilm, 1963?), 11 pp.

[29] Frank J. Cannon, *Under the Prophet in Utah* (Boston: C. M. Clark Co., 1911), pp. 230-31.

elect father or son; and Utah suffered the ignominy of being represented by only one Senator from 1899 to 1901.

Other Candidacies

Back in good graces once again, Brigham H. Roberts ran for Congress in 1898 and won. But the House of Representatives refused to seat this admitted polygamist, further deepening the state's embarrassment.

The turn of the century brought the return of Apostles to the hustings. Elder Reed Smoot, complying with the 1896 Manifesto, asked and was refused permission to stand for the Senate in 1901. But he received Church permission two years later and was elected by the legislature.

For four years, however, from 1903 to 1907, his right to retain his Senate seat was challenged during the long "Reed Smoot trial" before a Senate Committee. All the old charges came back to haunt him and his Church: church domination of politics (for here was an Apostle elected to the Senate) and polygamy (which Elder Smoot did not practice). But he was cleared of the charges and went on to become the most powerful Senator ever to represent Utah in Washington (serving from 1903 to 1933).

At lower levels of government, the election lists in Utah are replete with stake presidents who serve in the state legislature and on school boards.

On the appointive side, individual involvement of L.D.S. leaders is extensive: On boards of trustees of state institutions of higher learning (Elder Richard Evans, Alma Sonne, et al.), little Hoover Commissions (President Thorpe B. Isaacson), and the Legislative Reorganization Commission (President Nathan Eldon Tanner), among many others; and at the national level, one General Authority, Elder Ezra Taft Benson, has held a Cabinet post (Agriculture Secretary in the Eisenhower Administration, 1953-60).

Endorsement of Candidates

Nowhere does Mormon ambivalence in politics show through more than in a third area of "Church" involvement, the endorsement of political candidates.

The ambivalence began with Joseph Smith himself. In August, 1843, he bluntly told his parishioners:

> I am not come to tell you to vote this way, that way, or the other. In relation to national matters I want it to go abroad unto the whole

> world that every man should stand on his own merits. *The Lord has not given me a revelation concerning politics* — I have not asked Him for one. . . .[31]

But a paragraph later, Joseph intimated that his brother, Hyrum, had had a political revelation ("for the people to vote for Hoge"), "and I never knew Hyrum to say he ever had a revelation and it failed. Let God speak and all men hold their peace."[31]

A month afterward, Joseph endorsed a *Times and Seasons* (Church newspaper in Nauvoo) editorial that advocated a "reward your friends and punish your enemies" stance for the Church in national elections: " . . . that we may fix upon the man who will be the most likely to render us assistance in obtaining redress for our grievances; and not only give our own votes, but use our influence to obtain others. . . ."[32]

Thus the pattern was set at an early date for the Church to take cognizance of candidates. But Nauvoo "cognizance" was barely a hint of Brigham Young's practices in the theocracy of Deseret. Consider for a moment this scene in a Church conference on Sunday, June 19, 1853, President Brigham Young presiding:

> It came into my mind when Brother Bernhisel was speaking, and the same thing strikes me now, that is, inasmuch as he has done first-rate, as our delegate in Washington, to move that we send him again next session; though it is the Sabbath Day, I understand these things and say as other people say, "We are Mormons." We do things that are necessary to be done when the time comes for us to do them. If we wish to make political speeches, and it is necessary, for the best interest of the cause and the Kingdom of God, to make them on the Sabbath, we do it. Now suffer not your prejudices to hurt you, do not suffer this to try you, nor be tempted in consequence of it, nor think we are wandering out of the way, for it is all embraced in our religion from first to last.
>
> Brother Kimball has seconded the motion that Dr. Bernhisel be sent back to Washington as our Delegate. All who are in favor of it, raise your right hand. (More than 2000 hands were at once seen above the heads of the congregation.)
>
> This has turned out into a caucus meeting. It is all right. I would call for an opposite vote if I thought any person would vote. I will try it however. (Not a single hand was raised in opposition.)[33]

Territorial records reveal no other public election for Delegate being held that year.

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[30] *Documentary History*, vol. 5, p. 526. (Italics added.)
[31] *Ibid.*
[32] *Ibid.*, vol. 6, p. 40.
[33] Brigham Young, *Journal of Discourses* (Liverpool: F. D. Richards, 1854), vol. 1, p. 188.

In later years, endorsement took somewhat less blatant form than *in cathedra* elections without opposition candidates. In 1912, for example, President Joseph F. Smith utilized the pages of the *Improvement Era* to eulogize William Howard Taft and urge his re-election: "Should the people call him once again to the presidential chair, it is not likely that they will regret it, but, on the contrary, will find their action wise, sensible, and sound."[34] In that election, an old motto was revised to read, "As Utah goes, so goes Vermont" — the only two states carried by Taft.

More subterranean, and less official, were the endorsement tactics used in the heated Thomas-Bennett election for the U. S. Senate during 1950. A "watch-and-ward society" called the Law Observance and Enforcement Committee had become appended to the Church hierarchy prior to this time. Its primary job was to report to the First Presidency on violations of liquor, tobacco and prostitution laws in Salt Lake County. But in 1950 this committee extended itself in publishing a list of candidates who would support Church standards. Attached to a mimeographed talk which was to be read in the monthly Fast and Testimony Meeting, the list began with the candidates for Senator and Congressman and ran on through thirty-two local offices. Seventeen of the thirty-four Democrats had been crossed out; two of the thirty-four Republicans.[35]

Like Moses Thatcher of old, Mormon Democrats felt their Church had betrayed them. In the ensuing crossfire, the First Presidency issued a disclaimer through the Salt Lake press declaring that they had neither approved a list of acceptable candidates nor directed the circulation of such a list. But the list, and other gratuitous insults against Thomas, had their effect. He was defeated in November by the prominent Utah businessman-Churchman, Wallace F. Bennett.

The 1950 imbroglio led to a more cautious Church posture in the 1952 Presidential election. In closing the October Conference, President David O. McKay proclaimed the neutrality of the Church in the election. He denied rumors that the General Authorities had met and agreed on supporting one party. "The President is the President of the Church, not favoring in this election either political party." Noting membership in the Church of both Democrats and Republicans, President McKay indicated that "Both parties will be treated impartially by the Church."[36]

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[34] *Improvement Era,* vol. 15, pp. 1120-21.

[35] See Frank Jonas, "The Mormon Church and Political Dynamiting in the 1950 Election in Utah," *Proceedings of the Utah Academy of Sciences, Arts and Letters* (1963), vol. 40, pp. 94-110.

[36] *Salt Lake Tribune,* October 6, 1962, p. 1. But rents appeared in this veil of neutrality

But 1952 produced an Eisenhower and an Eisenhower elevated Elder Ezra Taft Benson to Cabinet status, a position that would transform the Apostle into an active Republican partisan for eight years. Everyone understood that the Secretary of Agriculture had to campaign for Republican Congressmen and Senators. But many Mormons were mystified by Elder Benson's use of the pulpit to help carry out that role.

In his October 3 address to the 1954 semi-annual Church Conference, for example, Elder Benson laid down four tests by which Mormon voters could judge political candidates and issues:

(1) Is the proposal (or candidate) right as measured by the Gospel?
(2) Is it constitutional?
(3) Does it have the approval of "the living oracles of God"?
(4) How will it affect the morale and character of the people?[37]

Having urged his Sunday audience (under the third test) to listen to the "counsel of the living oracles of God," Apostle Benson would then take to the political stump to lay down sound Republican doctrine.

In the late fifties, perhaps as a counterbalance to Elder Benson's Republican barnstorming, Elder Hugh B. Brown of the Quorum of the Twelve was given permission by President McKay to make a Democratic state convention appearance and some radio spots in behalf of Democratic candidate for Congress, David King.

At lower levels of the Church, the practice of endorsing political candidates also occasionally appears. The author has been present in a ward priesthood meeting, for example, where an effort was made to concentrate the Mormon vote on one of two Mormons running for the school board in that area. Another form of endorsement, equally rare, is a letter from a stake presidency to bishops within their stake identifying a school board candidate, for example, as a devoted Mormon committed to the protection of released time seminary programs.[38]

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in 1960 and 1964, when President McKay openly wished Richard Nixon and Barry Goldwater, respectively, success in their campaigns. After the 1960 comment, President McKay said that "he was speaking as a Republican." (*Deseret News*, October 11, 1960.) The 1964 episode closed with a formal statement from the First Presidency for Mormons to support conscientious men "who are aware of the great dangers inherent in Communism and who are truly dedicated to the Constitution in the tradition of our Founding Fathers." (*Deseret News*, November 2, 1964.)

[37] *Salt Lake Tribune*, October 4, 1954, p. 1.

[38] Letter from the Granite Stake Presidency endorsing the candidacy of Neil Kooyman for the school board, October 29, 1960 (author's files).

Advising the Electorate on Issues of Public Policy

The records of the Church and its newspaper, the *Deseret News,* are filled with examples of advice to the electorate on matters of public policy:

Against the repeal of prohibition, 1933[39]
Against communism, 1936 (reiterated many times since)
Against a peacetime draft, 1946
Against tactics of the John Birch Society, 1963
For civil rights for all people, 1963
Against the repeal of "right-to-work" laws, 1965
For tight controls on pornography, 1966
Against political extremists, 1966[40]

While the pulpit is occasionally used by Church speakers for the discussion of political issues, one surmises that it is less frequently done in Mormon meetings than in gatherings of the Unitarian Society, for example. Probably the rarity of it is the thing which catches Mormons by surprise when an occasional Church speaker uses the pulpit to expound on topics like the United Nations, reapportionment of the state legislature, or the threat of socialism in the United States.[41]

On occasion, more covert actions to influence the electorate are tried than front-page editorials and sermons from the pulpit. One thinks particularly of the efforts made by key Church people in 1954 to secure a favorable referendum vote on a one-senator-per-county reapportionment amendment.

To secure that vote in populous Salt Lake County (which would thereby cost the county six out of its seven state senators), a political committee of the Apostles was formed under the co-chairmanship of Elders Henry D. Moyle and Harold B. Lee. They authorized Stake President Junius Jackson to form the Salt Lake Valley Stake Presidents Committee as the campaign vehicle. Under the aegis of that

[39] But largely ignored by Utah voters, for Utah was the required 36th state to ratify the 21st Amendment.

[40] In the six weeks preceding the April Conference, 1966, there were abortive efforts by the John Birch Society to obtain an implied endorsement from the Church of their activities. The *Church News* responded on March 26, 1966, with a blunt editorial on "Politics and Religion," which said in part: "We have been taught to avoid extremes and extremists, whether in the Word of Wisdom, in politics or in any other area of thought. The Lord's work is not accomplished by immoderate measures and radical groups. . . .

"The Lord justifies us in defending our Constitution and this land for which it was written. But He does not justify radicalism in doing so. . . .

"The Church has nothing to do with Communists, nothing to do with racists, nothing to do with Birchers, nothing to do with any slanted group. But it does have everything to do with the eternal salvation of human souls."

[41] As a case in point, see the address of Elder Marion G. Romney to the Priesthood session of the April General Conference, 1966, on the problem of socialism.

committee, pro-reapportionment pamphlets were prepared and then distributed by Deseret Industry trucks, ward teachers, Beehive girls — by anyone who carried the "Church stamp" so as to convey the impression of Church endorsement of the proposal.[42]

But in the end, the ground was cut from beneath the entire effort by the release of a letter to the press which the First Presidency had written to Professor Frank Jonas, plainly saying that "the Church takes no position with reference to it. . . . No one is authorized to align us with either side of the controversy."[43] The effort to use Church channels for political campaigning was thereby successfully interdicted and the proposed constitutional amendment went down to defeat on election day.

Church Influence on Public Policy-Makers

Although the 134th Section of the Doctrine and Covenants recognizes that "governments have a right to enact such laws as in their own judgments are best calculated to secure the public interest," Church leaders have not hesitated to advise governments on their view of where the public interest might lie. And in the case of the Grand Council of the Kingdom, the Church obviously contemplated far more than "giving advice."[44] Believed to have been organized in March, 1844, the Grand Council (or "Council of Fifty") was to be the government of the Kingdom of God (which Kingdom was not the Church but the ultimate governing body *for all mankind*). The Council was composed of two non-Mormons and forty-eight to fifty Mormon high priests. As Brigham Young described it:

> The Kingdom of God will protect every person, every sect, and all people upon the face of the whole Earch in their legal rights; I shall not tell you the names of the members of this kingdom; neither shall I read to you its constitution, but the constitution was given by revelation. The day will come when it will be organized in strength and power.[45]

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[42] See Kenneth H. Mitchell, "The Struggle for Reapportionment in Utah" (unpublished master's thesis, University of Utah, 1960), pp. 113-117.

[43] *Salt Lake Tribune,* November 2, 1954.

[44] A member of the Council, John D. Lee, said that its full name was the "Municipal Department of the Kingdom of God set up on Earth and from which All Emanates, for the Rule, Government and Control of all Nations. . . ." Juanita Brooks and R. C. Cleland, eds., *A Mormon Chronicle: The Diaries of John D. Lee* (San Marino: Huntington Library, 1955), v. 1:80. Perhaps the best sources on the Grand Council are Klaus J. Hansen, *Millennial Empire: The Political Kingdom of God and the Council of Fifty in Mormon History,* scheduled for 1966 publication in book form from Michigan State University Press; and James R. Clark, "The Kingom of God, the Council of Fifty, and the State of Deseret," *Utah Historical Quarterly* (1958), vol. 26, pp. 131-148.

[45] *Journal of Discourses,* vol. 17, p. 156, as quoted in Hyrum L. Andrus, *Joseph Smith and World Government* (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book Co., 1958), p. 5.

The picture is one of a secret government, responsible not to the governed but to ecclesiastical authority, which will provide benign rule for all people, without election.[46]

One of the chief assignments of the Grand Council in the Nauvoo period apparently was handling preparations for the westward expansion of Mormonism.[47] And the Council did come west with the pioneers, as indicated by minutes of its meetings as late as 1880 which are still extant.[48] While the laity have no sure knowledge of its demise, one presumes that the Council, like polygamy, was abandoned about the time of statehood as the full machinery of civil government replaced the vestiges of theocracy.

But the practice of Church officials' making suggestions to public administrators and law makers has never died. As a case in point, one thinks of the Law Observance and Enforcement Committee during the 1940's when it reported to Second Counselor David O. McKay. Word from the Committee about a grocery store's selling cigarettes or beer to minors would lead to a "high level" call to Public Safety Commissioner Ben Lingenfelter, and the police would then check out the offending grocer.

Up until recent times, there were close ties between Church headquarters and city and county planning and zoning officers to assure the reservation of lots for new ward houses as subdivision plats were filed. But the responsibility has now shifted to the ward bishops to negotiate with subdividers.

In the legislative area, relations between Church officials and lawmakers are still very direct. Some are out-in-the-open for the public to see; others are behind the scenes. Communiques to members of Congress are periodically sent by the First Presidency. Two famous ones were the 1946 admonition to the Utah Congressional delegation to oppose a peacetime draft[49] and the 1965 letter to all Mormons in Congress to resist the repeal of "right-to-work" laws.[50]

Another technique at the state level is to call Mormons in the Legislature into Church headquarters during the biennial session

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[46] A reader of this manuscript observes: "The secrecy of the Council was not of its essence; only the hostility of public opinion kept the Council underground."

[47] *Documentary History,* vol. 7, pp. 213, 379.

[48] Andrus, *op. cit.,* p. 2, n. 4.

[49] Reprinted in the *Deseret News,* January 3, 1946.

[50] *Deseret News,* June 25, 1965. Five of the Congressmen and Senators replied sternly, "While we respect and revere the offices held by the members of the First Presidency of the Church, we cannot yield to others our responsibilities to our constituency, nor can we delegate our own free agency to any but ourselves." Indicating their willingness at any time to receive the views of the First Presidency, the five forewarned that "we cannot accept them as binding upon us." *Salt Lake Tribune,* July 13, 1965. President Hugh B. Brown then commented, "They have the right to tell us to jump in the lake, and they did just that." *Wall Street Journal,* August 10, 1965, p. 12.

for briefings on bills of concern to the Church (e.g., proposed changes in liquor laws).[51] Moreover, individual General Authorities do not hesitate to telephone or write their views to state legislators.

CHURCH INTERFERENCE IN POLITICS: ISSUES AND DILEMMAS

At least seven major issues are raised by the kinds of religio-political activities just described. They concern the felt need of any church to deal with real life, temporal problems, the rights of church and citizens in a democracy, schisms within the church, and the impact upon democracy itself when churches intervene in politics.

Issue No. 1: Must Not the Church Be in the World to Change the World?

Communities would lose a vital, energizing force-for-good if a kind of "Hatch Act" were imposed on religionists, barring them from politics.

Visualize the Catholic priest that led the successful reform movement against a corrupt Democratic machine in Flushing, Ohio; or the courage of Archbishop Francis Rummel of New Orleans in pioneering school integration in Louisiana; or the Protestant minister in Colorado sermonizing on the need for a school bond issue; or a phalanx of clergy from all faiths marching shoulder to shoulder for civil rights in Selma, Alabama. Religious leaders may be among the most sensitive of all observers and among the most courageous of all spokesmen on community affairs. Can one see a Martin Luther King excommunicated from politics?

Beyond the possible benefits to the community, the Church itself has great reason for concerning itself with public issues. As a number of Mormon Prophets have taught, a religion that cannot save people in this life cannot save them in the next. Churches cannot ignore temporal problems, many of which lie in the domain of public policy, and, therefore, by our definition, in the domain of politics. Such questions include racial discrimination (violating Christ's Second Commandment), pornography, governmental corruption, and factors contributing to divorce and juvenile delinquency, among others.[52]

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[51] Confidentail interviews with some of those who have attended these briefings indicate the omnipresence of pressure but the absence of arm-twisting.

[52] As Elder Benson said in his own defense against critics of his speaking out firmly on political issues: "I . . . believe that the institutions of church and state should be separated, but I also do not agree that spiritual leaders cannot comment on basic issues which involve the very foundation of American liberty.

"In fact, if this were true, we would have to throw away a substantial part of the Bible. Speaking out against immoral or unjust actions of political leaders has been the

Issue No. 2: The Right of the Church to Protect Itself From Hostile State Action

As the historical record of Mormonism so clearly attests, the wall of separation between church and state does not always protect churches from hostile government action. Somewhere in natural law there is the principle of the inherent right of self-protection.

If the Mormon Church sees a tax measure coming which would greatly hamper its welfare farms, or bills that represent frontal assaults on its doctrines (e.g., sale of liquor by the drink), may it not plainly tell legislators and the public how it feels? Inherent right and the First Amendment would strongly suggest that it may speak, that it may "petition the government."

Issue No. 3: Do *Church Leaders Abdicate Their Rights as Citizens on Assuming Church Office?*

When the religionist dons the vestments of high church office, must he put aside the tunic of citizenship? We have no Hatch Act that says so. But some would argue that separation of church and state requires church officials to stay out of politics. Such a proscription ends up depriving churchmen of their rights as citizens. We expect civil servants to make such a sacrifice (which this author deplores); should we expect it of our religious servants as well?

Issue No. 4: Schism Within the Church

One of the undeniable *victims* of heavy church involvement in politics is "unity of the faith." During the 1930's when many of the leaders of the Mormon Church became outspokenly Republican, a political fissure appeared in the foundation of the Church. That it has now reached serious proportions is indicated in part by the cutting quality of recent Mormon humor:

> "I thought I saw Brother Williams in the Temple last week."
> "Why that's impossible. He's a Democrat, you know."
>
> or
>
> "Brother Williams, you pray just like a Republican!"

Stripped of any humor, the sentiment is plain and simple: "J. D., you can't be a Democrat and a Mormon!"

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burden of prophets and disciples of God from time immemorial. It was for this very reason that many of them were imprisoned. Nevertheless, it was their God-given task, as watchmen on the towers, to speak up." "Stand Up for Freedom" (Salt Lake City, Utah Forum for the American Idea, February, 1966, mimeo), p. 6.

The schismatic threat to the Church probably reached its twentieth century apogee during the months of February-April, 1966. The rental of the Assembly Hall in February to a Birch Society front group for five lectures (with paid admissions); Elder Benson's keynote speech in that series, defending the Birch Society in its fight against Communism; a "Dear Brethren" letter during March to L.D.S. bishops from the Utah coordinator of the Birch Society inviting them to hear Birch head, Robert Welch, during the week of April General Conference; and the last-minute substitution of President J. Reuben Clark's picture for that of President David O. McKay on the April cover of the Birch Society magazine, *American Opinion,* all created a climate of fear that the Church was on the verge of officially endorsing the Birch Society.[53] That the Church stepped back from the abyss is to the credit of some courageous and far-sighted General Authorities.

In assaying the tensions and conflicts that are created when politics rears its head in a religious setting, one wonders if political admonitions by leaders of the Church are even worth the price. The sad commentary is that alienation of some groups within the Church may be occasioned by counsel on political matters that may not even be central to their spiritual welfare, and matters on which the "law and the prophets" have provided no authoritative guidance.[54]

Issue No. 5: Threat to Democracy From Church Interference

The paradox is that, while communities may benefit from the churchman in politics, citizens may be harmed. The danger is that, in a system which hopes for self-governing individuals, those individuals may simply go to sleep when religious guardians do their citizen's work for them.

The threat is especially great in Mormondom, with its belief in continuing, modern-day revelation. Mormons believe that their spiritual leaders have inspiration from on high in their church roles. Some Mormons assume that the same inspiration carries over into the secular, political activities of those leaders. "If Nixon is good enough for President McKay, he's good enough for me." That sentiment is the breeding ground of theocracy and the burying ground of democracy.

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[53] Reflections of the problem in the April Conference sessions can be seen in the April 9, 1966, sermon of Elder Harold B. Lee, the sermon that same night of Elder Marion G. Romney to the General Priesthood meeting, and the addendum to President McKay's remarks before the same gathering.

[54] As Elder Harold B. Lee has tellingly warned, "If our brethren who engage in political matters, politics, or partisan politics, on issues where the Lord or His prophets have not

As President Brigham Young warned a long time ago:

> I am more afraid that this people have so much confidence in their leaders that they will not inquire for themselves of God whether they are led by Him. I am fearful they settle down in a state of blind self-security, trusting their eternal destiny in the hands of their leaders with a reckless confidence that in itself would thwart the purposes of God in their salvation and weaken that influence they could give their leaders if they would know for themselves by the revelations of Jesus that they are led in the right way. Let every man and woman know by the whispering of the Spirit of God to themselves whether their leaders are walking in the path the Lord dictates or not.[55]

Indeed, a central precept in the revealed word of Mormonism is that God has not commanded in all things:

> Verily I say, men should be anxiously engaged in a good cause, and do many things of their own free will, and bring to pass much righteousness; for the power is in them, wherein they are agents unto themselves.[56]

That principle, taken together with the church-state boundaries laid out in the 134th Section of the Doctrine and Covenants, strongly suggests that politics is one of those areas which the Lord has left, largely untrammeled, in mortal hands.[57]

Issue No. 6: Doctrinal Restraint on Church Interference in Politics

It should be remembered that all the forms of L.D.S. Church involvement in politics take place on a stage whose backdrop is the 134th Section of the Doctrine and Covenants.

To repeat, that great charter marks out "Caesar's world" and "God's world." It would leave to government the definition of the public interest (verse 5). And in the plainest language it says: "We do not believe it just to mingle religious influence with civil government. . . " (verse 9).[58] Reviewing the entirety of our history, one wonders if those proscriptions perhaps have been honored more in the breach than in the observance.

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spoken, they are almost certain to draw fire from those of contrary minds." B. Y. U. address, "Be Ye Not Deceived," May 4, 1965.

[55] Brigham Young, *Discourses of Brigham Young,* as edited by John A. Widtsoe (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book Co., 1925), p. 209.

[56] Doctrine and Covenants, 58:26-28.

[57] One additional anti-democratic effect of the use of the pulpit for advice on politics is the inability of dissenters to challenge the speaker and "present the other side." Democracy does not thrive on one-way communication to captive audiences.

[58] A policy strongly reiterated by the First Presidency in their "Address to the World," April, 1907; reprinted in Brigham H. Roberts, ed., *A Comprehensive History of the Church* (Salt Lake City; Deseret News Press, 1930), vol. 6, p. 436.

Issue No. 7: The Constitutional Prohibition in Utah

As plain as the language in the 134th Section of the Doctrine and Covenants is the prohibition in Section 4 of Article I of the Utah Constitution: "There shall be no union of church and state, nor shall any church dominate the state or *interfere with its functions.*" Church directives to police chiefs, pressure on governing boards and planning officials, and some forms of lobbying with legislators raise questions of compliance with that constitutional mandate.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In the face of some doctrinal and constitutional restraints on Church involvement in politics, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints or its individual leaders have never been able to ignore Caesar's world for very long. Caesar has not always been kind to Mormons, and Mormons have consequently sought to have Caesar with them rather than against them. In taking political stances down through the years, the Church has reflected the freedom and the pluralism of America: The right of men to organize and assemble, to speak and publish, and to petition the government.

The Church's record in politics has been highly pragmatic — ranging from near-theocracy in Nauvoo and early Utah days when threats to the Church's existence were especially great on to somewhat less involvement in politics in the late nineteenth century when such a course might hasten statehood.

The diversity of means used to cast a religious influence on the political scene has been striking — ranging from pulpit admonitions to editorials in Church publications to the endorsement of candidates for public office and the candidacy, on occasion, of General Authorities, among other techniques.

Through it all are interspersed unusually difficult dilemmas as to the propriety and the consequences of the Church and its leaders taking any active part in political matters. What courses of political action would be appropriate for laity and leadership in Mormonism to consider for the future?

First, the membership of the Church must understand that responsibility for good government rests primarily on their shoulders, not on their Church officials.

Second, direct Church action would seem to be clearly justified in two political areas: whenever the *rights* of the Church might be endangered by government or pressure groups; and whenever Church doctrines are frontally threatened by political developments. In either of those two instances, the First Presidency should declare the position of the Church in bold terms.

Beyond those two areas, optional courses of action are open to us: wide participation in politics by many Mormons, high and low, with a diversity of viewpoints as the safeguard against any image of "Church commitment" to one point of view; or a self-restraining policy where the top leadership of the Church essentially eschew politics.

As to the option of unrestrained involvement in politics, two principles call for recognition: that chapels and worship services should be off-limits to all of us in treating political questions; secondly, that the disclaimer be regularly entered (and more clearly understood by the Church membership) that Mormon spokesmen speak for themselves and not for the Church when they deal with partisan questions. The benefits of such an open-participation policy would be to assure Church leaders their rights as citizens to speak out without committing the Church, and to stimulate individual members to think for themselves as they see Church leaders arrayed on various sides of political issues.

But on the other hand, a policy of non-involvement of top Church leaders in political matters also has something to be said for it. The avoidance of unnecessary schisms within the Church would be a prime consideration. Secondly, there is the hope that the pure word of God, without detours into politics, is all that men really need to find the good life. Elder Harold B. Lee reminded the Church in April Conference, 1966, of Paul's counsel to the Corinthians:

> And I, brethren, when I came to you, came not with excellency of speech or of wisdom, declaring unto you the testimony of God. For I determined not to know anything among you, save Jesus Christ, and Him crucified. — That your faith should not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God.[59]

"I would," Elder Lee added, "that all who are called to high places in the Church would determine as did this Apostle to the Gentiles to know and to preach nothing save Jesus Christ and Him crucified."[60] In similar fashion, the Book of Mormon prophet, Alma, had commanded his disciples "that they should preach nothing save it were repentance and faith on the Lord, who had redeemed His people."[61]

Finally, it may be argued that the Church should remain aloof from politics simply because the spiritual welfare of the people is a full-time calling. As the Prophet Joseph Smith once put it: "I

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[59] I Corinthians 2:1-5.
[60] Sermon reprinted in the *Church News*, April 16, 1966, pp. 13-14.
[61] Book of Mormon, Mosiah 18:20.

think it would be well for politicians to regulate their own affairs. I wish to be let alone that I may attend strictly to the spiritual welfare of the Church."[62]

Perhaps the appropriate course was really set out long before by the Book of Mormon leader, Alma the Younger, who effected a classical separation of church and state in his own ministry. It was this civil-religious leader who relinquished the civil sceptre to another man while retaining to himself the spiritual one, "that he might preach the word of God unto (his people) . . ., seeing no way that he might reclaim them save it were in bearing down in pure testimony against them."[64]

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[62] *Documentary History*, vol. 5, p. 259.
[63] Book of Mormon, Alma 4:19.

Some persons, by hating vices too much, come to love men too little.

Edmund Burke

RELIGION AND ULTIMATE CONCERN

AN ENCOUNTER WITH PAUL TILLICH'S THEOLOGY

Louis Midgley

Beginning a series on contemporary theologians, this essay examines some of the central ideas of the foremost Protestant thinker of our time. Louis Midgley is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Brigham Young University; he has published essays on Tillich's political theology in the Western Political Quarterly.

Paul Tillich,[1] the well-known German-American Protestant philosophical theologian, died on October 23, 1965, at the age of seventy-nine. I experienced a deep sense of personal loss upon hearing of his death. The man with whose ideas I have been jousting for the past half dozen years was suddenly gone. He has left a truly impressive legacy. He was honest, intellectually able, and enormously learned; his writing was powerful and convincing. He was the author of thirty-five books and nearly four hundred additional essays. The literature on his thought is a remarkable witness to both the extent of his influence and the power of his intellect; it now numbers some four hundred and eighty books and articles and some seventy-three dissertations and it grows by the day.

His influence, equal almost to his reputation, has become pervasive; he has had an impact far beyond strictly theological circles in such varied areas as philosophy, the arts (especially the visual arts),

sociology, psychotherapy, and politics. I would estimate that at least half of his writings are political or bear in some way on questions of interest to the political philosopher. This accounts for my own initial interest in his thought. His contribution to political philosophy is at least as substantial as that of any contemporary political scientist. It is possible to gauge the extent of his impact on the intellectual world both by the size and variety of the critical literature devoted to him – since 1960 ten books have appeared in English on his thought – and by the fact that his books have sold, in English alone, over three quarters of a million copies. And Tillich is anything but easy reading.

It is, of course, possible to see in Tillich's writings any number of more or less isolated, brilliant, and useful insights and concepts. This is one reason for his vast popularity. But he was above all a systematic thinker. His writings were all part of an interdependent whole. "It always has been impossible for me to think theologically in any other than a systematic way. The smallest problem, if taken seriously and radically, drove me to all other problems and to the anticipation of a whole in which they could find their solution" (ST, I, p. vii.). To take Tillich seriously is to be confronted by his impressive theological system. One reason for my having undertaken a study of his thought has been a curiosity about this system. Actually his theology represents, at a number of crucial points, a total denial of Mormon theology. And, in many ways, Tillich made explicit some positions that are only hinted at by other theologians. He was always radical in the sense that he strove to see the implications inherent within various kinds of theological commitments. The lines are, therefore, much more clearly and sharply drawn between Tillich and Mormon theology than with most other theologians. One of my purposes here is to indicate the extent to which Mormon and Tillichian theology are in opposition to each

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[1] References to Tillich's books will follow parenthetically in the body of the essay and will employ the following abbreviations:

(CTB) *The Courage To Be* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952)

(CEWR) *Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963)

(DF) *Dynamics of Faith* (New York: Harper, 1957)

(IH) *The Interpretation of History* (New York: Scribner, 1936)

(LPJ) *Love, Power and Justice* (New York: Oxford, 1954)

(PE) *The Protestant Era* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948)

(ST) *Systematic Theology*, 3 Vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, 1957, 1963)

(TC) *Theology of Culture* (New York: Oxford, 1959)

(TPT) *The Theology of Paul Tillich*, ed. C. Kegley & R. Bretall (New York: Macmillan, 1956)

(UC) *Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965)

other and to probe some of the underlying reasons for whatever opposition there may be. I see no reason why Mormons should not take seriously whatever challenge he represents and insights he may have had. Tillich is certainly a worthy partner in a Mormon-Protestant dialogue.

I

Tillich always sought to defend the fundamental truths of religion from enemies that he felt were assailing it from two opposite directions. First, he wished to preserve genuine religion from the threat of the secularization stemming from scientific humanism. But he was also passionately opposed to any semblance of literalism in the interpretation of religious language. Vast numbers of educated people reject, for example, what they consider to be the absurdity of the resurrection story, especially when it is taken as a report about something that actually happened to someone called Jesus. However, many of these same people sense the emptiness of the world without some beliefs that make life appear meaningful. Tillich spoke to these "thinking and doubting people," as he called them. He "insisted that we cannot get rid of the symbols and myths like the resurrection story but must interpret them in a nonliteralistic way. Otherwise, of course, they would be meaningless for all time" (UC, p. 190). He had, for example, no objection at all to the activities of the "great critics since the Enlightment, and especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries," who have undercut traditional religious beliefs. "After these dangerous people, these courageous people, have done their job and have undercut and destroyed the primitivism of religious literalism, I try to recreate the old realities on another basis" (UC, p. 192). His attention was directed to

> . . . those people who are in doubt or estrangement or opposition to everything ecclesiastical and religious, including Christianity. And I have to speak to them. My work is with those who ask questions, and for them I am here. *For the others, who do not, I have the great problem of tact.* Of course, I cannot avoid speaking to them because of a fear of becoming a stumbling block for *primitive believers.* When I am preaching a sermon — and then I am quite aware of what I'm doing — I speak to people who are unshaken in their beliefs and in the acceptance of symbols, in a language which will not undermine their belief. And to those who are actually in a situation of doubt and are even being torn to pieces by it, I hope to speak in such a way that the reasons for their doubts and other stumbling blocks are taken away. On this basis I speak to a third group, one which has gone through these two stages and is now able again to hear the full

> power of the message, freed from old difficulties. I can speak to those people, and they are able to understand me, even when I use the old symbols, *because they know that I do not mean them in a literal sense.* (UC, p. 191; italics supplied)

I will attempt to show in this essay that there is an unbridgeable gulf between Tillich and Mormonism on the most fundamental theological issues. Though he made no particular effort to hide his views from what he called "primitive believers," they have not always realized just how radical he was and have therefore failed to see the full implications of his arguments. One purpose of this essay is therefore expository; I wish to indicate a number of areas in which there is potential agreement between Mormon and Tillichian theology and then to show the profound challenge he presents to Mormonism and the dangers inherent in not taking him seriously. I am interested not only in showing the extent of the challenge Tillich represents to Mormon beliefs, but also in replying to his arguments at what I feel are the most crucial points. We will first look at his concept of "religion" and this will introduce his theological system as it centers on the concept of God.

Tillich made a sophisticated attempt to transform the word "religion" into a genuinely useful concept. He described "religion" as man's concern about the meaning of life; hence, religion is man's ultimate concern. Every individual has some concern that is for him ultimate; therefore, everyone is "religious." Individuals may have as their "gods" things like success, money, sex, justice, security, fame, political or physical power, intellectual or artistic achievement — anything can become a god for man because, Tillich felt, "whatever concerns a man ultimately becomes god for him" (ST, I, p. 211). Likewise, groups have their concerns and therefore their gods. The life of groups, such as political parties, social clubs, business groups and churches, to name only some of the most obvious possibilities, depends upon and expresses some ultimate concern and, therefore, has a religious dimension. Tillich always sought to identify the religious dimension, the style, within every department of human culture. He considered communism, nationalism, and liberal humanism as "world religions" because they are bearers of ultimate concerns that differ only in content from those movements more commonly known as religions.

There is really nothing in Tillich's description of "religion" as man's ultimate concern that should be difficult for the Mormon to accept. Tillich's development of this theme has much to recommend it. And the idea that whatever is one's ultimate concern is one's god

is fully scriptural. For example, the concept can be found in both the Book of Mormon and the Doctrine and Covenants:

> And their hearts are upon their treasures; wherefore, *their treasure is their God.* And behold, their treasure shall perish with them also. (2 Nephi 9:30; italics supplied)
>
> They seek not the Lord to establish his righteousness, but every man walketh in his own way, and after his own God, whose image is in the likeness of the world, and whose substance is that of an idol, which waxeth old and shall perish in Babylon, even Babylon the great, which shall perish. (Doctrine and Covenants 1:16)

All aspects of culture, including especially the political, Tillich argued, have a religious dimension, and "religion means 'being ultimately concerned'" (TPT, p. 347).[2] He expressed the relationship between culture and religion in a formula: "religion is the substance of culture, culture is the form of religion" (TC, p. 42).[3] More fully, he argued that: "Religion as ultimate concern is the meaning-giving substance of culture, and culture is the totality of forms in which the concern of religion expresses itself" (TC, p. 42). This formulation certainly does not suffer from a lack of breadth.

Now what is it that actually concerns man ultimately? Men are obviously concerned with many different things, but one concern may so dominate a man, a group, a state, a culture, as to become an "ultimate" concern and the object of such concern functions as a god. But Tillich goes much further; ultimate concern is ubiquitous: "no human mind is entirely without an ultimate concern and some practical and theoretical expression of it" (TPT, p. 347).[4] Why is it necessary to argue that everyone is religious? He seems to have insisted that everyone has some ultimate concern and is, therefore, religious in order to argue that the important question is not whether one should or should not have a religion, for it is impossible to avoid being religious, but whether one has achieved the proper religious expression. Now Tillich is able to make everyone religious by simply defining them as such; his assertion that all men have an ultimate concern is merely formally true. This suggests some difficulties in his thought which I do not wish to pursue; others have already done so. Instead I will try to show why he felt it necessary to insist on the ubiquity of religion, that is, that man is a *homo religiosus.* Once Tillich is able to establish that all men are religious, that is, ultimately concerned, he then argues for one manifestation of religion over all others: he tries to show us what ought to be the object of our

[2] Cf. PE, p. xv.

[3] Cf. PE, p. 57; IH, p. 50.

[4] ST, III, p. 130; TC, p. 41; UC, p. 27; ST, II, p. 9.

ultimate concern. The Mormon scriptures which I have already quoted employ a similar strategy. This is certainly not a way of saying that religion, or ultimate concern, is always good, beautiful and true, as some seem to believe, but, just the opposite, that man's concerns usually constitute idolatry and false religion. Here again is a point at which I believe the Mormon can agree with Tillich; both insist that the concept of religion must be supported by a norm that will make possible the distinction between the true and the false, the good and the evil, in man's religious concerns. The point then is not to have just any old ultimate concern, but the proper one. Tillich was at his very best when he talked about the evil potentials of a religious vacuum. I can see no real reason why a Mormon could not accept much of his description of the dynamics of "religion." When one's concerns begin to slacken, as sometimes happens, when one's "gods" begin to die, emptiness develops and into this religious vacuum pour new gods (or demons!). From this simple insight, Tillich developed concepts that he used to interpret almost every event in human history. He offered this insight to the psychotherapist, who sometimes accepted the idea that emotional difficulties can stem from false or conflicting ultimate concerns; he also employed it to explain the activities of groups and even entire cultures — here he got involved in sociology, politics, the philosophy of history, the visual arts, and church history. Behind almost everything that he wrote is the idea that culture has a religious dimension and that everything man does is an expression of his ultimate concern. His life was devoted to the ruthless criticism of what he identified as false religion.

Perhaps Tillich's most elaborate attempt to clarify the concept of ultimate concern is found in the following passage:

> Man is ultimately concerned about his being and meaning. "To be or not to be" in *this* sense is a matter of ultimate, unconditional, total, and infinite concern. Man is infinitely concerned about the infinity to which he belongs, from which he is separated, and for which he is longing. Man is totally concerned about the totality which is his true being and which is disrupted in time and space. Man is unconditionally concerned about that which conditions his being beyond all the conditions in him and around him. Man is ultimately concerned about that which determines his ultimate destiny beyond all preliminary necessities and accidents. (ST, I, p. 14) [5]

This is a difficult passage; however, it deserves careful attention and full criticism. This it has received. One writer has said, in commenting upon the preceding passage:

[5] See also ST, III, p. 287; TC, p. 40.

> Professor Tillich slides from man's being "infinitely concerned" to the object of his concern, "the infinity to which he belongs"; and there are other comparable slides from being "unconditionally concerned" to "that which conditions his being beyond all conditions". . . . After one notices that the adverb modifying 'concerned' generates the content of the concern, one wonders why Professor Tillich limited himself to man's ultimate, unconditional, total, and infinite concerns. Why not man's underlying concern, or his perpetual concern, or his formal concern, or his everlasting concern, to suggest only a few of the appropriately weighty possibilities, before going on to man's happiest concern, or his strangest concern. . . . One can take any of these possibilities and produce such sentences as "Man is perpetually concerned with that which perpetuates his perpetuity". . . .[6]

" 'Ultimate,' 'unconditional,' 'total' and 'infinite' are normative terms. They are prospectively useful in measuring, or qualifying, or rating; but they must measure, qualify, or rate something."[7] Some serious questions are raised when Tillich introduces the norm, that is, when he attempts to indicate what ought to concern man ultimately. Up to this point, I feel that Mormon and Tillichian theology are quite congenial.

By giving the word "ultimate" the meaning of "most important," "dominant," or "controlling," it should be possible to identify what Tillich would call the "god (s)" of various individuals, groups, and nations, even entire cultures. But he wished to do more than merely identify various manifestations of religion; he wished to assess their validity. The concept of ultimate concern contains two distinct elements: 1. Concern should be ultimate. This seems to be an assertion that there should be an abundance of concern, or to put it more accurately, if not more precisely, man should be ultimately concerned. 2. But ultimately concerned about what? Here we find out what the norm is for ultimate concern. Tillich's answer: Man is not really ultimately concerned unless he is actually concerned about *the Ultimate*. This raises two important questions: (1) What is the Ultimate? and (2) How do we come to know and be concerned about it?

II

At the level of mere description, Tillich's concept of religion as man's ultimate concern is, I believe, a genuinely useful concept. The difficulty arises when his norm is considered. Tillich's real aim was to criticize false religion in the name of what he thought was the

[6] E. Sprague, "On Professor Tillich's Ontological Question," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, II (1962), p. 86.

[7] *Ibid.*

God of true religion. He emphatically denied that God *exists,* for only finite things exist. This was his way of saying that God is not a finite thing; however, God is real, or to follow Tillich's formulation, God is reality-itself or being-itself, the power of being in all finite existing things. The Ultimate, therefore, does not exist and no merely existing thing is truly Ultimate. His writings are thus full of references to an Ultimate, Unconditional, Absolute, Infinite, ground and power and abyss of all being, meaning and value. God is not merely a finite "thing," but the ground or power that things must have in order to be; God is the is-ness in everything that is.

Events, persons, places — anything — may function as symbols which point to the truly Ultimate. One can speak of the Ultimate only because symbols point to it. Statements about God are thus symbolic. But what of statements about statements about God? Tillich admitted that "the statement that everything we say about God is symbolic . . . itself it is not symbolic" (ST, II, p. 9). If it is not symbolic, what is it? Was it intended to be a factually true assertion? As an assertion about how people do in fact speak about God, it is clearly false. Proof of this is the fact that Tillich strongly opposed those who make non-symbolic statements about God or who interpret religious symbols literally. For example, Mormons employ some language about God that they believe is literally true and, therefore, not merely symbolic. They believe and their scriptures assert, for example, that God is *a* finite being with a spatio-temporal existence. This makes a Mormon deity merely a finite, existing "thing" in Tillich's language. What he always maintained was that such a God was not God at all but merely *a* "god" and, therefore, an idol or perhaps even a demon. It should be clear that what Mormons say about God will fly in the face of Tillich's "God"; the Mormon deities are merely, in Tillich's language, "gods" and not genuine objects of ultimate concern. Now if God is as Tillich claims, Mormons are grossly idolatrous. This represents the radical challenge of his theology.

The concept of religion as concern is not difficult to accept; it is a genuinely useful idea. Whatever is the highest, most complete concern is god for man — "whatever concerns a man ultimately becomes god for him. . . " (ST, I, p. 211). But Tillich was not fully satisfied with this formulation. He insisted that no ultimate concern is ultimately ultimate unless it is ultimate concern about the Ultimate. Now just how is it possible to discriminate between an ultimate concern that is ultimately ultimate and one that is not really ultimately ultimate because it is not ultimately about the

Ultimate? This is a serious question. If we could get hold of a thing called the "ultimate," the matter could be settled. But the Ultimate, Tillich constantly said, is *no-thing,* and one never knows it directly but only through some vehicle — some preliminary, concrete concern. How is one to determine which everyday, mundane, concrete, preliminary concern is really revealing the Ultimate? This question points to a fundamental difficulty in Tillich's theology, for, as I will attempt to show, the very nature of the position he advanced precluded his giving a nonevasive and unequivocal answer.

Tillich maintained that there is risk involved in any ultimate concern. The risk is genuine; there is the constant possibility of idolatry — the affirmation of something which is not ultimate as the Ultimate. The "risk" is generated by the abundance of everyday, mundane, preliminary concerns that crowd out and swallow up genuine concern for the Ultimate or that assume the character of ultimacy themselves. It is quite possible to be concerned about something less than the Ultimate; this, in fact, is the tragic fate of mankind. It is impossible to be directly concerned about the Ultimate, for the Ultimate is only encountered through some particular, finite, concrete object or event, which functions as a symbol of the Ultimate. Thus "it is impossible to be concerned about something which cannot be encountered concretely. . . . The more concrete a thing is, the more the possible concern about it" (ST, I, p. 211).

Tillich actually made three rather different assertions about concern: (1) Man is ultimately concerned about the Ultimate, *i.e.,* being-itself, or in theological language, God, for God "is the name for that which concerns man ultimately"; (2) Man can be concerned only about something that is actually concrete; (3) But no concrete thing is ultimately Ultimate.[8] The Ultimate with which man is ultimately concerned is only revealed by concrete things which function as self-negating symbols of the Ultimate. Unfortunately man tends to ascribe to symbols an absolute validity and to confuse them with the Ultimate which they should symbolize. A further risk is that one may "affirm a wrong symbol of ultimate concern, a symbol which does not really express ultimacy" (ST, II, p. 116).

Concrete *things* that serve as symbols of the divine take on what he called "holiness." "The holy is the *quality* of that which concerns man ultimately. Only that which is holy can give man ultimate concern, and only that which gives man ultimate concern has the quality of holiness" (ST, I, p. 215). But there is a definite risk involved in affirming the holiness of any *thing.* It is true that "every-

[8] See W. L. Rowe, "The Meaning of 'God' in Tillich's Theology," *Journal of Religion,* XLII (1962), pp. 274ff., especially p. 276.

thing secular can enter the realm of the holy (ST, I, p. 221),[9] but the "holy" can also be profanized or secularized, with disastrous results. "Everything secular is implicity related to the holy. It can become the bearer of the holy. The divine can become manifest in it" (ST, I, p. 218).[10] That which is really "holy" is embodied in holy "objects" and is encountered in no other way. There is only the barest manifestation of that which is genuinely Ultimate, of the truly holy, within human history, and man is constantly tempted to confuse the holy with that which points to it. The struggle against temptation is manifest at all levels of personal existence; it is the struggle between true and false religion. The basis of Tillich's criticism of false, demonic religion is what he calls the "Protestant principle," *i.e.,* the rejection of all attempts to identify the holy itself with some finite thing or event, with a holy "object." Nationalism, for example, is often, though not necessarily, a domestic distortion of true religion. The nation may be holy, *i.e.,* an "object" of genuine concern; but it may also constitute an idol. The nation, or some other such entity, may actually point to the Ultimate. Holy "objects," such as buildings, persons, events or nations, are simply the available vehicles through which concern for the Ultimate is expressed. "A nation which looks upon itself as holy is correct in so far as everything can become a vehicle of man's ultimate concern, but the nation is incorrect in so far as it considers itself to be inherently holy" (ST, I, p. 216).[11] But how is it possible to distinguish between the genuine pointer and the false article? This question is crucial for Tillich's theology.

By what standard can religion be judged? Religion, *i.e.,* a faith, an ultimate concern, a set of symbols, he argued, "is true if it adequately expresses an ultimate concern" or, put in a slightly different way, religion is true "if its content is really ultimate" (DF, p. 96).[12] The term "adequacy" refers to the power a symbol should have to express something, to create action and communication. Now this is certainly "not an exact criterion in any scientific sense. but it is a *pragmatic* one that can be applied rather easily to the past with its stream of obviously dead symbols" (DF, p. 97). Unfortunately it is much more difficult to apply it to the present, because one can never be sure that a symbol is actually dead. Tillich recently expressed this argument in more precise terms: "If one asks about the criteria of religious symbols we must state generally that the

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[9] Cf. ST, III, pp. 87ff.
[10] Cf. DF, p. 38; TC, p. 59; PE, p. 123.
[11] Cf. DF, pp. 10ff; PE, p. 180; CEWR, pp. 7ff., 12ff.
[12] Cf. ST, I, p. 244; TC, p. 66.

measure of their validity is their adequacy to the religious experience they express. This is the basic criterion of all symbols. One can call it their 'authenticity.' Nonauthentic are religious symbols which have lost their experiential basis. . . ."[13]

But there is another criterion for the *truth* of symbols. Even if the symbol is still alive, it might not be pointing to that which is really Ultimate. For example, the symbols of the nation may be alive, as they were in Germany under the National Socialists, and yet demonic. "The criterion of authenticity is valid but not sufficient. It does not answer the question of the amount of truth a symbol possesses. The term 'truth' in this context means the degree to which it reaches the referent of all religious symbols."[14] The symbol must, by its self-negating quality and by its transparency, point to the referent for which it stands. Any confusion between the symbol and that to which it is supposed to point reflects negatively on its adequacy as a symbol. The measure of the truth of a symbol is the measure of its self-negation. "That symbol is most adequate which expresses not only the ultimate but also its own lack of ultimacy" (DF, p. 97). This, of course, is a restatement of the important question: How can one measure the adequacy of a symbol to negate itself and at the same time point beyond itself? The "Protestant principle" itself needs criteria before it can be applied. As it stands, Tillich did not provide any non-pragmatic method of determining the truth of symbols, that is, whether symbols are genuinely self-negating. Nor was he able to specify how the self-negating quality of symbols could be ascertained in a concrete situation.

The chief difficulty in Tillich's system was his inability to provide tests by which it might be possible to discriminate between the demonic and the divine. This difficulty stems directly from his dogmatic assumption that God is nothing, *i.e.,* literally no-*thing,* that God is not *a* being that exists. Statements about God were for him entirely symbolic. The only non-symbolic and valid literal statement about God is that God is being-itself. This statement seems to be literal in the sense that the word "God" is the exact and complete equivalent of "being-itself." But what is being-itself? What can be said about it? At one point Tillich seemed to say that there are some equivalents or exact synonyms. Thus it would be possible to substitute "power of being," "ground of being" and other such phrases for "being-itself" (See, *e.g.,* ST, I, p. 235ff.). But he also insisted that "every assertion about being-itself is either metaphorical or symbolic"

[13] Tillich, "The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols," in *Religious Experience and Truth,* ed. S. Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1961), p. 10.

[14] *Ibid.* See also DF, p. 197; TC, p. 29.

(CTB, p. 179). Sometimes he argued that "power of being" and "ground of being" are "symbolic notions, in so far as they use elements of being (power, cause) in order to circumscribe being-itself" (TPT, p. 335). Elsewhere he held that these circumscribing phrases are metaphorical (LPJ, p. 37f). If they are symbols, it would seem that we have no conscious choice in their use. They are simply "born out of a definite encounter with reality and they last so long as this encounter does, then they die or become transformed into something else."[15] But metaphors are perhaps consciously employed to "communicate one point of analogy between the proper meaning of the metaphor and that to which it is 'trans-ferred' *(metapherein)*. Because of this point of analogy, the choice of the right metaphor can be decisive for the solution of a whole series of problems."[16] Finally, one can give to is-ness "metaphoric names, like 'being-itself' or 'ultimate reality' or 'ultimate concern' (in the sense of that about which one is ultimately concerned). Such names are not names of a being but quality of being."[17] Religious symbols point to the quality of *is*-ness that is named by divine names. Apparently the circumscribing phrases can be either metaphors or symbols or both, depending upon whether they are used in conceptual thought (either theological or philosophical) or more directly in the religious life of man.

"God is being-itself or the absolute" (ST, I, p. 239); "God is the name for that which concerns man ultimately" (ST, I, p. 211; ST, III, p. 287; TC, p. 40). There is something curious about all this talk about names. Gilbert Ryle has argued that assertions like "Fido is a dog" provide no information about any actual dog, except that, whatever it is, *if it actually is,* its name is Fido.[18] To be genuinely informative one must do something more than merely name — one must describe; one must assert something that is at least potentially false or true. Tillich most certainly wished to be informative — that being the purpose of his theology. He explicitly rejected the possibility that the fundamental answer to the question "What is being-itself?" was merely a tautology (See, *e.g.,* ST, I, p. 102, 164). It appears to me, however, that the word "God" for Tillich merely denoted or named is-ness or being-itself.

If Tillich's one literal statement about God was merely a name or denotation, as it appears to me to be, nothing whatever at all

[15] Tillich, "Dimensions, Levels, and the Unity of Life," *Kenyon Alumni Bulletin,* XVII (1959), p. 4.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] Tillich in Hook, *op. cit.,* p. 7.

[18] G. Ryle, "The Theory of Meaning," in *British Philosophy at Mid-Century,* ed. C. A. Mace (New York, 1957), pp. 247ff.

follows from the assertion, other than the fact that this is the way he came to use some words. No information, other than the fact of a particular linguistic convention, is provided by naming. Using a proper name is not committing oneself to any further informative assertion whatever. Proper names are appellations and not otherwise cognitively informative (and descriptions are likewise not merely appellations). Names appear to be arbitrary bestowals that convey nothing at all other than the decision to name something with a certain name. To ask for the meaning of words like "being-itself" or "God" is not to ask for a name but for an assertion that is somehow true.

If it is to be used meaningfully, the word "God" must have a referent. Without knowing the intended referent for the name "God," one cannot possibly know the *meaning* of the norm Tillich proposed for judging man's religious concerns. Without knowing God, the norm lacks any content. *Anything* can be a god, but not God. How can the referent be reached? "To what does a religious symbol refer, one asks? How can it be reached? And if it can be reached by symbols only, how can we know that something is reached at all?"[19] Tillich knew that this question had to be answered. "Is there a nonsymbolic statement about the referent of religious symbols? If this question could not be answered affirmatively the necessity of symbolic language for religion could not be proved and the whole argument would lead into a vicious circle." He struggled to provide an answer. He suggested various methods for answering the question, but he explicitly rejected the application of any kind of inductive methodology: "For it can lead only to a finite part of the universe of finite objects through observation."[20] But why should that necessarily disqualify it? Because "nothing finite, no part of the universe of finite relations can be the referent of religious symbols, and, therefore, no inductive method can reach it."[21] Even if the truth of this assertion is granted, and I see no reason at all for granting it, the question still remains: How can God be reached and how can it be demonstrated that something has been reached? Religious symbols do in fact point to what their users feel are, in Tillich's vocabulary, finite objects and existing beings — mere "things" — and he knew it. This is what he called the "tendency toward concreteness," and it is common in all religions (ST, III, p. 283). Why is it then wrong to think of God, as Mormons do, as a particular, personal, existing, concrete, finity reality? The answer: God is being-itself

[19] Tillich in Hook, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
[20] *Ibid.*, for both quotations.
[21] *Ibid.*

and not *a* mere being. But this is merely an arbitrary stipulation. One can deny it simply by not equating the word God with the Infinite, Absolute, Unconditional or Ultimate — with is-ness or being-itself.

Tillich argued that the careful analysis of existence uncovers the finitude inherent in reality and thereby implies an Absolute which is beyond the finite. "That to which this analysis leads is the referent in all religious symbols."[22] This is merely another way of saying that man looks beyond the ambiguities of this world. That which is beyond the finite is identified by the metaphors "being," "power" or "ground." But is the quality really real; is it a real essence present in some degree in everything or merely a concept or name? He assumed that it was the no-thing he called being-itself that men look for when they look beyond the ambiguities of this world.

What Tillich apparently intended to say was that "everything we say about God *ought to be* symbolic" (TC, p. 40; the italicized words are supplied). Statements about God ought to be symbolic because literal, factual statements transform God into a finite being, a thing, and are therefore false. But how could one show that all possible non-symbolic statements about God are false without having already assumed what God must and must not be in order to be God? This is exactly what Tillich had done. But then in order to prevent his theology from resting on what he fully recognized as a circular and vacuous argument, he was forced to make "an assertion about God which itself is not symbolic" (ST, II, p. 9). God became literally being-itself. Such an assertion cannot rest on self-evidence. It simply is not self-evident except when transformed into an empty tautology. And Tillich was well aware of the weakness of self-evident truths (ST, I, p. 102, 164). But his assertion is not an accurate description of how the word is commonly used.

For Tillich, religious language is always beyond any possible empirical criticism because it is symbolic.[23] The truth (*i.e.*, authenticity, adequacy, divinity) of symbols is the power they have to reveal whatever it is that they symbolize. But one must know what it is that a symbol is intended to reveal before it can be known if it actually succeeds in doing it. Religious symbols, he insisted, should not symbolize any-*thing* or actual event. The "truth" of a symbol is always truth *for someone* and not about something. The proper posture of man is not credulous acceptance of merely probably

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[22] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[23] ST, I, pp. 130ff., 238ff.; ST, II, pp. 107-17; DF, pp. 85-9; TC, p. 28.

empirical statements like "Jesus was resurrected" — a proposition he felt was absurd if taken at all literally — but *concern,* concern about one's own being and therefore about that which is the ground of all finite being (s). Faith is not the acceptance of factual propositions about "doubtful historical probabilities"[24] like the resurrection of Jesus, even if the probability were high. "If the Christian faith is based even on a 100,000 to 1 probability that Jesus has said or done or suffered this or that; if Christianity is based on possible birth-registers of Nazareth or crime-registers of Pontius Pilate, then it has lost its foundation completely."[25] "Faith is the state of being ultimately concerned." Even one who "doubts" has what he called "faith" because he is concerned.

> Not only he who is in sin but also he who is in doubt is justified through faith. The situation of doubt, even of doubt about God, need not separate us from God. There is faith in every serious doubt, namely, the faith in the truth as such, even if the only truth we can express is our lack of truth. But if this is experienced in its depth and as an ultimate concern, the divine is present . . . ; he who seriously denies God, affirms him. *Without it I could not have remained a theologian.* . . . Being religious is being unconditionally concerned, whether this concern expresses itself in secular or (in the narrower sense) religious forms. The personal and theological consequences of these ideas for me were immense. Personally, they gave me at the time of their discovery, and always since then, *a strong feeling of relief.* (PE, p. x-xi; italics supplied)

Tillich has never accepted literally doctrines like the resurrection of Jesus. As far back as 1911 he was busy trying to show "how the Christian doctrine might be understood if the non-existence of the historical Jesus should become historically probable." He continued to say, "Even today, I maintain the radicalism of this question over against compromises. . . " (IH, p. 33f).

III

I have come to view Tillich as a truly tragic figure. His life was dedicated to the pursuit of truth, a kind of truth that really makes some difference to man. His every effort was to find an answer to the question of the meaning of life. The human predicament was always an issue for him. Man's existence, he felt, is ambiguous because it is threatened by sin and guilt; plagued by hopelessness and meaninglessness; finally challenged at its heart by death and personal

[24] Tillich, "The Problem of Theological Method," in *Four Existentialist Theologians,* ed. W. Herberg (Garden City: Doubleday, 1958), pp. 255, 246ff.

[25] *Ibid.,* p. 246.

extinction. His description of the human predicament strikes me as profound; his recognition of the ambiguities of man's present condition are often overlooked in our own sunny and too easy complacency. But his answer, I feel, was no real answer at all, merely consolation and comfort to the condemned. His inability to do more than offer consolation stems directly from his concept of God and his approach to the meaning of religious language.

The notion of *a* God who literally speaks to man, a central Mormon belief, was flatly rejected by Tillich. If revelation "is brought down to the level of a conversation between two beings, it is blasphemous and ridiculous. If, however, it is understood as the 'elevation of the heart,' . . . to God, it is a revelatory event" (ST, I, p. 127). The very idea of a God issuing commands and revealing information was in Tillich's eyes simply a picture of a Divine Tyrant. He rejected it as both absurd and demonic, but without giving reasons. The split between Mormon and Tillichian theology is illustrated by noting that Mormons believe that evidence for the existence of God is to be found in testimony concerning the sensory experience of men to whom he has revealed himself. Tillich felt that such a God would be a mere some-*thing* within time and space who might or might not exist. He could not tolerate the idea that a being, about whose existence there was doubt, was God. Such a God could not be the object of concern.

If Tillich was correct in his view of God, there never will be a time and place where the ambiguities of life will be genuinely overcome. The sole consolation is that in God everything is right. Religious language is at times transparent to the ground of being in which the split between things as they actually are and as they really are and therefore ought-to-be is healed. But talk about such things as the resurrection and the Kingdom of God cannot be taken literally. Tillich employed such language in a most powerful manner in his sermons. But he felt that it would be hard to find in them

> . . . any directly negative statements, even against literalism. I simply restrain myself in that situation. For instance, the resurrection stories: I do not criticize in my sermons the highly poetic symbolic story of the empty tomb, although I would do so in my theology and have done it in my books. But I speak of what happened to Paul and the other apostles, as Paul describes it in I Corinthians 15. Now that is a preaching method I would recommend for all sermons. (UC, p. 193)

But what if someone is inclined to take the symbolism literally and thereby involve himself in absurdities and idolatry? Tillich replied to this question by saying, "If they do not ask, and I am expected to give aid and comfort in some situation in life, as at funerals, then

there are those great words of Paul, I Corinthians 15. In such moments the question of literalism or nonliteralism does not exist, for we have the power of the word" (UC, p. 194). In a recent sermon entitled "That They May Have Life" Tillich gave his view of the meaning of the gospel in the face of the most final threat — death. "And the Christian message," he said,

> . . . contains a "no" to life by pointing in all it says and does to the dying man on Golgotha. "Yes" and "no" to life are united in a unique way when we see in him that God himself participates in this "no" and "yes." "Yes" and "no" united — this means . . . : the "no" is taken into the "yes," death is taken into life, the pain of having to come to [an] end is taken into the joy of being here and now. The meaning of the end is changed. Certainly it will come as the beginning came. But it is also *here,* within the grace of life which created a new beginning. The end and the beginning are here and now. For the eternal [that is, the Ultimate] is here and now. And the experience of its presence makes our last day, like any other day, into something preliminary. If death is accepted by us already, we do not need to wait for it, be it near or far, be it with fear or with contempt. We know what it is because we have accepted it in all its darkness and tragedy. We know that it is the confirmation that we are creatures and that our end belongs to us. *We know that life cannot be prolonged, neither in this nor in some imagined future existence.*
>
> And the question is no longer: What will be after death? But the question will be: Have I taken death into my life? Am I able to have an abundant life just because I have gone and am going through death as Jesus did? Is the ultimate grace of life working in me. And if I don't feel it, the question of life and death may become an ardent desire and may be changed into the prayer, with or without words: Give me strength to take my death into my life.[26]

Beautiful, powerful language with a bleak, solemn message. No shout of joy there. But this is clearly what Tillich's system entails and we should realize it. My own feeling about his theology can be expressed in the words of Wordsworth:

> It moves us not. — Great God! I'd rather be
> A Pagan suckled in a creed outworn . . . .

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[26] Tillich, "That They May Have Life," *Union Seminary Quarterly Review,* XX (1954), p. 8 (Italics supplied).

EVERY SOUL HAS ITS SOUTH

Karl Keller

The editors wish to encourage essays, such as this one, in which the author responds to his involvement in crucial events and issues of our time. Karl Keller, Assistant Professor of English at the State University of New York at Cortland, where he is the L.D.S. Branch President, has published poems and essays and is finishing a book on Emerson.

"You leave God behind, you know, when you enter Kentucky," the driver of the car said as we crossed the Ohio River bridges into Louisville. "This is the South, the damned and damning South."

We were driving Highways 65 and 40 south to Somerville, Fayette County, Tennessee, the center of a civil rights project with a militant and well advertised life of four years. We (and eventually about forty others) were students and faculty of universities in New York and Pennsylvania committing ourselves to a summer's life of fighting Jim Crow and Mister Charlie and Uncle Tom with voter registration and literacy schools in a rural area of southwest Tennessee. It was Faulkner country, and we were benevolent invaders. We were no pioneers in a cause, no curious in search of messages, but merely volunteers hoping that this brief human contact would assure us of our humanity and others of theirs. I wanted to feel that God too was crossing that state line with us that day.

There had been scuffles and beatings and shootings on the project in the summers previous. There had been progress too. And from what we could learn about the project beforehand, the Negroes in the area now had the initiative, though they were still a thousand years behind in their desires. We entered this summer at midpoint in the project's life, and our hopes for convincing the Negroes of their rights and encouraging their civil efforts were modest. I felt at one with the others because of those hopes.

But I was a *Mormon* going civil-rights-ing and that made a difference. To *me* it made a difference. Local church members had advised me not to go ("It's not approved," "You're needed here," "It's beneath you," "You can't change things"), and an ilk of friends had begun the stigma of radicalism ("You're not the type," "How idealistic!" "So you want to be a hero?"). But little did they know the reasons of the blood.

I went because I was frankly worried: worried that my wife and children should find me slipping after talking intense brotherhood, worried that the church members I led and taught should know where the doctrine but not the action in life is, worried that the students I counselled and read and philosophized with where I taught should reach for meaning for their lives and find no guts, worried in fact that I should somehow while propagating and preaching the Kingdom of God miss it, miss it altogether. The rest was nonsense.

On that first night in Tennessee, at the home of a generous and incredibly poor Negro family where two of us were staying for the summer, while I was lying on a deal bed passed down generations from a white man's junk heap, watching the badly pieced walls gotten bit by yellowed bit like a colored man's life and listening to a long hot summer's wealth of flies swelling the poor society of a light bulb, my mind made dialogues out of my decision to spend the summer as a civil rights worker. Meditation is discovery and justification.

This I knew that night in Tennessee, first of all: that one sure place the Kingdom of God militant can be found *in our world* is in the social battlefronts: in the radical urgency of social welfare work, in the radical urgency of civil rights marches and picket lines, in the radical urgency of passive protest against malignant politics, and in the radical urgency of socially conscious experimentation in humanistic education. This sense of social urgency grew in my blood gradually, I guess, out of Moses's heroic stories on brothers' keepers, and Christ's example of compassion for poor and accused, and King Benjamin's celebrations of personal charity ("If I had I would

give"), and a thousand sermons and examples from knee-high on. In me, time had gradually made personal involvement in humane problems a spiritual necessity. Involvement was after all the *only* dialogue a man has with God, action the only angel, risk the only Kingdom.

This "Christian" urgency was dormant in me however — suppressed, I should almost say, by home and hometown ignorance, by diversions of church and school, by the work for an education and professional status — until loving identification with a formidable issue like the race question fired my blood. A mulatto uncle's story had gradually unfolded in my early years and had shocked me into initial recognition. He was left as a baby on my grandparents' farmhouse doorstep in Southern Utah, and was raised by them with the usual human expectations. But he fell in love with a girl of scornful faith in the community, and because of his difference, he was disappointed in love. Cynical friends shortly after that threw him out of their car between towns one winter night and he lay in the snow all night and his fingers froze dead in the cold. I pitched hay with him several summers, and ten fingers that were off up to the second knuckle were awful reminders. Doom, drink, and disillusionment were in his eyes after that. My blood never forgot Uncle George.

But besides that there was in early years a growing awareness that my father had gone as a missionary for the Church in the South. His missionary stories at home were unintended stimuli. The work in Arkansas was difficult in those years, and he had to spend most of his mission teaching Negroes and whites to read and write before others later could teach them gospels of light. That was a noble thing, it always seemed to me, a very noble thing. Two weeks before he died, when I was a young man coming into my own ways, he voiced a strong hope that I too might "do something."

Later, I had had a gradual realization of the hypocrisy of indifference among the positioned and the promising, who love and are loved, but who, having conditioned themselves to be children of light rather than children of this world wise in their generation, made themselves unaware of social wars and incapable of social depth. Then finally, finally, I had gradually learned awe before the spat upon. All these reasons of the blood made a place where my social self could plant its testimony.

In Tennessee, this dialogue in my mind continued as we talked with the Negroes hot day in and wet day out in cotton fields and shacks during the weeks to come. It was much like the work I had known as a missionary in Germany several years before — going two

by two in the name of an ideal, looking for signs of hope in the eyes of a half-forgotten and half-deplored people, getting commitments for action from oppressed and ignorant, drawing the reluctant and the backward together to discuss spiritual and material welfare — like missionary work, except for one thing: because of the nature of the project I could not tell them, neither the white workers nor the Negroes, that the main impetus behind my interest and energy was the Mormon Church. They would not have understood. One does civil rights work, after all, because *society* is his church and *humanity* his theology and *action* his expression of faith, and not because a particular church self-centeredly trains and sponsors certain ones to promote a special social viewpoint in order to gain souls for itself. And they would not have believed me either. To the civil-rights workers, Mormons do not stir; they are not aware; they do not care. And of course the Negroes (through no fault of their own at all) wouldn't know that the Church cared — or even existed — for them.

Yet I found the Church coming out in me those days in Tennessee in a thousand ways. The Church in me made me frankly unafraid of the badgering county sheriff and his trained badgers who were constantly after us. The Church in me made it possible to endure the spitting looks and the distempered rudeness of the whites in the area who had no insight into our intentions with the Negroes. It drew me to old ladies on their fallen porches shelling peas all their lives and all their lives oblivious to causes; drew me to diseased and broken men chopping cotton late into the night in their depleted fields, ignorant of interracial kindness; drew me to young couples with more naked children than they could care about, ignorant of possibility; drew me to distended and distorted children that had seen hell yet knew no evil. Sympathy is a cheap virtue: all of us on the project had that. Beyond that in me there was the Church-born desire to recognize the divinity in each smashed soul and to be so bold as to wish for the godly means of making a miracle in their lives. In specific, the Church in me emboldened our search for people who would register and vote, who would enroll their children in all-white schools, and who would attend our literacy schools at night. I spoke frequently in their gatherings in an attempt to stir enthusiasm among them for *our* work and *their* rights, and because as a missionary among the fishermen and factory workers on the Baltic years before I had had to become "as the weak, that I might gain the weak," as Paul advises, I was soon dubbed "The Preacher Man" for want of a better term of approval. I liked that; it made me

one with their deepest interests. They invited me again and again to teach in their Sunday Schools, to "preach" in their meetings, to talk comfort and encouragement with them. I of course taught them *the* Christianity I knew; I knew no other kind, believed no other. They loved its tenor. I had not gone to them in the name of the Mormon Church, yet the Church came in a little way to them.

Every day we talked with scores of Negroes in our work. By now they were used to civil rights workers in and out of their fields and shacks. Our work was to stir them up to greater individual and collective use of their rights in elections that excluded them, in schools that eluded them, in stores and theaters and restaurants that either cheated or barred them. Of these possibilities they were doubtful (it was easy to be impatient with their patience for change), yet we met with them some evenings of each week to get them to organize themselves in their own causes. On those occasions, they always sang spirituals and prayed, and what they were saying as they sang and prayed was that they wanted God, just as I did, to be in on the new world that was coming to them in our guise.

Sunday church meetings were their best times for combining such godly and social concerns abundantly, and our most productive occasions for communicating to them our social concern for them. These occasions were a mortal shock at first: we were not prepared for such spiritual fervor among them and such loving communion with each other. At first we felt like intruders in the black man's heaven. Only those of us who had known such spirit at some time in our own religious lives penetrated the divine difference.

Their testimonials, their praying and singing, were more alive than I had ever experienced before. They were born of suffering and transcended skin and history. The glorious woe of their double burden — the burden of being and of being black — weighed heavily on them and gave their rowdy devotions spiritual solidity. With them my spirit too transcended blood and time, just as it had on special occasions as a missionary. As they sang and prayed, I became black and felt initiated into their kind of spiritual greatness. The Christianity I knew communicated with the Christianity they knew.

But the director of our county voter-registration and literacy project, a professor of economics and a man of keen social insight, admitted in a rare moment of lucidity that, while as civil rights workers we were giving the Negroes a social ethic they had never had before, we were also part of society's gradual but inevitable erosion of the Negro's religion. Their churches become "white," you see, as the economics and education in the area conform to that of the

whites. Protestant hymns replace deeply felt jazz devotions, set prayers replace cadenced cryings to an immanent God, formal theology replaces the felt love of story and example, articles of faith replace human sympathy, meetings replace personality, genteel satisfaction replaces spiritual pride in the beauty and integrity of race. To break into their fiery devotions Sundays to promote our project in their midst was flies in the balm of Gilead. In areas closer to Memphis, the project director said, where Negroes had achieved much higher social status and material well-being, their religion had become formal, well-dressed, dull, and therefore, like most other American Christianity, in practice dead. And the same would happen to all this holy burning: the fire of their intense love of God put out. After all, affluence is suspicious of emotion; success thwarts dependence on the divine; lack of social conflict reduces hope for the future life. To be accepted by whites, the Negroes must make themselves acceptable, and the black man's God goes out first. The immanence of God is thus swallowed up by eminence.

I think I broke down crying only once while on the project in Tennessee, and it was never at the smell of poverty or at the look of the socially trapped or at the sound of ignorance; only once — at the thought of the dying of that fire of faith. I have never met the like; we may never again. I have wondered how that fire, amid the social change, might be kept alive.

The project in the county was in part a failure: our goals were too high and our abilities too little. True, many Negroes went to register and to vote. A handful of children quietly integrated several white schools. The local white authorities were put in their place a little. The literacy schools attracted hundreds for a few weeks and left small encouragements here and there. And confidence in the help of white men rose among the Negroes.

But most of the workers were never really one with the people, and that made quite a difference. We had not totally become black like them. The whole of the Negro life is religious, the workers' lives almost entirely secular. Where for example the Negroes would be singing, "Help me prepare [for the next world]," the whites would get them to sing, "We shall overcome [this world]"; where the Negroes would address each other as brother and sister *all* the time, the whites would beg off from the moral intimacy; where the Negroes lived constantly in *hope,* the whites often turned that into anger. Both Negroes and whites had the same goals in mind, of course, but the approaches and needs of the two were very different. The leaders of the project, for example, were interested in the political force of

mass action and the economic power of the whole Negro community and for the most part overlooked individual needs — needs like nutrition in one family, moral stability in another, a son's rebellion against excellent but poverty-stricken and discouraged parents, a daughter's premature desires, and so on. Overpopulation was more of an issue with them than the sustenance of integral culture. Too, the white workers had difficulty in seeing how the Negroes resolve their phenomenal problems of disease and poverty and lack of security with faith and hope, how they long for divine as well as social relief from wretchedness, how they demand of themselves that an educated mind and social aspirations be commensurate with Bible inspiration, and how The Promised Land is to them both economic *and* prophetic. We had the consistent difficulty of white pride, it seemed to me; that is, we wanted so much for the Negroes to be like ourselves, "white," that we overlooked the spiritual advantages of being black.

I remember Maggie Mae Horton, a Negro mother of eighteen children who at forty gives all her time to stirring up feeling in the Uncle Toms of the delta. The language was biblical, her tact in her work forcefully Christian. She kept God and godliness in every part of her work, for to her civil rights and The Kingdom are one. Yet she wondered (and did it out loud once) why the white leaders and workers on the project had another bent, why their social orientations were essentially secular, sensitive but secular. She saw, as I was beginning to, that in many of them social work was compensation for the lack of spiritual concerns.

As it was, we could not get into the Negroes' lives well, because for the most part we were unreligious though dedicated young people, critical of Negro religion, often unwilling to love the spiritual life with them, unable to pray with them, unfired by their spirit. Those colored people who sang and prayed in their human agony deserve, it seemed to me on those genial hot Sundays in Tennessee, better teachers and examples than we were.

In late summer the project (by this time connected loosely with CORE and the Freedom Democratic Party in Mississippi) fell apart. There were far too few of us to handle the political and educational problems that arose. The Freedom Schools we had set up week-nights in almost every backwoods churchhouse in the county to teach literacy and democratic ideals had soon declined into pep rallies for strikes and sit-ins. And we were politically inept young people bucking the apt and evil representatives of the county and state, and therefore bound to fall fairly if fightingly flat. There was

no strong leadership to inspire all our work, and individual initiative in working with individual families' problems — that is, loving them into the recognition of their human dignity, their spiritual superiority, the source of their individual and collective problems, and the necessary aspirations to individually transcend their lot — was discouraged. Then public denunciations finally blew up the whole project. For example, some Negro leaders charged (correctly) that sex between a few of the workers and between a couple of workers and local Negroes degraded the project, and newspapers in the area charged (incorrectly) that we were all Communists or at least Communist-led. Yet another summer will bring another attempt to make the project work better. It *has* to work, or all is lost in the area, for there are no others who help them. Otherwise they just lie there.

I left the project for New York to teach and to be with my family. To me, as a Latter-day Saint, the experience had been cathartic, apocalyptic, metaphysical. I returned home not primarily with a greater sense of mission or message, nor a greater sense of urgency or pride at personal involvement, nor with greater knowledge and sympathy than when I went. Time can teach these things anyway. But in more significant measure, I returned with greater identification with the moral self which I know as a Mormon that I must, driven by time and temperament and teachings, become.

When time no longer ties me to certain necessities, I will turn again — and it doesn't have to be to Tennessee, but maybe to a local neighborhood or to Another Country — to lose myself among the trapped or degenerate. How else am I to find what I in this world must find — myself? Every soul has its own South. Especially a Mormon's.

Guest Artist

LeConte Stewart



If there is one characteristic which runs throughout the work of LeConte Stewart, it is a disciplined understatement, a kind of muted paean to the land he knows and loves so well.

Born in Glenwood, Utah, in 1891, Stewart has been a resident of Kaysville, Utah during most of his career. At the time of his retrospective exhibit at the Salt Lake Art Center in 1962, it was conjectured that he "has painted and drawn almost every house, barn, hill and field" in Davis County, Utah. "Whoever has seen these paintings will forever after see the land in terms of Stewart's vision. He has given meaning and grandeur to this unpretentious land. He has transformed it and dignified it with his artist's eye."

Stewart's technical training was taken at the Art Student's League in New York and the Pennsylvania Academy of the Fine Arts, but he returned to Utah to paint and, after serving as head of the Art Department of the University of Utah from 1938-56, he has continued to be a productive artist and a pivotal figure in Utah art.

Dialogue is pleased to present in this issue three representative drawings which portray the artist's feeling for his native rural landscape.



Roundtable

THE QUEST FOR AUTHORITY

Participants: *Richard L. Bushman*
William A. Clebsch
Mario S. De Pillis

The editors have arranged a sort of "instant dialogue" concerning an article in the Spring issue of DIALOGUE, *"The Quest for Religious Authority and the Rise of Mormonism," by the young Catholic scholar, Mario De Pillis. Richard L. Bushman, Assistant Professor of History at Brigham Young University, gives a Mormon's response to De Pillis, and William A. Clebsch, Associate Professor of Religion at Stanford, gives a Protestant's response. De Pillis then replies to Bushman and Clebsch.*

TAKING MORMONISM SERIOUSLY

Richard L. Bushman

In his article on the quest for authority in early Mormonism, Mario De Pillis contends that "the question of the historical origins of Mormonism must ever remain central" in any exchange between Mormons and non-Mormons. Coming in the first paragraph, this statement may put off many Mormon readers. Far from providing a meeting ground for "honest dialogue," the question of origins has more often been the battleground for an exhausting fight between combatants with such radically different assumptions that agreement or even fruitful conversation is impossible. By now it should be apparent that no exhibition of the Prophet's anomalous brilliance as a theologian or personal stature as a man will win over people convinced *a priori* that revelation could never come to a New York farm boy. On the other hand, piling up similarities between Joseph's teachings and the notions of Alexander Campbell, Sylvester Graham, and Ralph Waldo Emerson is no demonstration that Mormonism is the undisputed offspring of nineteenth century America. Mormons are not surprised that a society engrossed with the Bible above all other books should spawn individuals teaching ideas similar to

Joseph's restoration of pure biblical Christianity. Moreover, the Mormon conception of apostasy and restoration postulates that God would prepare the world for his Prophet's revelations by fostering comparable attitudes and beliefs. L.D.S. historians have long argued that nineteenth century America was carefully cultivated to receive the teachings of the Restoration. The discovery of similarities confirms Mormon belief as much as it explains away the Prophet. Since the assumptions, rather than the facts, determine the conclusion, discourse between historians of differing persuasions has usually ended in acrimony and mutual distrust.

The Book of Mormon and the writings of Abraham in the Pearl of Great Price are the aspects of Mormon teaching which offer scholarly leverage on the authenticity of revelation. Their claim to be ancient writings can be readily tested by established canons of proof. Unfortunately, non-Mormons have started at the wrong end again by showing similarities with nineteenth century beliefs. By the same measure, the appearance of Paul's theology in the sermons of New England ministers would prove his epistles fraudulent. The only way to prove the Book of Mormon and the writings of Abraham false is to find contradictions with the milieu of the ancient world from which they claim to have arisen. No non-Mormon historians have undertaken this task, however, and all we hear is that the Gadianton bands were disguised versions of the Masons. Meanwhile Mormon historians have gotten the jump on their antagonists and brought to light a multitude of similarities and harmonies which go far toward proving the Book of Mormon authentic ancient history.

De Pillis's failure to discuss the origins of Mormonism in these terms may blind Mormon readers to the value of his work, both for our own understanding of the early Church and as the opening comment in a potentially rewarding exchange. Actually De Pillis is reproving historians, as a Mormon might, for missing the significance of theology and belief in the rise of the Church. "Non-Mormon historians have not taken Mormonism seriously *as a religion.* They have thought it sufficient to take a position on the golden plates and to relate the 'movement' to the general history of the time. Mormonism ends up as a kind of religious Grahamism." He wants to rescue us from the social historians and the men of letters who see Mormons as colorful or bizarre but would not dream of treating Mormon theology with the same respect one affords Luther or Calvin or even the Puritans. De Pillis does not consider Joseph to have been one of the giants of his age, but the article does insist that he spoke directly to a major religious issue and must be placed in the intellectual as well as the social mainstream of his era. De Pillis's analysis of Mormon origins is substantially closer to the one Mormons themselves would give than those in most non-Mormon accounts and is far superior to those of Wallace Stegner or Fawn Brodie, which so often ring hollow to Mormon ears. At least he sees the Priesthood as more than an adolescent indulgence in ranks and titles.

De Pillis's search for origins is also useful because it goes beyond the somewhat naive and hopeless attempt to explain away Joseph and treats the more promising question of what was appealing about Mormonism. That side of his interest is probably what compelled De Pillis to take Joseph's religious teachings seriously. Mormons would do well to entertain the same question, for perhaps then we too would take Joseph more seriously. The long sojourn

in the Great Basin has so accustomed the Church to a provincial status that Mormons can hardly believe that our teachings could once have spoken to the most burning issues of the day. But the conversions of John Taylor and Sidney Rigdon, keen and well-informed as they were, and the success of Wilford Woodruff with the congegation at Ledbury, which included forty-five ministers, attests the relevance of the missionaries' message to contemporaneous theological concerns. De Pillis asks what attracted these people along with the thousands of less well-educated. What was it that made Mormonism plausible? What needs did it meet? However much Mormons believe that the Holy Spirit converts, we do not hold that it annihilates the mind, but rather that it works through the thinking processes. What elements of belief, what aspirations and fears in the minds of nineteenth century men gave the Holy Spirit a footing? On these grounds Mormons can indeed enter into a conversation with De Pillis and any other historians who care to join him.

De Pillis's main argument is simple and, in my estimation, true. The proliferation of denominations under American conditions of religious toleration impelled many to seek an authoritative faith. An anxious search for *the* truth moved Joseph to pray in the grove, and when he found his answer, others accepted it because they were bent on the same quest. Joseph's claims to revelation and priesthood authority appealed to men hungry for certain knowledge of God. De Pillis gives little evidence for his assertion, but a Mormon audience, at least, does not require it. Besides the familiar story of the First Vision, we have the account of Parley Pratt and countless others. Parley was reasonably satisfied with the gospel he learned from associates of Alexander Campbell except for one shortcoming: lack of a "commissioned priesthood, or apostleship to minister in the ordinances of God." One night's conversation with Hyrum Smith persuaded Parley to believe in Joseph's revelations and authority. Mormons can agree that De Pillis has hit upon an important reason for the success of the early Church.

Like many people who get a good idea, however, De Pillis carries this one too far. The quest for authority can help explain why converts were attracted to the Church. From a non-Mormon point of view it might even explain why Joseph would dream up the idea of Priesthood. (Though if it was such a successful solution, one would expect other Americans to have tried it; the same cause operating universally in America should have produced similar results in other religions.) But this single cause does not explain the intricate elaboration of priesthood into two divisions with multiple levels and a complicated division of duties. The cause is altogether too simple for the complex result. Men eat because they are hungry, but raw hunger does not satisfactorily account for sophisticated French cuisine. Custom, aesthetics, status-strivings, and probably a host of other social forces lie behind the delight in French cooking. De Pillis's hypothesis may well explain why Joseph and Oliver sought divine authority before baptizing one another, but those historians who reject the possibility of revelation will have to look further for an explanation of the layers on layers of keys and powers added in succeeding years. What in the world led Joseph to expand upon the claim to a single divine commission when the involved priesthood structure contradicted so severely the preference for simple ecclesiastical organization inherited from his New England forebears and approached dangerously the ways of the hated papists? That is a knotty problem indeed for critics of the Prophet.

By the same token, the quest for an authoritative religion may help us understand why revelation attracted investigators, but it does not explain (for Mormon or non-Mormon) why certain doctrines were revealed. Hopefully De Pillis's assertion that this single factor accounts for much of Joseph's teachings will not hinder researchers from looking for other relevant elements in the theological environment. Apart from the question of the source of the revelations (where the answer is settled for church members), there is the problem of why Joseph asked the questions he did. What stopped him on specific passages in the Bible and brought him to ask for illumination? Why did the statement on the resurrection of the just and the unjust provoke him to prayer? De Pillis's somewhat exaggerated claims could slow work on questions interesting to Mormons and non-Mormons alike.

Mormons will find factual and interpretative flaws in the work. There is, for example, no reason for ascribing skepticism to Oliver Cowdery on the question of authority to baptize. Both he and Joseph simply wanted to know the prerequisites for performing the ordinance. The Melchizedek Priesthood was not necessary to ordain Teachers or Deacons, and the position of High Priest as an office in the higher priesthood has been clear ever since the reception of Section 107 in the Doctrine and Covenants. But Mormons should not snap at De Pillis for relatively minor errors. If mutual understanding and trust is ever to grow between Church historians and non-members, tolerance on both sides is necessary.

In this vein, the only disappointing misconstruction for me was De Pillis's statement that the danger of doctrinal waywardness and the need for one true fold expressed in the Book of Mormon are "the only real theological themes of the book," which is much like saying that revulsion against sex is the central impulse of Augustine's *Confessions*. The Book of Mormon has always been difficult reading for outsiders. Little progress has been made since Mark Twain quipped that it was chloroform in print. The theological richness, the overpowering devotion to Christ and gratitude for His atonement, the narrative complexity and human interest — all these seem to elude non-Mormons. De Pillis is not to be blamed, especially when he has come so far toward understanding early Mormonism. Obviously Mormon writers have not adequately explicated the book. What authoritative work should De Pillis have read to grasp its import and beauty? Mormons must find words to reach the likes of him as well as a strictly Mormon audience. That goes for Mormon history as well, and De Pillis may have opened new ground on which a dialogue can begin.

EACH SECT THE SECT TO END ALL SECTS

William A. Clebsch

It is not only refreshing in itself but also an occasion for rejoicing by all serious students of American religious history that Mario S. De Pillis is recalling our attention to the historical study of Mormonism's origins, understood as human actions in time and space and interpreted as a constitutive part of the American pilgrimage. Such a view of Mormonism is unusually instructive when carried out in considerable detail and when thoroughly documented.

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For even as the young Joseph Smith in Palmyra was receiving the first

revelations which, although later amended in important ways, made him the founder of a religion, the aging Friedrich Schleiermacher in Berlin was teaching us that religions are best understood historically by studying *ad fontes* their founders. It is correct in this connection to refer to Schleiermacher's mode, not Erasmus's, of returning *ad fontes* because the former allows founders of religions to be understood as humans acting in temporal, spatial, and cultural contexts, even while the student holds under critical scrutiny his own assumptions as to the validity or invalidity of that divine authority which all historically founded religions claim as their authentication.

Therefore, it is entirely valid to wish that "non-Mormon historiography," especially where it has been "implicitly anti-Mormon," should have consulted the standard Mormon historiography of Roberts, Whitney, and J. F. Smith, even while recognizing that "such standard Mormon historians" are implicitly or explicitly pro-Mormon. It is also valid to fault writers for fastening on the dramatic and heroic career of Brigham Young as the key to understanding Mormonism as a religion — although it can hardly be denied that Young is the representative man of Mormonism's role in American social history. It is valid to deplore debates over the golden tablets, rampant (on both sides) since Alexander Campbell's cutting *Delusions* and Henry Caswall's patronizing *City of the Mormons,* for indeed the sacred scriptures of any religion are "authentic" so long as they carry divine authority for believers. To such documents the historian properly brings such questions as how they became authoritative for believers and how far they remain so in a given situation. But whether they are authentic as divine revelations rests always on merely human testimony, and it is only that testimony, not that which it attests, which falls within the historian's ken. It is not only valid but timely and necessary to plead that Mormonism's sub-canonical documents — or those of any other religion (and, with the aforementioned reservations, the canonical writings too) — be subjected to rigorous textual-historical scrutiny in the interest of historical accuracy. For all this, and it is very much indeed, the article is both valid and valuable.

* * *

Perhaps the dialogue about "Mormonism as a religion" among other American religions, for which the article urgently pleads, has already begun more fully than is recognized. That a significant breakthrough in the study of American religions has occurred in the last generation, under the auspices of university historians in the United States, has been convincingly demonstrated by Henry F. May in a penetrating article, "The Recovery of American Religious History," *American Historical Review,* LXX (October 1964), 79-92. He concludes that "the revival" of religious history as well as religion "has brought American history back into the great dialogue between secular and religious thought. It is to this dialogue, after all, that American culture itself owes much of its vigor and complexity." Perhaps the dialogue to which Professor May refers goes beyond that proposed by De Pillis, but to commence the latter necessarily leads to the former.

That even among church historians there appeared, beginning in the 1950's, "a new, synoptic, literally synthetic, or universal interpretation" of American religion was the thesis of my article, "A New Historiography of American Religion," *Historical Magazine of the Protestant Episcopal Church,*

XXXII (September 1963), 225-257 (the quotation is from page 225). No more than Professor May's did my article shed new light on, or display new attitudes toward, Mormonism in particular. But they cited a vast literature which indeed does shed a few rays of such light and which almost without exception displays the healthy attitudes and the openness for dialogue with Mormonism as a religion for which De Pillis yearns. Yet he cites none of this literature.

Two examples of church historians may carry my point. Certainly Mormonism was taken seriously as a religion by Jerald C. Brauer in his *Protestantism in America, A Narrative History* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953; a slightly updated edition appeared in 1966). On pages 163-166 he neither allows Young to overshadow Smith, nor argues about the golden plates, nor ignores early documentary data. More recently Winthrop S. Hudson has given us his masterful *Religion in America* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965), in which four large and tightly-written pages deal with the origins, historical and doctrinal, of Mormonism; in them, Young gets four lines and Smith all the rest. Both these historians stress early doctrinal developments and religious authority in their interpretations, Hudson more generously but both with patent earnestness. That they allot only a few pages to Mormonism is surely no slight. When we consider that more than 200 denominations or sects demand some sort of explanation in general works on American religion, to devote four of 400 pages to Mormonism indicates, if anything, a quantitative two-to-one bias in its favor. With Hudson's opinion that Mrs. Fawn M. Brodie's *No Man Knows My History* is the "best biography of Smith" De Pillis reveals implicit agreement. (I am perplexed to find in his copious footnotes no mention of Thomas F. O'Dea, *The Mormons* [Chicago, 1957], which most of us non- but not anti-Mormon historians regard very highly precisely for its taking Mormonism seriously *as a religion.*)

* * *

I have dwelt, perhaps too long, on the early paragraphs of De Pillis's article because I want to emphasize at once the validity of his approach as it appears to a humanistic historian of religion and because his plea for honest and serious consideration of Mormonism as a religion with its own history, properly understood by primary interest in its founder, is a plea already largely answered in an ample corpus of writings.

All American religious groups have been plagued by their own historiographers' turning apologists and catechists — try any of the denominational volumes in the "American Church History" series (itself otherwise a landmark in church historiography). If serious dialogue between Mormons and other American religionists is to take place, these demons must of course be exorcised. But not only they. Also to be laid aside in the interest of honest conversation is the sense of persecution or neglect of any given religion. That is not easy, as De Pillis's article itself demonstrates. There can be little doubt that among major religious groups in America the Mormons bear the sorest scars of persecution. But before them the Quakers were lashed, and since them the Jehovah's Witnesses. The difficulty is that any religious group claiming both uniqueness and absolute authenticity must sense neglect in the very fact of its being one sect among many, and under these circumstances neglect is hardly distinguishable affectively from a sense of persecution. Such things

happen even to tight-knit parties within denominations which are, in most respects, well assimilated into the religious pluralism (and its implicit relativism) of American society.

To the best of my knowledge nobody has written about it before, but the chronological, geographical, and religious parallels between the Mormons and the early strict Anglo-Catholics within the Protestant Episcopal Church are quite striking. In the late 1830's, writings of the English Tractarians on the independent spiritual authority of priests struck such men as William Adams, James Lloyd Breck, and John Henry Hobart, Jr. (the bishop's son) as new revelations, conveying absolute religious authority inherent in a divinely authorized priesthood and dissolving all doubts about conflicting claims of the multitudinous sects. It was in New England and New York that the Tractarian doctrine of authority was especially appealing. Those who accepted it were at first harrassed by their fellow Episcopalians and more generally suspected of crypto-Roman Catholicism. These sectarians, like the Mormons, looked to the west for their Zion, and the three persons mentioned settled into a semi-monastic community in Nashotah, Wisconsin. They were theologically in revolt against old-line true religion in the American wilderness. Some such Anglo-Catholics indeed defected to Roman Catholicism, but many remained restlessly within their denomination as a sub-sect, sensing neglect and persecution because their claim to unique religious authority failed of the universal acknowledgement which alone could justify it.

At one juncture or another, every religious group in America has undergone a similar crisis. In one crisis or another, every such group has aspired to be the sect to end all sects. In this sense, Mormonism epitomizes the experience of sectarian religion in America from William Bradford and Anne Hutchinson to Malcolm X and Father Divine.

* * *

To belong to a family is not, of course, to lose individuality. Mormonism (here I speak not of the Reorganized Church) is, in fact, distinct. But its distinctness resides not in the fact that it is based on a special revelation, not in its authority and priesthood, not in its anti-Calvinistic doctrine, not in its having a special key to unlock the Bible, not in its attentiveness to early Christianity and to the old Israel, not even in its intimacy with the Deity. It is distinct for its capacity to transform the crisis-situation which all sects have known into an enduring program of social organization — enduring, at least, until recently. Thus it would require mountains of new data and reams of new interpretation to unseat Brigham Young from his cathedra as the representative man of Mormonism as a distinct socio-politico-economic community based on sectarian religion. Of course I merely underscore De Pillis's emphasis upon Smith's entire career after 1830 as the founder of the Mormon *religion,* and I also underscore the uniqueness of the Prophet's revelations not because they were revelation but as his particular revelations.

Whether such distinctness, specifically religious or more generally social, is capable of earning for Mormonism a "special status . . . as a fourth major religion" in America strikes me as a very important but entirely open question. I remain unconvinced that a Protestant-Catholic-Jew-Mormon configuration "is generally accepted in American society."

Motion-picture films used at the 1956 Democratic National Convention

and later shown on nationwide television hookups are at best evanescent indicators of basic forces at work in American society, and they are even flimsier signs of portentous tendencies in American religion. At the same time nobody would deny the significance of the fact that certain prominent Mormons have recently become men of national prominence — mostly as Republicans. But my doubts arise not so much from the evidence adduced as from the three-community conception of American religion on which Mormonism's proposed membership as a fourth community entirely relies. The sociological researches of Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, reported at length in *Religion and Society in Tension* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), produce strong indications that the three-community conception is more a construct of interpretation than a description of the actual present realities of religion in American society. Alongside the question of Mormonism's admission as a fourth member of a religious constellation is the weightier question whether any such constellation exists outside the pages of certain well-known books.

That Mormonism has thus far deviated from the morphology of sectarian assimilation into mainstream American religion results not only from its genius at merging religious with political and economic institutions but, perhaps more prominently, from its self-imposed and geographically reinforced isolation from the mainstream of American life. But can Mormon isolation and Mormon cohesion, mutually dependent as they are, resist the erosive forces of television, population mobility, outward as well as upward education, and all the other familiar elements of rapid social change? And if Mormonism is being brought into dialogue with other American sects or religions, is the sufficient condition of the dialogue specifically religious or is it the result of a more fully shared Americanness?

* * *

From these sociological uncertainties let us return in conclusion to Clio's domain where we belong. It is demonstrable (but not briefly so) that the three-community conception of American religion relies not so much on the cohesion of Jews, Catholics, and Protestants as American religions as it relies on the centuries-old influences of Jews, Catholics, and Protestants upon the deepest currents of Western civilization. Predictions come not from Clio but from some ventriloquist muse, and nobody can say confidently whether Mormonism's power to be exceptional will enable it to find status as a fourth American religion. It is simply a matter of record that its influence on Western civilization is, so far and understandably so, superficial.

However, it is hardly to be expected that dialogue will begin on such a fourth-religion basis. Each American sect has some time hoped to be the sect to end all sects. Only when that hope was forfeited as hopeless — call it maturity or loss of nerve — has genuine dialogue arisen between these communities. Then denomination met denomination in the interest of understanding and cooperation, not in the hope of conversion or of attaining status as an independent religion. What the various religions (denominations, sects, churches, or however called) in America have come to share is first a common Americanness and then a common religiousness.

In a very powerful sense, every religious community in the United States today is natively American. From the fourth century onwards, religion in

Europe followed the principle *cuius regio eius religio* (whose region his religion) — not only Christians but Moors and Jews and pagans. No European religion transferred to these shores has maintained the principle. Instead the rule in America has been *cuius ecclesia eius religio* (whose congregation his religion). Not Mormon Prophet nor Catholic Pope nor Anglican Priest nor Puritan Presbyter nor Methodist Preacher has for long broken the rule, and the potpourri of American religions endures. Its very multiplicity is the condition of its harmony. Things unique — doctrine, discipline, worship, order, polity, piety, etc. — abide the *de facto* forfeiture of universality by a device that is simple and pragmatic: by turning *de jure* claims to universality into specific characteristics of uniqueness.

The Prophet's dictum holds for the Latter-day Saints: "Truth is Mormonism. God is the author of it." Just that dictum is the ticket of admission to the dialogue between religions and between the religious and the secular in America. For every participant in the dialogue representing religion says the same about his religion (with varying degrees of vehemence). The dialogue proceeds on the tacit assumption that such absolute claims are basically characteristic of religion, and that those who voice them intend them relatively.

MORMONISM AND THE AMERICAN WAY: A RESPONSE

Mario S. De Pillis

Let me begin by congratulating the editors and founders of *Dialogue* for their intellectual daring and integrity in the handling of this journal. And I want to thank them for inviting considered commentary on my article instead of falling back on the usual device of edited letters.

My article, though it was long and detailed, needed formal commentary. In arguing for the importance of early Mormon history as the basis for defining "Mormonism" as a religion, I selected but one major religious element in the early church: authority. Much had to be omitted, a fact that is implicit in the commentaries of both Mr. Clebsch and Mr. Bushman. They have raised the larger question of the significance of the phenomenon of Mormonism in American history and life.

It is a special pleasure to respond to commentators who understood and even in a large part assented to my basic thesis. To use an accurate colloquialism, Clebsch and Bushman knew what I was talking about.

Before taking up the varied questions raised by Mr. Clebsch I would like to clarify my use of the word "authentic." In the standard usage of professional historians the word refers to the historical actuality or "historicity" of a written document or an artifact. In this sense for example, both the "Protocols of Zion" and the "Piltdown Man" have been shown to be inauthentic forgeries. Non-Mormon historians have always implicitly or explicitly stressed the inauthenticity of the golden plates and the revelations claimed by Joseph Smith. I had suggested that while that is a legitimate and relevant inquiry, it might be more fruitful to examine the actual content of the revelations for their religious significance.

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Clebsch, on the other hand, in writing of the "divine authority which all historically founded religious claim as their authentication," used the word as a theologian might use it. The historian's method, of course, is hardly capable of scrutinizing the historical actuality of divine intervention.

The theological use of the word "authentic" led Clebsch to imply that I deplore *all* investigations of documentary or "historical" authenticity. Not at all. I simply object to the unscholarly spirit of such investigations in the past (for example, the eagerness to believe in the untenable Spaulding Theory of the origins of the Book of Mormon) and regret their less fruitful effects in the present. Such investigations, when carried out in a scientific spirit, are still relevant to historical truth. And I would even invite Mormon scholars to join in the first necessary step (not possible for non-Mormons), namely, the careful editing and publication of the original manuscripts of the basic Mormon sources, warts and all. Probably the easiest and most logical place to begin would be Joseph Smith's manuscript "History of the Church."

Another way of saying all this is that I took great pains in my article to write not as a church historian or western historian or intellectual historian but as a historian pure and simple, who applies the same basic canons of historical method to all historical phenomena. This stance, conscious if not explicitly announced, explains the first large omission noted by Clebsch: that I ignored certain historians who have already advocated the need to study religious history in its larger historical context and have already fulfilled the need — even to the point of according a place in Mormon history to Joseph Smith.

I was aware of most of the works mentioned by Clebsch, but am still not persuaded that they support his conclusions. First there are two general historiographical articles: one by Clebsch himself (1963) and one by Henry F. May (1964). Both came to a similar conclusion: they saw the beginnings of a new, synoptic, universal interpretation of American religion, one that engages both "church historians" and "secular" historians.

But this is a very new historiographical attitude and has not even begun to touch the writing of Mormon history by non-Mormons. I documented this fact fairly carefully in my sampling of standard intellectual histories and pointed out that it can also be documented in college textbook accounts of Mormonism. Indeed, Puritanism, the one religion that has enjoyed the most rigorous treatment (I called it "serious" and "professional") has hardly had the study it needs — especially for its period of decay in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The monumental work of the late Perry Miller went unheeded by serious, secular, professional, synoptic historians through the 1930's and most of the 1940's. Other religious denominations do not even have their Perry Millers, and it will be even longer before such denominations are understood.

One root of the problem has been the fact that for years "church history" was an isolated specialty. It was written (as we "secular" historians like to think) by seminary teachers, often untrained members of the denomination being written up. The official organization of trained church historians seemed unable to break out of their isolation, and not until the last five or ten years have secular historians deigned to acknowledge the legitimacy of church history — even in its newer scientific form. Suspicion of and

disinterest in church history still persist. I am perhaps a victim of the disinterest, though not of the suspicion.

I did indeed ignore the general works of church historians Brauer and Hudson. But after all they wrote general works: where are the full-length studies of Mormonism by either secular or church historians? And more to the point of my article, where are the secular textbook writers who bother to consult the very new breed of church historians? I do not find that the three pages alloted to Mormonism by Brauer (1953) have in the least affected the intellectual historians or textbook writers. It is the latter and not the church historians who bend the minds of thousands of college students. And for all the mastery Hudson may demonstrate in his four pages on early Mormonism, I doubt that these pages in his new book (1965) will change things much.

But Clebsch's remarks have at least sparked my interest in the new church historians and in what Henry F. May called their "dialogue" with secular historians. I feel as I once did after living for some time with a large and pious Mormon family. Lest I give offense in the intimacy of family life I gave up cigarettes and coffee and adjusted myself cheerfully to meatless weekdays and orange soda. It was wonderful for my character, but I do remember once sneaking out at night for a cup of coffee. Perhaps at the risk of offending colleagues who look askance at church history, I shall take to sneaking out to Brauer, Hudson, and Clebsch.

Mr. Clebsch should not be perplexed at my omission of Thomas F. O'Dea's *The Mormons* (1957). I was speaking of historical research on Mormonism. O'Dea's book, though excellent in many ways, is a sociological analysis using historical materials. He does not consistently confront the great issues of historical change that have been debated in the professional literature. And when he does, he often leans heavily on secondary works, many of which are inadequate.

Clebsch's conclusion that my plea for an honest and serious consideration of Mormonism as a religion "is a plea already largely answered in an ample corpus of writings" is hardly tenable.

A second omission noted by Clebsch has to do with other denominations which, like the Mormons, have suffered persecution. He pointed out that the Quakers, Jehovah's Witnesses, and any similar groups claiming uniqueness and authority "must sense neglect in the very fact of [each] being one sect among many, and under these circumstances neglect is hardly distinguishable affectively from a sense of persecution."

There is some truth in this. A Mormon social psychologist once wrote of the "group consciousness" intensified among the Mormons by persecution. And the Quaker historian Rufus Jones long defended the records and historical reputation of the Quakers from all hostile outsiders as assiduously as B. H. Roberts did among the Mormons.

But a sense of neglect accompanied by some harrassment is hardly comparable to the persecution of the Mormons. The Mormon experience of massive expropriations of property and means of livelihood, of legal injustice, of social harrassment, of widespread bloodshed; of rape, beatings, and violent outrages of so many kinds for so many years — this experience was "affectively" (emotionally) so distinct and unusual that, for me at least, the persecutions of other American sects seem merely unpleasant. Robert B. Flanders, a member of the Reorganized Church, concluded his recent history

of Nauvoo by stating that as a result of the persecution culminating in 1846 the Mormons developed a hatred and suspicion of outsiders that "blighted" the entire mentality of the Mormon community in Utah for many years afterwards.

A final omission noted by Mr. Clebsch is theoretical, complex, and stimulating — though not easy to follow. He suggested that Mormon origins and destiny should be discussed in connection with the socio-politico-economic community known as the United States; and that the United States is more than a community: it is an institutional expression of Western civilization. This is indeed a synoptic and universal approach to Mormon history.

More specifically, Clebsch sees three particularly relevant points to be discussed. First, while accepting the rightness of my emphasis on Joseph Smith and early Mormonism as premises for any understanding of Mormonism as a religion, he would still re-enthrone Brigham Young. He states that when Mormonism is viewed as a distinct socio-politico-economic community within the larger community, Brigham Young is "the representative man of Mormonism's role in American social history." Secondly, as a socio-politico-economic community Mormonism simply does not appear to have the deep historical roots in Western civilization to justify calling it a fourth major religion. Thirdly, even if such a deeply rooted community were assumed, a dialogue with Mormonism is more likely to discuss "shared Americanness" than the religious values of a separate fourth religion: the American situation, in contrast with the European principle of *cuius regio eius religio,* will implacably force all dialogue to proceed "on the tacit assumption that . . . absolute claims [to universal authority] are basically characteristic of religion, and that those who voice them intend them relatively."

These propositions are worth several days of profoundly stimulating conversation, and it is comforting to know that my Mormon commentator, Mr. Bushman, has not confronted me with a similar nest of hornets.

Concerning the first proposition, it seems to me that to invite Brigham Young back to his pre-eminence as "the representative man of Mormonism's role in American social history" is to drag him through a very narrow back door to the throne. It would involve, as Clebsch candidly admits, basing the historical distinctiveness of Mormonism, not on the Book of Mormon, the Doctrine and Covenants, the doctrine of authority, the priesthood, and so on, but on the social and economic foundations of the community of Mormonism. In short, it would involve not discussing the history of Mormon religion at all, but only the sociology of the Mormon religion.

Moreover, one cannot, it seems to me, separate Mormonism as a religion with doctrines from Mormonism as a socio-economic community with social values and group interests. I suspect that Clebsch was aware of this impossibility and that his awareness led him to write the unclear and contradictory sentences at the beginning of the fourth section of his essay: ". . . it would require mountains of new data . . . to unseat Brigham Young. . . . Of course I merely underscore De Pillis's emphasis upon Smith's entire career after 1830 as founder of the Mormon *religion,* and I also underscore the uniqueness of the Prophet's revelations not because they were revelations but as his particular revelations."

There are mountains of data, old and new, for unseating Young. I can cite only one (explicitly de-emphasized in my paper): Mormon communi-

tarianism. The entire history of the socio-politico-economic community under Young in Utah can hardly be understood without the "law of stewardship," which Joseph Smith promulgated in the very early revelation on the "United Order of Enoch" (Doctrine and Covenants, Section 42, Feb. 9, 1831). Indeed, Leonard Arrington's socio-economic history of Mormonism in Utah begins in 1830.

The political arrangements of the Utah community were clearly less a product of doctrine than the social and economic institutions. American society at large produced the political order: negatively, by persecuting Mormons as dissenters and thus welding Mormon group consciousness; positively, by supplying ready-made political and legal institutions. Mormons accepted the federal legal and political system. On the other hand, Mormon religion was not without influence in politics. The political order of territorial Utah, for example, was controlled by a ruling class that was coextensive with the Council of Fifty organized in Nauvoo.

Perhaps Clebsch's reinstatement of Young turns on a particular definition of "social history." I myself conceive of social history as the history of society — its classes, property arrangements, social institutions like the family, educational institutions, and so on. In this sense (polygamy and cooperation come immediately to mind), Joseph Smith was definitely the shaper of Mormon society. If "social" and "society" refer to the larger society of the United States, I do not see how either man could be considered more "representative." Almost exact contemporaries, they were very similar in social and geographical origins.

The second proposition I have extracted from Clebsch's analysis concerns my thesis that Mormonism could be considered a fourth religion. Perhaps in emphasizing the unique importance of Mormonism in American culture I pushed that point too far. I rested content with an allusion to an image from a political campaign — metaphorical evidence at best. Mr. Clebsch was most astute to pick this up.

Nevertheless, for all the similarity of the career of Mormonism to that of other sects and for all its shallowness of historical roots as compared with the three major religious communities, I am greatly impressed with its remarkable resistance to erosion — even by the standardizing American "consensus" culture. Consider the fate of its contempoaries, Campbellism and Shakerism, the one with practically nothing left of its original distinctiveness, the other with practically nothing left in membership. Christian Science has shown an ability to survive, but its distinctiveness is quite diluted because it did not, like Protestantism, Judaism, Catholicism — and Mormonism — create a distinctive culture. Or consider, notwithstanding the sociological researches of Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, the continued high percentage of endogamous marriages within each of the four groups — especially within Mormonism.

I agree that it is not Clio's domain to predict, but I sometimes wonder whether sociology can predict much more accurately. Undoubtedly differences among all four groups are declining, but it would be premature to state that the groups have ceased to exist.

Clebsch's less sociological criterion for testing my "fourth religion" thesis is the fact that the influence of Mormonism on Western civilization is at best superficial compared with Judaism, Catholicism, and Protestantism. An impressive argument. Influence depends to a large extent, for example, on

the numbers converted relative to the total population and on the coercive backing of the state; in the light of either of these two causes Mormon influence would necessarily be miniscule in Western civilization and even within the United States. But while quite conscious of the limitations of my thesis, I would suggest that Mormonism is probably the largest religion in the United States associated with a particular socio-economic community which cannot exactly be termed Protestant. The only other such group I can think of is the narrowly ethnic Black Muslims. And without benefit of the government coercion that helped spread particular religions in the past Mormonism has displayed a truly remarkable potential for growth, especially in English-speaking countries.

Clebsch speculates very persuasively on the future prospects for a dialogue with Mormonism. It may indeed be true that Mormonism must "mature" or lose its nerve before it can abandon its claim to unique restored authority and thus prepare the way for a dialogue based first on common Americanness — and then on common religiousness.

But given a complete loss of nerve, I do not see how the discussion of "common Americanness" can precede a discussion of common religiousness. A loss of nerve would mean the reduction of Mormonism to a kind of religion that is socially workable, that is, one that has much in common with other de-universalized denominations. For the Mormons, this would involve, for example, the rejection of authority as represented in (1) a practicing belief in the Book of Mormon and the Doctrine and Covenants and (2) a practicing belief in the historical rationale of a "Great Apostasy" and Restoration. In sum, "maturing" would mean a loss of distinctive Mormon doctrines or "religiousness." It would require — and Clebsch rightly makes this a prerequisite of dialogue between *any* groups — that Mormonism must cease proselytizing among other Christian groups. Catholic and Protestant ecumenists have been able to accept the latter requirement, but the vitality of Mormonism and some of its unique doctrines seem to presuppose what Protestants call "sheepstealing." Thus, the denial of doctrine, whether forced by historical maturity or consciously made in the face of threats, would be so great that Mormonism would have to abjure its own identity.

There would also be serious obstacles on the non-Mormon side. For example, the Jewish, Christian, and non-believing scholars now so effectively cooperating in scriptural studies would have to be willing to discuss Mormon scriptures as if they were as authentically Hebrew as the traditional scriptures. As both Mr. Bushman and I have noted, this seems unlikely.

How optimistic can one be about so fundamental a change in Mormonism (and attitudes toward it)? Considering the continued expansion of Mormonism in foreign countries as well as the United States, change seems improbable.

But ecumenism cannot afford to be as rationally pessimistic as these implications I have spun out from Clebsch's remarks. Looking at the positive side (not so positive, I am sure, for many Mormons), the withering forces of modern social change may indeed force a loss of nerve in the near future. The distinctive aspects of Mormon religion could conceivably be interpreted right out of practical existence — as the doctrine of polygamy and the "gathering" to Zion were. Joseph Smith's claims could then be parables of hope.

This drastic change is merely historical speculation based on Mr. Clebsch's remarks and, I trust, will not offend Mormon readers. Such a change is

probably what Clebsch had in mind in writing that unique doctrines with universal claims can abide the pragmatic "*de facto* forfeiture of universality." Perhaps (to continue in the optimistic vein) a journal like *Dialogue* is a sign. And the theological racism of the Book of Mormon is already profoundly threatened. Eternal denominational verities, even less offensive ones than racism, seem to be dying all about us. The shape of Roman Catholocism is particularly worth pondering in this regard. As Father Gregory Baum recently wrote in *Christian Century,* ". . . what is happening in the Catholic Church at this moment . . . is that we do not always know exactly what authoritative teaching is." One wonders whether the piety of an Italian peasant-pope has not had more effect than all the socio-economic forces of the United States.

This brings us to the third and final proposition drawn from Clebsch: *cuius regio eius religio. Regio* must be translated kingdom or state, not "region." Unlike "region" the word state clearly implies coercive power. It is true that, with the possible exception of the magistrates of Massachusetts Bay, the state in America has not been able to employ coercion in religion. But secularization and disestablishment are no longer unique to America. And the result has been not harmony in multiplicity but polite toleration. Mr. Bushman applies the American rhetoric of toleration in asking fellow Mormons not to snap at me for minor errors because mutual trust can grow only if there is "tolerance on both sides." It seems to me that secularization has led not to the relativization of unique claims but merely to a gradual acceptance of the idea that coercion in religious matters is wrong. Radical Protestant and Catholic ecumenists insist that we have got to go beyond this nineteenth-century concept of "toleration."

If universal claims were really so casual as to be "intended relatively" and if they are to be supplanted by a common search for "truth" as a basis for dialogue, then we will find ourselves asking with the quintessential Roman pragmatist, "What is truth?" I confess, like so many intellectuals, a dangerous attraction to this Roman indifference.

Whatever the philosophical basis for dialogue, it remains true that the practical and theoretical obstacles to a meaningful exchange with Mormonism are very great. Mr. Bushman's comments are all directed to the very concrete problems involved. As a Mormon who has given considerable thought to non-Mormon historical interpretations of Mormonism, he is hardly about to question my stress on the inadequacy of non-Mormon versions of Mormon religious history.

It would be salutary for many non-Mormon historians to heed Bushman's reiteration of what Mormon historians have long said: that for Mormons Smith's appropriation of materials in Jacksonian culture simply shows that God had prepared America for the Restoration. Logically, then, Mormons believe that Mormon scriptures should be tested on their own non-Jacksonian terms: ancient history, chiefly Egyptian and Hebrew. It may surprise non-Mormons to learn that an able linguist with training in Egyptology, who is a faithful Mormon, avidly defends the historicity of Mormon scriptures. It would be interesting to see equally able non-Mormon Egyptologists testing the historicity of these scriptures. Americanists are only partially equipped to do so. And besides, the Mormon view of Jacksonian society is based on a providential reading of history and not merely a universal claim. Twentieth century historians refuse to discuss providential views of history – except as philosophy.

Mr. Bushman's two main points, like those of Clebsch, deal with large topics which I could only touch upon in my paper. One is the need to study the etiology of doctrines other than authority.

I would be the last to discourage a search for other theological elements in Joseph Smith's environment. But I do not see any doctrinal element extant between 1827 and 1830 that could explain the appeal of Mormonism as well as the idea of authority. Of course, the examination of doctrines from the point of view of their appeal to converts may be for Mr. Bushman the wrong end to start from. As he himself asserts, trained historians differ on assumptions, not facts. The professional, secular, non-Mormon historian invariably assumes that Mormonism was a sect and, like other sects, had certain social sources. Thus, Whitney R. Cross, whose work is accepted by O'Dea, tries to establish a connection between the early conversions and the convert's place of residence, his age group, his Yankee traits, his education, and so on. For most non-Mormon secular historians the attractiveness of Mormon doctrine ends up as a product of social factors.

Given this non-Mormon assumption concerning sectarianism and given the much older assumption that Mormon revelation was human in origin, the non-Mormon historian will not generate much enthusiasm for the questions posed by Bushman. He would simply say that it would be interesting to know why Joseph asked the questions he did of specific passages in the Bible, but that his questioning differed little from that of all sectarian prophets of the time. Mr. Bushman and I would agree that purely religious motives certainly operated in conversion — the premise of my article; but I would be more receptive than Bushman to a complementary social analysis.

I deliberately omitted a second topic taken up by Mr. Bushman in that I consciously avoided any lengthy discussion of the Book of Mormon. I was arguing that the locus of Mormon authority was the revelation of the priesthood, together with subsequent elaborations, and not the Book of Mormon. I had stated that themes related to the preservation of a true, orthodox, authoritative faith were nevertheless very prominent in the Book of Mormon, so much so, that "these themes are, it seems to me, the only real theological themes of the book."

I was quite surprised that Mr. Bushman could term this a "misconstruction." A due regard for the deposit of faith has long been a perfectly respectable concern in all religions. No one will deny that there are other themes in the book, such as the fervent devotion to Christ mentioned by Bushman, but none so historically distinctive and so persistent as the theme of authority. It would have been more to the point for Bushman to question my documentation than to compare my emphasis on authority to a strained psychoanalytic interpretation of Augustine or to assume that my lack of personal involvement with the Book of Mormon blinds me to the richness of its religious content for believing Mormons.

A note on my "minor errors" concerning the history of the priesthood: I do not think they are errors but historical interpretations that simply differ from handbooks like that of Widtsoe. Church government is to my mind the most frustrating and difficult topic in Mormon history. I think the clarity which Mormons see in the history of their church polity is as artificial as that of Catholic historians who project modern notions of church government back to the inchoate legal structure of early medieval canon law.

All in all, however, Mr. Bushman's discussion has the power of illumination that can come only from a fervent insider.

In fact, the striking trait of both commentaries is their constructiveness. Happily both writers were able to assent to my basic thesis deeply enough to employ their energies in going beyond it — exploring implications of authority, sectarian history, historiographical assumptions, and sociological analyses. A common grammar of assent makes exchanges between Catholics and Protestants comparatively easy. I am sure that the sharper corners of the present exchange will not prevent smoother discussion in the future and that in the long run both scientific history and religious truth will be well served.

I do not believe that three-hundred-fifty millions of people that live in China in a state of heathen darkness are created to live in this state, and be damned because they have not the right religion. I do not believe that all the nations that worship various kinds of idols, in different parts of the earth, and know nothing about the true God, will be consigned to be burned in fire hereafter, because they know no better than worship as they do. . . . I was going to say I am not a Universalist, but I am, and I am also a Presbyterian, and a Roman Catholic, and a Methodist. In short, I believe in every true principle that is embodied in any person or sect, and reject the false. If there is any truth in heaven, earth, or hell, I want to embrace it, I care not what shape it comes in to me, who brings it, or who believes in it, whether it is popular or unpopular.

John Taylor
Salt Lake City, Utah
June, 1853

Karl Keller

FAITH

Sacramental hours
cross this chapel of infinity
where the arch of the brain dreams horror.
And no one comes.
Within the waiting shadows
the silence says wait:
the darkness is a piece of a piece
in the rapture of even being.
But no one comes.

CREATION

God may have his presence
in silence only,
made so that a man
may have space and time
to make himself himself.
Whatever is is lost —
but the unmade silences
teach hope, and possibility,
and all the virtues
God gave men
to make gods of themselves.
Whatever is made
belongs to God.
But wherever silence is
man steps in
and becomes,
encounters time
and unmade space,
working in a way
no other one
has ever wrought.
And what he makes of silence
becomes, like God,
himself.

Carol Lynn Wright

RITUAL

Why ritual?
May I not receive
Christ without burial
By water?
If I remember
That He bled,
If I believe,
What need for
Sacramental bread?

Only this I know:
All cries out
For form —
No impulse
Can rest
Until somehow
It is manifest.
Even my spirit,
Housed in heaven,
Was not content
Until it won
Embodiment.

GUILT

I have no vulture sins, God,
That overhang my sky,
To climb, grey-feathering the air,
And swoop carnivorously.

It's just the tiny sins, God,
That from memory appear
Like tedious buzzing flies to dart
Like static through my prayer.

DEATH

Death is the great forget, they said,
A mindless, restful leaving
Of all consciousness and care
In a vast unweaving.

And so I waited, cramped and still,
For approaching Death to bring
Forgetfulness — but all he brought
Was a huge remembering.

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Reviews

Edited by Richard L. Bushman

A review can be the occasion for proposing a major reinterpretation. Klaus Hansen finds in Robert Flanders's study of Nauvoo evidence for a new explanation of the division among Mormons after the death of Joseph Smith. The protestors against Brigham Young's leadership preferred a church that restricted itself to ecclesiastical affairs, while Utah Mormons, continuing the direction taken by Joseph Smith in Nauvoo, aimed to build a new society with a communal economic order, a theological political structure, and new forms of family life. Polygamy and priesthood succession were simply aspects of this overarching controversy.

In his review of recent articles on Mormon conflicts with the law, Thomas Alexander reverses two conventional interpretations. Mormons have often been apologetic about the repression of the Nauvoo Expositor. *Now Dallin Oaks, in an article which Professor Alexander lauds, has shown that the Nauvoo City Council was within its rights. In the Utah period, on the other hand, the Mormons are thought to have been the innocent victims of shameless mistreatment by the federal government. Dr. Alexander takes issue with this position in a critical review of a pair of articles by Orma Linford.*

Milton Backman's review of Horton Davies's work on Chistian sects points up the unfortunate consequences of not reviewing a book. While it went through two editions, no one called Professor Davies's attention to minor errors of fact and gross errors of interpretation in the chapter on Mormonism (nor, apparently, to those in the chapters on other "sects"). Dr. Backman says that the Mormonism of the book is not the Mormonism of Mormons, which should be interesting to ecumenicists like Mr. Davies.

While an old book by book-review standards, John Robinson's Honest to God *is still being discussed, especially on college campuses. Karl Sandberg introduces readers to the modern dilemmas which spawned the book and to Bishop Robinson's method of handling them. The problems of faith which plague other Christians seem far removed from most Mormons, and yet Mormon wrestlings with science reflect a similar tension. Professor Sandberg briefly suggests how the Mormon concept of God may be a more satisfactory answer to contemporary religious disaffection than the one Bishop Robinson offers.*

THE WORLD AND THE PROPHET

Klaus Hansen

Nauvoo: Kingdom on the Mississippi. By Robert Bruce Flanders. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965. x plus 364 pp. Illustrations, bibliography, and index. $6.50. Klaus J. Hansen is Visiting Assistant Professor of History at Utah State University, where he advises the Priests' Quorum in his L.D.S. ward; he has articles and reviews in various professional journals, and his *Millennial Empire: The Political Kingdom of God and the Council of Fifty in Mormon History* will be published this year.

Discussing religion in America, de Tocqueville once remarked that "religions ought . . . to confine themselves within their own precincts; for in seeking to extend their power beyond religious matters, they incur a risk of not being believed at all. The circle within which they seek to restrict the human intellect ought therefore to be carefully traced, and, beyond its verge, the mind should be left entirely free to its own guidance." Joseph Smith could not have disagreed more. Religion, in his opinion, clearly should not confine itself to traditional precincts. In fact, it served its intended purpose only if it included the entire spectrum of human thought and action. Nauvoo became his monument to this philosophy. Perhaps at no other period of his career was Joseph able to merge religion and temporal affairs more fully. He saw his roles as real estate promoter and speculator, city planner, architect, politician, military leader, innkeeper, business entrepreneur, progagandist, and public relations man as necessary and complementary adjuncts to the role of "Prophet, Seer, and Revelator." This all-inclusive view of religion became a major heritage of Mormonism and Nauvoo the crucible in which were formed the religious, social, and political institutions which Brigham Young transferred to the Great Basin after Joseph's tragic death.

Not all Mormon residents of Nauvoo would have disagreed with de Tocqueville. Ebenezer Robinson, for example, first editor of the *Times and Seasons,* found it increasingly difficult to accept the temporal counsel of his beloved prophet. He refused to join the Nauvoo Legion at the peril of tremendous social and moral pressure; when he learned of the doctrines of plural marriage, he refused to believe they were of God. William Marks, president of the Nauvoo Stake, joined the Council of Fifty — a secret political organization with executive, legislative, and judicial powers intended as a nucleus government for a projected Mormon nation state — only because of his strong ties of fealty to Joseph Smith. He witnessed Joseph's installation as king over that organization with the greatest distaste. Others, less loyal to Joseph, openly broke with him over such doctrines while he was still alive. In fact, this break precipitated the events leading to the murder of the Mormon prophet.

The death of Joseph Smith produced a rift in Mormon history which has not yet been healed. Those who accepted the union of temporal and spiritual matters, those who supported the political kingdom of God, polygamy, and temple work, followed Brigham Young to the Valley of the Great Salt Lake. Those who rejected these doctrines and practices — which they considered to be radical departures from the more "orthodox" Mormonism they

had joined – refused the leadership of Young, and, flitting from one claimant to the mantle of the Prophet to another, ultimately joined the Reorganized Church, established in 1860.

It is understandable that Utah Mormons and those of the Reorganized Church have disagreed about the significance of Nauvoo and the role of Joseph Smith in its controversial history. Utah Mormons, proud of their Nauvoo heritage, have always pointed to Joseph Smith as the father of their institutions. It was in Nauvoo, according to B. H. Roberts, "that Joseph Smith reached the summit of his remarkable career. It was in Nauvoo that he grew bolder in the proclamation of those doctrines which stamp Mormonism as the great religion of the age. It was in Nauvoo that Joseph Smith's life expanded into that eloquent fulness which gives so much promise of what man will be in eternity." All his life Brigham Young insisted that he was merely following the visions Joseph Smith had imparted to him in Nauvoo. The union of the spiritual and temporal continued inseparable in Utah. Polygamy was publicly announced; the Council of Fifty controlled political and economic life; endowments, marriages, and baptisms for the dead were performed in temples as they rose in St. George, Logan, Manti, and Salt Lake City. Hence Utah Mormons had no difficulties with historical logic and continuity. Joseph was a prophet of God in both temporal and spiritual affairs, and so was Brigham Young.

Those, however, who rejected the political kingdom of God, plural marriage, and temple work were trapped in a contradiction if they acknowledged Joseph's authorship of these "innovations." The simplest escape was simply to deny that he had anything to do with such practices. According to them, the villainous John C. Bennett had duped an honest prophet who always believed the best of those who served him and who lacked experience in temporal affairs. The episode taught the prophet to stick to spiritual matters and they would argue that Joseph did so most of the time after the Bennett affair. That arch-villain Brigham Young, they would say, foisted the image of a temporal-minded Joseph Smith upon the world. Brigham put into the mouth of a Joseph unavailable to defend himself doctrines which the Utah leader wanted to practice in his new kingdom and for which he needed Joseph's prestige and the authority. And so it can hardly be said that the historiographies of the Reorganized Church and of Utah Mormonism have been parallel.

It is, therefore, refreshing and not a little ironic to read a book by a brilliant and objective historian, a member of the Reorganized Church, who corrects some of the discrepancies in the historical record. He has looked unflinchingly at facts which for the most part support the Utah Church: Joseph Smith *did* start a political kingdom of God and a Council of Fifty; he *was* made king over that organization; he *did* originate polygamy; he *was* the author of those new rituals which were practiced in the Nauvoo Temple – all facts which the Reorganized Church has preferred to contradict or ignore. Again and again, he emphasizes that Nauvoo was the prototype for Utah. Flanders is even more emphatic on this point than B. H. Roberts or Reva Latimer Halford in her gigantic masters' thesis, "Nauvoo—The City Beautiful" (University of Utah, 1945), because he has uncovered much significant new evidence to substantiate that assertion. It is doubtful that anyone will improve on Flanders in this respect for a long time to come.

This book is indeed the definitive political and economic history of the Mormons in Illinois, superseding George R. Gayler's rather superficial doctoral dissertation, "A Social, Economic, and Political Study of the Mormons in Western Illinois, 1839-1846: A Re-Evaluation" (Indiana University, 1955). Flanders's work will be a major building block for whoever attempts the Herculean task of writing a much-needed encyclopedic history of the Mormons in Illinois, an undertaking in which Mrs. Halford only partially succeeded.

Largely disregarding social history or the development of Mormon theology, Flanders focuses almost completely on Nauvoo as a political, corporate kingdom of God, a kingdom that was not only *in* this world, but in his opinion very much *of* it. Flanders's interpretation will undoubtedly alienate many Utah Mormons, although they will be delighted with the additional historical proof for their position. As an objective historian, he presents the facts. But what do these facts mean to him? He makes it obvious that he does not like what he has uncovered. Although agreeing with Roberts that Nauvoo was



the prototype for the Rocky Mountain kingdom, Flanders clearly implies that the results were unfortunate. If the one was flawed, as he obviously believes, so inevitably must be the other. In Flanders's opinion, Joseph was first of all founder of a new religion, one who "inspired a new faith in his converts, and gave them and their posterity a large body of scripture, much of which has proved of lasting religious and literary value" (p. 4). Yet at Nauvoo Joseph abandoned these high endeavors for more mundane pursuits. Flanders obviously agrees with de Tocqueville.

Flanders's story of Nauvoo is tragedy in the large sense of the word, a tragedy resulting from the same dilemma that faced John Winthrop three hundred years earlier: the dilemma of living in the world without becoming part of it. Simon Stylites, who pursued holiness on a pillar in the Syrian desert, took the easy way and could never aspire to sainthood either in the Puritan or the Mormon heaven. But as Winthrop recorded so candidly in his journal, if man did live in the world, he was continually in danger of becoming either an intolerant religious zealot or a profligate. Joseph Smith and his

followers faced essentially the same problem. Yet they also had other troubles which Winthrop escaped by sailing to America: the Gentiles. If the Saints defended the kingdom too vigorously, they might become too exclusive; but they would also be tempted to adopt the methods of their enemies for self-defense and thus become like those whom they despised. How could a worldly Mormon "Kingdom of God" defend and protect the kingdom of Christ? That is Flanders's implicit question. His objective answer is the history of the fall of Nauvoo — a fall produced because the Saints were too much in and of the world.

The image of Joseph Smith in Nauvoo emerging from Flanders's pages "is of a man of affairs — planner, promoter, architect, entrepreneur, executive, politician, filibusterer — matters of which he was sometimes less sure than he was those of the spirit" (p. vi). "When Smith failed to separate the prophetic role from that of administrator, entrepreneur, political aspirant, and plain disputant, the sacredness of his spiritual leadership became jeopardized in the eyes of many Mormons. When 'thus saith God' mixed in temporal affairs, as it did in the Nauvoo House enterprise, trouble resulted" (p. 244). Flanders's story of Nauvoo is largely composed of such troubles: Joseph being taken in by Isaac Galland and John C. Bennett; engaging in petty squabbles with the Laws, Higbees, and Foster over whether the commercial center should be on the "flat" or on Mulholland Street on the "hill"; playing political games with Cyrus Walker; installing himself as the only Lieutenant General in the history of the United States since George Washington; repudiating debts by filing for bankruptcy; relaxing prohibition laws, with the spirits flowing freely even at his own mansion; succumbing to vanity and affectation; desiring political power and prestige to the point of having himself crowned king in the Council of Fifty. The melancholy facts of a tragic decline are all here.

For Utah Mormons, on the other hand, Nauvoo was tragedy only in the colloquial sense of the word that permits newspapers to call murder or even automobile and airplane accidents tragedy. For in the eyes of Brigham Young and those who followed him to Utah, Joseph's "innovations" failed primarily because of the Gentiles. It is true that Roberts, perhaps more than many of his coreligionists, acknowledged human weaknesses in the Saints. He even recognized minor flaws in the character of Joseph Smith, something the more flowery panegyrics issuing periodically from Mormon presses in recent years fail to do; yet ultimately there is no question in Roberts's mind that Nauvoo fell because, as Joseph once remarked, "the influence of the devil and his servants will be used against the Kingdom of God." Utah Mormons cannot admit a major flaw in Nauvoo, for these were the very practices and doctrines Young transplanted to the Rocky Mountain kingdom. Hence the inevitability of Roberts's proud evaluation of Smith's accomplishments in Nauvoo.

Flanders may have gone a little too far with his implicit uncomplimentary evluation of Utah Mormonism. He might well have let his readers come to their own conclusions. What the facts imply is uncomfortable enough. A final quote at the end of the book, a very derogatory assessment of Utah Mormonism by the apostate Stenhouse, seems gratuitous. Unfortunately, Flanders has thus seriously weakened a strong position, particularly because such barbs, though irritating, have long ago lost their sting. After having suffered such missiles for more than a hundred years, Utah Mormons have developed a thick hide. I am afraid that too many readers will simply

pull out the barb and with it dismiss the whole book. And that would be unfortunate indeed; they cannot afford to dismiss this study for such superficial barbs, which may well have been intended as balm for members of the Reorganized Church, who have to grapple with veritable spears thrust into their sides.

Flanders's book may be uncomfortable for a more important reason. It is a monument to the irony of Mormon history. How much of the Nauvoo that Flanders establishes as a prototype for Young's Rocky Mountain kingdom are contemporary Utah Mormons willing to accept? How do they feel about Joseph Smith as king over the Council of Fifty and as Lieutenant General of the Nauvoo Legion? And what is their real attitude towards polygamy? Admittedly, descendants of polygamous families still proudly acknowledge their heritage; but many Mormons clearly wish it had never happened. A leading historian at the leading state university in Utah for years avoided any mention of the subject; references to it in graduate theses were eradicated with the remark, "Too controversial!" Preston Nibley, it will be remembered, wrote an entire book on Brigham Young without mentioning the dread word once. The Nauvoo most Utah Mormons are willing to accept as a cradle for their institutions has more in common with the romanticized and superficial image of Cecil McGavin's *Nauvoo the Beautiful* (Salt Lake City, 1946) than with historical reality.

Utah Mormonism has moved subtly but distinctly in the direction of de Tocqueville. Not that anyone would publicly admit the change. Yet unquestionably, those who rejected Brigham Young and what he stood for in Nauvoo could more easily have accepted the kind of Mormonism found in Utah today. In many ways Nauvoo was less the prototype of the future than was the Mormonism of those who rejected all the city stood for. Today kingdom building is frowned upon not only in Independence but in Salt Lake City as well. Here is the larger meaning of Flanders's book. Clearly, it is a pivotal work in the historiography of Mormonism, one that could well initiate serious dialogue between the factions. If no Mormon scholar can afford to ignore it, neither can other Mormons of whatever persuasion.

MORMONS IN THE SIDE STREAM

Milton V. Backman, Jr.

Christian Deviations: The Challenge of the New Spiritual Movements. By Horton Davies. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965. 144 pp. $1.45 (paper). Milton Backman is Associate Professor of History of Religion at Brigham Young University and serves in the presidency of his L.D.S. stake mission; he recently published *American Religions and the Rise of Mormonism.*

During the third week of January, 1966, millions of Americans united in prayer, beseeching God's assistance in their quest for Christian unity. One of the leading advocates of this ecumenical movement is Horton Davies, Putnam Professor of Religion at Princeton University. According to Professor Davies, the next stage in the reintegration of a divided Christendom is the uniting of "side-stream" Christianity with the "mainstream." Many Catholics and Protestants are not satisfied, he asserts in the recent reissue of

pull out the barb and with it dismiss the whole book. And that would be unfortunate indeed; they cannot afford to dismiss this study for such superficial barbs, which may well have been intended as balm for members of the Reorganized Church, who have to grapple with veritable spears thrust into their sides.

Flanders's book may be uncomfortable for a more important reason. It is a monument to the irony of Mormon history. How much of the Nauvoo that Flanders establishes as a prototype for Young's Rocky Mountain kingdom are contemporary Utah Mormons willing to accept? How do they feel about Joseph Smith as king over the Council of Fifty and as Lieutenant General of the Nauvoo Legion? And what is their real attitude towards polygamy? Admittedly, descendants of polygamous families still proudly acknowledge their heritage; but many Mormons clearly wish it had never happened. A leading historian at the leading state university in Utah for years avoided any mention of the subject; references to it in graduate theses were eradicated with the remark, "Too controversial!" Preston Nibley, it will be remembered, wrote an entire book on Brigham Young without mentioning the dread word once. The Nauvoo most Utah Mormons are willing to accept as a cradle for their institutions has more in common with the romanticized and superficial image of Cecil McGavin's *Nauvoo the Beautiful* (Salt Lake City, 1946) than with historical reality.

Utah Mormonism has moved subtly but distinctly in the direction of de Tocqueville. Not that anyone would publicly admit the change. Yet unquestionably, those who rejected Brigham Young and what he stood for in Nauvoo could more easily have accepted the kind of Mormonism found in Utah today. In many ways Nauvoo was less the prototype of the future than was the Mormonism of those who rejected all the city stood for. Today kingdom building is frowned upon not only in Independence but in Salt Lake City as well. Here is the larger meaning of Flanders's book. Clearly, it is a pivotal work in the historiography of Mormonism, one that could well initiate serious dialogue between the factions. If no Mormon scholar can afford to ignore it, neither can other Mormons of whatever persuasion.

MORMONS IN THE SIDE STREAM

Milton V. Backman, Jr.

Christian Deviations: The Challenge of the New Spiritual Movements. By Horton Davies. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965. 144 pp. $1.45 (paper). Milton Backman is Associate Professor of History of Religion at Brigham Young University and serves in the presidency of his L.D.S. stake mission; he recently published *American Religions and the Rise of Mormonism.*

During the third week of January, 1966, millions of Americans united in prayer, beseeching God's assistance in their quest for Christian unity. One of the leading advocates of this ecumenical movement is Horton Davies, Putnam Professor of Religion at Princeton University. According to Professor Davies, the next stage in the reintegration of a divided Christendom is the uniting of "side-stream" Christianity with the "mainstream." Many Catholics and Protestants are not satisfied, he asserts in the recent reissue of

Christian Deviations, with the current divisions within the Christian fold and are working cooperatively to correct this problem. Unfortunately, he contends, many societies such as Pentecostalism, Seventh-day Adventism, Moral Re-armament, Mormonism, the Jehovah's Witnesses, British-Israel, Christian Science, Spiritism, and Theosophy have deviated considerably from traditional Christianity and are impeding the movement.

Rather than merely summarizing the beliefs of all these societies, Horton Davies emphasizes the unusual or peculiar concepts of the "side-stream" sects and condemns unrelentingly beliefs which conflict with his interpretation of the Christian gospel. According to Davies, Christians should endorse the Apostles' Creed and the reality of the Incarnation, the Cross, and the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. They should believe in an eternal life given through grace alone, based upon the fulfillment of certain moral and spiritual conditions. They should also adopt as the three interlocking authorities for the Christian faith, the Bible, the Church, and the individual inspired by the Holy Spirit. The Bible should be regarded as of primary importance, "the Church of secondary, and the inspired individual of tertiary importance."

Davies criticizes Roman Catholics for placing too much emphasis on the Church as a norm of faith. "The exclusive dependence upon the Church as the organ of truth leads to the propounding of unbiblical doctrines, such as the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin and the Immaculate Conception, as the essence of the faith." He also censures Jehovah's Witnesses, Seventh-day Adventists, British-Israelites, and Mormons for over-emphasizing the Old Testament to the detriment of the New, and classifies Joseph Smith, Mary Baker Eddy, and Ellen G. White as "self-appointed prophets" who sought to displace Jesus. "Christian humility," he argues, "makes it unlikely for a mere human to pretend to a better insight into the mind of God than Jesus had."

Even though Davies is extremely critical of groups who depart from his version of Christianity, he fails to define precisely his interpretation of the gospel essentials. Davies argues that a paramount reason Christians should unite is to prevent the confusion that has resulted from sects competing in the mission field. Yet Protestant liberals who strongly support the ecumenical movement disagree sharply on the meaning of basic Christian dogma and endorse widely differing views of the Apostles' Creed. They would disrupt a reunited church fully as much as the deviants Davies condemns. How would missionaries of the world church answer questions such as: What is the Incarnation? Is Jesus the Son of God or the son of Joseph and Mary? What is meant by the resurrection of Christ? Many seekers would not be satisfied with the vague answers missionaries of such a world church might provide. "I don't know," a missionary would be forced to respond. "Doctrines have been de-emphasized. A wide latitude of belief exists in the church." The "clarity" proposed by Davies could not be a feature of the church contemplated by the current leaders of the ecumenical movement.

One of the most surprising aspects of this book is that so many oversimplications, contradictions and other glaring errors have survived two editions. It is, for example, an exaggeration to say that Spiritism and Christian Science are attempts "to make one Christian tenet into the whole of Christianity." British-Israelites, Davies asserts at one point, have placed the writings of the Old Testament prophets on the same level as those found in the New Testament, but in a subsequent sentence he argues that they

hold the Old Testament to be more important than the New. He says on one page that The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints is the "sect . . . most widely committed to missionary activity" and on the next that the "most active proselytizers among the sects are the Jehovah's Witnesses." He avers, without giving any evidence, that the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society is "the religion of the hard-pressed and frustrated, who without such faith and the company of their fellows at the bottom of the social scale, would be the utterly defeated," and that the British-Israelites' belief in a "chosen people" leads to the conviction that there is a "master-race." He overemphasizes the influence of William Miller on Seventh-day Adventist theology, stating that Mrs. White picked "the brains of William Miller." He incorrectly attributes the doctrine of investigative judgment to Mrs. White, failing to note that Adventists credit Hiram Edison wih discovering this principle. Davies badly oversimplifies the unique aspects of the Seventh-day Adventists and Latter-day Saints by failing to discuss a number of their distinguishing beliefs.

The most inaccurate chapter is the one on Mormonism. It is incredible that a distinguished historian and theologian, teaching at a reputable institution would make so many mistakes. In all three editions of his work the date of the visit of a heavenly messenger to Joseph Smith is given as 1822 instead of 1823. In the current edition, Davies specifies the date that Utah entered the Union as 1895 instead of 1896. In the 1954 and 1961 editions, Davies states that the Mormons arrived in the Salt Lake Valley in the spring of 1847. He improves the latest edition by saying that in 1847 Brigham Young "started for the Rocky Mountains with a selected group of stalwarts." But this later statement needs clarification, for a majority (possibly five-sixths) of the Latter-day Saints residing in Nauvoo and nearby communities began their journey to the Rocky Mountains in 1846. After spending the winter on the Great Plains, the first company under the direction of Brigham Young continued the migration west.

In addition to these mistakes, Davies neglects to describe in any detail Joseph Smith's account of the first vision and inaccurately describes the events that occurred between 1823 and 1827: "Four years later [meaning four years after the initial appearance of Moroni] he [Joseph] claimed that the angel instructed him where to look for the golden volume and then he immediately dug it up."

Davies's most serious error is his failure to differentiate between the theological speculations of Church members and accepted doctrines of the Church. On occasions he describes as established beliefs concepts which few members have held and which no reputable members have taught. Davies should be pleased to learn that Mormons themselves would classify many of these doctrines as Christian deviations.

Latter-day Saints, for example, do not deny the existence of Jesus before His incarnation as Davies charges; in fact, they believe He is the Jehovah of the Old Testament and, like all the children of God, has always existed. Notions that Jesus is "the son of Adam-God and Mary" and that Jesus married the Marys and Martha at Cana have never been officially endorsed. Latter-day Saints do not hold that the Indians are "the lost ten tribes of Israel." The Church certainly does not claim that "all who are not Latter-day Saints will be everlastingly damned." On the contrary, Mormons believe that

all individuals who have not had an opportunity to accept the gospel of Christ in this life will be granted this privilege after death and before the Final Judgment. Although they hold that the wicked will suffer mental anguish following death, they interpret "eternal" punishment as punishment imposed by God. They reject the traditional concept of hell and a simple division at Judgment into "saved" or "damned" in favor of a great variety of opportunities for progression in a future existence. The Church does not teach that "the Atonement wrought by Christ is limited to the pre-Mormon dispensation"; and to charge that Mormonism is not Christo-centric "for Christ is to them merely a forerunner of Joseph Smith" is to display startling ignorance. Mormons believe that all men will be resurrected as a consequence of the Atonement and maintain that only those who accept Christ and live in harmony with the teachings of the Savior will fully benefit from Christ's action. These disciples will be cleansed of their sins preparatory to their return to God's presence.

A number of questions directed at Latter-day Saints have been proposed in this work. How could Nephi learn to speak and write "Reformed Egyptian" in Jerusalem, much less in America? And why did Nephi claim to have "engraved the first sacred plates in 'Reformed Egyptian'?" Davies overlooks the many economic and cultural ties between the Israelites and Egyptians in the seventh century before Christ and the likelihood that Nephi and other emigrants could have learned Egyptian before being uprooted. Moreover, Nephi did not claim to have employed a "Reformed Egyptian" language when he inscribed his history on the plates, for Nephi wrote, "I make a record in the language of my father, which consists of the learning of the Jews and the language of the Egyptians" (1 Nephi 1:2). Centuries after the Nephites arrived in America, Moroni mentioned that he and Mormon had adopted a language which they called "reformed Egyptian, being handed down and altered by us, according to our manner of speech" (Mormon 9:32). The reason for utilizing this language is also briefly explained: "If our plates had been sufficiently large we should have written in Hebrew [characters]" (Mormon 9:33), indicating that ideas could be recorded on less space using modified Egyptian than using the Hebrew language. Would Horton Davies question the assertion that the Egyptian (and Hebrew) language would change between 600 B.C. and 400 A.D. among a people isolated from the Old World?

"Are there any extant examples of pre-Columbian gold plates?" is another question proposed by Professor Davies. The answer is an emphatic yes. There are hundreds of such plates. He might have asked, "Are there in existence any pre-Columbian gold plates that contain writings by early Americans?" The answer to that question is probably no. However, some of the gold plates that archaeologists say were employed for ornamentation purposes contain inscriptions or decorations. These plates substantiate the claim that early inhabitants of this continent possessed the necessary technological skill to record their history on metallic plates.

In a work entitled *The Problems of the Book of Mormon* (Salt Lake City: Bookcraft, 1964, pp. 92, 121), Dr. Sidney B. Sperry provides a possible answer to another question raised by Davies, "How can we account for 27,000 words from the King James or Authorized Version of the Bible in Smith's 'translation'?" Sperry writes:

> The text of Isaiah in the Book of Mormon is not word for word the same as that of the King James version. Of 433 verses of Isaiah in the Nephite record, Joseph Smith modified about 233. Some of the changes made were slight, others were radical. However, 199 verses are word for word the same as the Old English version. We therefore freely admit that Joseph Smith may have used the King James version when he came to the text of Isaiah on the gold plates. As long as the familiar version agreed substantially with the text on the gold plates, he let it pass; when it differed too radically he translated the Nephite version and dictated the necessary changes.

The same basic reasoning has been employed by Dr. Sperry to explain parallels in the New Testament and the Book of Mormon, for Latter-day Saints believe that Christ delivered the same sermons and taught the same concepts to His "other sheep" in America as He did to the inhabitants of Palestine.

Another weakness of his work is that Davies has failed to include in his suggestions for further reading many excellent books discussing the beliefs of the societies considered. Because Davies primarily discusses doctrines rather than history, his selected bibliographies should include works such as *Seventh-day Adventists Answer Questions on Doctrine* (Washington, D. C.: Review and Herald, 1957); James E. Talmage, *The Articles of Faith* (Salt Lake City: The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 1924) and *Let God Be True* (Brooklyn, N. Y.: Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, 1946) or *Things in Which It is Impossible for God to Lie* (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, 1965).

In one respect, Davies's book indicates a failing of Latter-day Saints. In the preface to the third edition Davies writes that he is grateful for criticisms, both positive and negative, and trusts that the latest edition reflects the benefits of helpful suggestions. From these comments it seems that no Latter-day Saint has written to Professor Davies about the obvious errors in his book. Probably no Latter-day Saint was invited to review the first two editions, indicating a definite need for a publication such as *Dialogue*. In the past, Latter-day Saints have too frequently failed to reply to authors who have perpetuated myths about Mormonism.

This work further indicates a need for Latter-day Saints to produce more scholarly books on Mormonism and to promote their placement in libraries. Many non-Mormon authors have been greatly influenced by well-written but biased and unreliable works. When better books on Mormonism are available, critics are more likely to present the history and beliefs of the Latter-day Saints with greater accuracy.

THEOLOGY FOR A NEW AGE

Karl Sandberg

Honest to God. By John A. T. Robinson, Bishop of Woolwich. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1963. 143 pp. $1.65 (paper). Karl Sandberg is Associate Professor of French Literature at the University of Arizona, where he recently published *At the Crossroads of Faith and Reason: An Essay on Pierre Bayle;* he observed European Christianity first-hand as an L.D.S. missionary in France.

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The Church of England, the heir of a nineteen hundred year Christian tradition, has fallen upon evil days. At least such is the assessment of The Reverend Nicholas Stacey, Rector of Woolwich, in a recent issue of *Harper's.*[1] Far removed from the mainstream of modern life, the church is an ineffective eddy in a secular society, whose values are shaped without reference to the divine. In spite of a sustained reactivation program, the Rector's own parish of 10,000 members situated in an industrial area can scarcely muster enough souls on Sunday to create an atmosphere of worship. For most people the church has become a religious club, Stacey says, where God is isolated from people except for one or two hours a week. It would appear that the church has suffered a worse fate than ceasing to be true – it has become meaningless.

It is against this background that one must read *Honest to God,* a challenging and provocative little book by the Bishop of Woolwich, Dr. John A. T. Robinson. The work attempts to re-establish contact with the world and to relocate the sense of holiness in a secular society.

Bishop Robinson's point of departure is that the modern world is secular, in contrast to the time when most of society stood on the common ground of a revealed book and ethic. Though men sinned against it, they acknowledged a transcendant standard of morality. Secular society repudiates the standard itself.

The experience of and necessity for God have largely disappeared. Bishop Robinson affirms that the hypothesis of God, once necessary to explain the creation and continuance of the universe, has been replaced by materialist explanations which seem just as plausible. Personal weakness and dependence on the elements once compelled people to rely on divine protection; today science and technology have made men the masters of nature. More important, the sanctions of the traditional Christian morality, deprived of their theological foundations, have largely disappeared, and secular society has fallen into a sterile ethical relativity, which threatens the worth and dignity of the whole human venture.

As a "defender of the faith," Bishop Robinson refuses to confine himself to the shrinking "religious remnant" which still accepts Christian presuppositions. He seeks a common ground which can give meaning and direction, if not to all men, at least to the ethically oriented for whom traditional Christianity has become impossible. His procedure is to emphasize the role of Jesus in Christianity and to suggest a radical revision of the traditional notions of God, ethics, and the spiritual life.

The traditional idea of God (based, it might be noted, upon the Platonic dichotomy between form and matter) is that God differs essentially from His creation. The practical result has been to picture God as a Person (inaccurately, in the Bishop's view) "up there" spatially or "out there" metaphysically, occasionally entering into relationship with His creation, but possessing a nature totally foreign to it. This God has become remote, unnecessary and, in a scientific age, incredible. To be meaningful, God must be present "in the center of life."

How does one get God back in the world, or in other words, how does one recover or discover the holy and transcendant in a secular world? Here Bishop Robinson leans heavily on the writings of the late Paul Tillich. Frankly

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[1] "The Decline of the Church of England," *Harper's Magazine* (March, 1966), pp. 64-70.

parting company with the idea of God as a supreme person, whose existence or non-existence becomes a matter of argument, Bishop Robinson and Tillich assert that God is by definition that which is ultimate in the universe. Beneath the flux of surface phenomena, beneath the changing and transitory, is the Eternal. God is not thought of as "a" being, but as Being itself. When Tillich speaks of "God," says the Bishop, he speaks of "our ultimate concern, of what we take seriously without reservation" (p. 46). For him the word "God" denotes "the ultimate depth of all of our being, the creative ground and meaning of all our existence" (p. 47). When we say, "God is Love," we do not refer to a person who embodies love perfectly. We mean that "in pure personal relationship we encounter, not merely what ought to be, but what is, the deepest, veriest truth about the structure of reality" (p. 49).

Jesus was not the God-Man described in the traditional understanding of the Incarnation. "Jesus never claims to be God, personally," says Bishop Robinson, "yet he always claims to bring God, completely" (p. 73). He could say "I and the Father are one. . . . The Father is in me and I am in the Father," because in Jesus there was nothing of self; He was "utterly open to, and united with, the Ground of His being" (pp. 74, 76). Jesus is the "man for the others" and it is in His life that we find "the love whereby we are brought completely into one with the Ground of our being" (p. 82). As Bonhoeffer says:

> To be a Christian does not mean to be religious in a particular way, to cultivate some particular form of asceticism (as a sinner, a penitent or a saint), but to be a man. It is not some religious act which makes a Christian what he is, but participation in the suffering of God in the life of the world (p. 83).

The experience of the divine is to be found in the depth of the world, in relationship with people, and not out of the world. The only atheists are those who hold life to be shallow. And Bishop Robinson offers the way of unconditional Christian love as expressive of the ultimate depth of life.

In questions of ethics, the Bishop casts the traditional molds into the melting pot in his attempt to confront the secular twentieth century. He departs from the absolutistic morality, whose precepts are "given, objectively and immutably" (p. 107). For example, one Christian view of marriage holds that it not only should not but *cannot* be dissolved. Wedlock creates an indelible union; once two people are married, they can no more cease to be man and wife than a brother and a sister can cease to be related. Bishop Robinson feels that the chances are small of commending this view to a modern world which has rejected the metaphysical suppositions upon which it rests. Binding Christianity to such a doctrine would simply discredit the one with the other (pp. 108-109).

The precepts of Jesus, he says, were not meant to be understood legalistically. The one absolute constant in ethics is the command of unconditional love of God and man, and Jesus did not spell out what love demanded in every situation. His teachings are simply illustrations of what love might require. At one time it might mean sacrificing all one possesses, at another giving one's clothes, lending money without question, or violating the accepted rules concerning the Sabbath. The rightness or wrongness of any given act is determined not by *a priori prescription* but by the consideration that "the

deepest welfare of these particular persons in this particular situation matters more than anything else in the world" (p. 114).

To a couple contemplating a divorce, Christian counsel would not be, "Don't, because divorce is always wrong." The "new morality," as Bishop Robinson conceives it, would rather pose the question, "What will serve the deepest interests of the people concerned?" To a young man asking in his relations with a girl, "Why shouldn't I?" the answer is not, "Don't, because it is a sin." He should be helped to see for himself that if he does not love the girl deeply, his act is immoral; and if he does, he will respect her too much to use her or take liberties with her (pp. 118-119).

Such a morality would rely upon the guidelines of tradition and the "bank of experience," but it would insist that each person find for himself the application of the law of love in his own situation. More demanding than the old ethic and potentially dangerous, this morality, the Bishop maintains, is the only way possible between the morass of relativism and the unworking rigidity of the old absolutism.

A common Mormon approach to the Sabbath is very similar to what Bishop Robinson advocates as a general rule of conduct: the principle is stated, a few strong recommendations are given, and the application is left to the individual. Can this approach be used in all questions of ethics? I believe Bishop Robinson's approach has much to recommend it. The fruits of the morally absolutistic Puritan religion or the rigidly legalistic religion of the Pharisees were far from being universally admirable. Yet the history of casuistry shows that often the principle is accommodated to conduct before conduct is made to square with principle. To avoid either excess, it is necessary to provide the individual with both principle and freedom and let him find his own way. This approach may be strengthened by the Mormon idea that man and God cooperate in a universe governed by law. Moral stability does not come by absolutes imposed from without but by increasing knowledge of one's present self, of the cause-and-effect nature of his environment, and of his eternal potential.

The chief weakness in the book may be precisely in the use of the word "God." Before reacting too vigorously to the phrase "God is dead," used popularly and somewhat inaccurately to refer to the whole of the radical theology, I would want to know which God is reported to have died. Having spent two and one-half years talking about religion in European industrial cities, which must strongly resemble Woolwich, I have to agree that the traditional idea of God has become meaningless to most people. It is possible, however, that this condition does not result from making God too personal but rather from a doctrine making him too remote. Although popular Christianity pictures God in some personal form, it insists that He is wholly different from man, existing above and beyond His creation, in a state of uninvolvement with it. He exists mainly as an intellectual necessity to explain the world. A remote and uninvolved God or a mere hypothesis cannot but become meaningless to human beings.

Consequently, I cannot get very enthusiastic about depersonalizing God as a means of getting Him back in the world. It is true that for many Anglicans and others the Bishop's approach has had a rejuvenating effect, making the concerns and questions of religion real and immediate by insisting that God is not "out there" but "in the midst of us," and that the Gospel has to

do with the world and not withdrawal from the world. He has no doubt made the idea of God accessible to the subtle intellect, but I wonder to how many others. It is significant that the more he insists on the impersonality of the Ground of all Being, the more he emphasizes the personality of Jesus and the personal element of religious encounter. Personality seems to be such an indispensable element of religion that the vagueness of "the Ground of Being" may ultimately make it as meaningless as the God "up there."

Fortunately, the alternatives are not restricted to the traditional idea and the "Ground of Being." The Mormon concept of God differs essentially from both. The idea of God as an explanation for the world has had almost no part in Mormon writings. And Mormons have never accepted the Platonic dichotomy between spirit (mind) and matter. The whole effort of Mormonism is predicated upon God's direct and continued involvement in the world to bring all of mankind to a higher level of existence. God surpasses man incomprehensibly in degree but is not essentiallly different from him in nature.

Mormonism, in fact, looks upon God as a divine Parent whose purpose is, through the experience and knowledge to be gained in the world, to bring mankind to an eternal and divine quality of life. Men are thus regarded as eternally progressive beings. Given desire and obedience to presently discovered truth, they will continue to increase their knowldge of their environment and consequently their control over it. The "autonomy" of men in this sense is consistent with the bringing of them to the condition in which they become "free forever" (II Nephi 2:26).

But an increasing human independence and maturity does not push God out of the universe. As men become freer, they are not cut off from God. They are rather invited to cooperate more intelligently and more effectively with Him and with each other in fulfilling the divine plan.

Space permits neither an elaboration of these views nor an attempt to forestall the veto which some will prepare. But such a view of God and man is at least consistent with the modern emphasis on action and the discovery of progressive qualities in human beings.

These doctrines may also have the virtue of evoking the latent powers in men as they encounter greater demands and greater opportunities to participate with God in resolving the problems of life. A religion becomes vital only as it communicates the feeling that God's purposes are being worked out in and through the world, and what is vital in Mormonism may be attributed in part to its success in imparting this sense of immediacy.

But in spite of reservations and basic differences of point of view, I find Bishop Robinson's book significant and important, first of all for its candor and honesty. To throw overboard the forms and beliefs which have become established and venerable through long tradition is not a task lightly undertaken, and he has not hesitated when these forms and beliefs become hindrances to the meaningful life. Without such honesty there is perhaps no authentic religion.

More important, the very writing of such a book suggests that the sectarian age is moribund. When the challenge to Mormonism was to defend its position among other churches in a society still basically Christian, it did so with energy and intelligence, as is seen in the writings of the Pratts and B. H. Roberts. Today, in a society which is basically secular, the challenge to Mormonism, as to all religions, is to direct its voice to the issues of a new age.

BY STUDY AND BY FAITH

Joseph R. Murphy

Truth by Reason and by Revelation. By Frank B. Salisbury, Salt Lake City: Deseret Book Co., 1965. x plus 362 pp. $4.50. Joseph Murphy is Associate Professor of Zoology at Brigham Young University and has published articles in the fields of Ecology and Ornithology; he and his wife are superintendent and president of their ward Mutual Improvement Association, the L.D.S. youth auxiliary.

A survey of Latter-day Saint literature dealing with science and religion will reveal that, with few exceptions, biologists are poorly represented. All manner of other scientists and technologists, including chemists, physicists, geologists, agriculturalists, sociologists, medical practitioners, and even non-scientists have attempted to define the place of science and scientific philosophy in L.D.S. theology. The lack of expression from professional biologists is the more regrettable because many of the topics dealt with are those of vital concern to modern biology (e.g., organic evolution, man's physical nature, human nutrition and metabolism, extraterrestrial life, etc.).

It is significant, then, that a devout Latter-day Saint who has earned a solid reputation in biological research and teaching has recently produced a book dealing with many facets of science which appear to present interpretive difficulties for adherents to the restored Gospel. This commendable effort is the work of Dr. Frank B. Salisbury, Professor of Plant Physiology at Colorado State University, who has made important investigations into the physiology of flowering and other phases of physiological plant ecology, and has also studied and published in the fascinating field of exobiology. It would appear that Dr. Salisbury is well qualified to undertake a work of the nature of his *Truth by Reason and by Revelation.*

According to the author's preface, the book was written with two rather disparate groups of people in mind: the troubled student who may experience some erosion of his religious foundations as he encounters "the theories and philosophies of the world," and the author's fellow scientists, at least the atheists and agnostics among them, for whom he would like to provide a rational basis for his own faith in God and the Gospel of Christ. Dr. Salisbury feels that he can find common ground for both groups by describing the development of faith, "beginning with the assumption of no faith at all." Although the author states that no effort was made to outline the principles of the gospel, I believe that most readers will agree that the book contains a fairly complete treatment of the major tenets of the restored Church.

The opening section of the book, subtitled "Searching for Truth," begins with a statement of the alleged areas of conflict between science and religion and is followed by chapters which contrast the approach to truth through the two methods, concluding with a chapter on the mechanics of gaining a testimony of the gospel.

In section II, "Problems of Science and Religion," the author devotes five chapters to the general subject of the creation of life and organic evolution. There are additional chapters on miracles, nature of the spirit, the Word of Wisdom, extraterrestrial life, and Satan.

The final section of the book consists of two chapters dealing with the nature of man, contrasting the viewpoints of science and of revealed truth.

Any attempt to define or explore a concept as subjective and often as abstract as truth is apt to prove difficult, particularly when the intent is to compare truth as a part of religious experience with the tentative "truths" of science. The author contends that there are absolute truths towards which scientific inquiry and religious revelation are both leading; nevertheless, the inherently different methods and limitations of the two systems suggest that less than complete correlation can be achieved. Dr. Salisbury tacitly acknowledges this in his discussion of the two methods of truth seeking (Chapters 2 and 3) wherein he concludes that the scientist is limited to those conclusions which will stand the test of the formal processes of logic, while the method of revelation has no such limits. I do not mean to imply that there are no absolutes discernible by science, but the scientist's major contribution is made on the frontiers of expanding knowledge, where he is apt to be more concerned with evidence than with final proof or absolutes.[1]

Turning from generalities to some of the specific problems discussed in the text, I will restrict the majority of my comments to the "problem" of organic evolution, and the related question of the origin of life. Judging from the amount of space devoted to these concepts, the author considered them of crucial importance in developing the theme of his book.

Although the author makes some concessions to evolutionary processes and allows natural selection limited operation, I believe it is fair to say that his position is, with some important qualifications, essentially anti-evolutionary. He is particularly unwilling to recognize the process of natural selection as fundamental in the creation of new species. In developing his argument, he first states the case for evolution (Chapter 7) by reviewing the various lines of evidence generally found in introductory biology texts (e.g., the fossil record, anatomy and embryology, biogeography, evidence from genetics, etc.). Owing in part to the necessity for brevity and in part to questionable interpretations and errors in fact on the part of the author, this is not in my opinion a particularly strong or satisfactory chapter.

For instance, in his discussion of fossils Dr. Salisbury argues that there are few if any known intermediate forms which might serve as transitional types between major animal groups. As a matter of fact, paleontological museums and monographs are replete with fossil forms so intermediate and so transitional in character that appellations such as "reptile-like amphibian" and "mammal-like reptile" are widely applied. In the one instance which the author does cite as a possible example of this kind of transition, "the giant flying lizards which might be thought of as intermediate between the lizards and the birds," he adopts a hypothesis, namely derivation of birds from the ancient pterodactyls and pteranodons, which has been discredited for many decades; but he unfortunately fails to mention the well-studied fossils of *Archaeopteryx* which provide a nearly ideal transition between reptiles and birds.

This is but one example; similar exceptions could be taken to many of the author's conclusions relative to the other evidences for evolution which are discussed in this chapter, wherein he appears to be arguing against the evidence for evolution rather than presenting the case for it. In fact, he

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[1] For a good discussion along these lines, see Paul B. Weisz, *The Science of Zoology* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 10-15.

reaches the remarkable but poorly supported conclusion that these traditional evidences for organic evolution argue equally well or better for the hypothesis of special creation.

I am tempted to devote considerable discussion to Chapter 8, entitled "Natural Selection," for it is here that the author considers evidence primarily from the fields of genetics and cytology and believes that he detects "fatal weaknesses" in evolutionary theory. Genetics is not my speciality, however, and I will restrict myself to one or two observations on his conclusions in this key area.

Dr. Salisbury believes that natural selection does occur in a limited sense, but feels that its effects are quantitatively too small to account for the broader patterns of evolution. On page 155 he asserts that "the source of variability, gene mutation, cannot provide enough good mutations or combinations of mutations to supply the selection process with stock for evolution." By way

of contrast, G. L. Stebbins, a competent student of speciation processes, has recently argued that "only one in a million of the useful mutations or one in a billion of all mutations which occur needs to be established in a species population in order to provide the genetic basis of observed rates of evolution."[2] Stebbins also points out that there is no relationship between the rate of mutation and rate of evolution.[3]

Continuing this same line of argument, Dr. Salisbury asserts that we cannot account for the observed complexity in nature on the basis of the selection process, since essential intermediate stages in the development of organs or behavior patterns would seem to have negative survival value. This "classic" argument, as he terms it, would hold true only if we asserted that the environment remained constant over long periods of time, whereas there is ample evidence to indicate that past environments were notably unstable. A con-

[2] G. L. Stebbins, *Processes of Organic Evolution* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 30.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 31: "Natural selection directs evolution not by accepting or rejecting mutations as they occur, but by sorting new adaptive combinations out of a gene pool of variability which has been built up through the combined action of mutation, gene recombination, and selection over many generations . . . . Consequently, the rate of mutation rarely if ever has an influence on the rate of evolution."

dition which from our present point of view may seem to have been non-adaptive might have been eminently adaptive under the environmental complex prevailing at the time. The recent careful studies on industrial melanism in British moths have provided an excellent example of the manner in which a changed environment can convert a "harmful" mutation (in this case the dark or melanistic phase of the moth) into an "advantageous" mutation.[4]

In the above paragraphs I have deliberately attempted to demonstrate the vulnerability of many of Dr. Salisbury's conclusions relative to the evolutionary principle. By so doing it is not my intent to defend the position of the atheistic or agnostic evolutionists. On the contrary, I prefer to ally myself with that group within the Church who feel that a reasonable and harmonious synthesis can be forged between the principle of organic evolution and the revealed truths bearing upon these subjects. This general attitude has been expressed in a recent article by B. F. Harrison which appeared in *The Instructor*.[5] I find a daily source of inspiration in the knowledge that within a few steps from my office in the biology building on the B.Y.U. Campus are located the offices of several bishops, high councilmen, and at least one general board member, who espouse views similar to my own. That these views are at variance with many of Dr. Salisbury's ideas certainly implies no lack of respect for his professional competence. I am fearful, however, that his book will be used as an anti-evolutionary tract by certain fundamentalist elements. (Judging from comments and questions about the book already brought to me by students, my fears are well grounded.) This would be most unfair to Dr. Salisbury, for while he by no means warmly embraces the evolutionary concept, he avoids the trite and unwarranted "either – or" approach (i.e., either you are a good Latter-day Saint *or* an evolutionist, etc.) so frequently offered inquiring students by those who have been unable to come to terms with various scientific philosophies. In fact the author suggests a number of alternatives to account for the creation of life and its present diversity (pp. 186-193). He points out that several of these are in essential harmony with revealed truth and admits that he finds himself vacillating from one point of view to another as he continues to study the problem. I also appreciated Dr. Salisbury's interpretation of some of the scriptural passages, ancient as well as modern, often cited by fundamentalists as adequate to "put down" scientific principles and philosophies which seem to be at odds with their own understanding of these concepts. The author has demonstrated that such scriptures need not present the insurmountable obstacles which some have suggested.

In reference to general literary style, the author writes lucidly enough but incorporates certain characteristics of expression which I frequently found irritating. I suppose it is impossible in a book of this type to suppress one's personal biases and prejudices without appearing to equivocate, but Dr. Salisbry often seems to get carried away. For example, he seems to have the notion that most scientists accept ideas such as organic evolution and pre-Adamic man blindly, dogmatically, and "without thinking." Whatever may have been Dr. Salisbury's experiences with his scientific colleagues along this line, I have certainly not found this to be generally true of my own non-L.D.S.

[4] For a discussion of this fascinating example of natural selection in action, see J. M. Savage, *Evolution* (N. Y.: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963), pp. 54-55.

[5] B. F. Harrison, "The Relatedness of Living Things," *The Instructor*, V. 100, No. 7 (July, 1965), pp. 272-276.

associates in science. Quite the contrary, most of these men have reached their conclusions only after extensive study and the rejection of what they felt were unsatisfactory alternatives. In this connection, I believe that our author sets some kind of record for reiterative quoting of Matthew 24:24 ("false Christs, and false prophets . . . shall deceive the very elect"), which is a convenient if not always sporting method of consigning one's opponents to the scriptural scrap heap. He reserves his strongest censure for the field of anthropology, which he dismisses as at best "poor science," although he is obviously not well acquainted with this area. He also takes psychologists strongly to task, but I imagine they are accustomed to such treatment.

How successfully, then, has the author accomplished the purposes he set out to achieve with this text? I am not at all certain that it adequately serves the purpose for either the "troubled student" or the unbelieving scientist whom the author had hoped to convince. As he correctly points out, no one, neither scientist nor layman, can build a testimony of the gospel on the tentative truths of science. Yet men of science, as well as inquiring students, are apt to judge the merits of an argument on the basis of the material presented in evidence. I wonder, therefore, about the reaction of the author's worldly scientific associates to the inclusion in the book of his speculative "biological" hypothesis on Eve's emergence from Adam's rib, his assumption that flying saucers are likely genuine space ships operated by extraterrestrial intelligences, and his adventures with the evil spirits in the tapping piano bench. Perhaps ideas and experiences of such a highly personal nature would best be left to individual confrontations, where a more subjective atmosphere generally prevails.

In my opinion the author's strongest argument, and the principal contribution of his text, is in the area of gaining a knowledge of the reality of God and His eternal Gospel not through empirical evidences or logical inference, but only through exercise of faith in things spiritual. Recognizing this, scientists within the Church can certainly support the oft-repeated statement that there can be no conflict between revealed truth and the teachings or conclusions of science. The problem remains that God has not spoken relative to many matters of immediate concern in science; hence the believing scientist will continue to sift evidence from all sources in his never ceasing attempt to approach a more complete and harmonious understanding of the Creator and his creations. Dr. Salisbury's book represents a noteworthy precedent relating to this search; it is to be hoped that his fellow Latter-day Saint biologists will be stimulated to expand and enlarge on his effort.

FOOLS OF LIFE

Cherry Silver

The Collected Stories of Katherine Anne Porter. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1965. 495 pp. $5.95. Cherry Silver, a member of *Dialogue's* Board of Editors, received her doctorate in English from Harvard University and now makes her home in Lahaina, Hawaii, where she serves as Primary president and a teacher for teen-age girls in the L.D.S. branch.

The Collected Stories of Katherine Anne Porter has been published following the success of her long novel, *Ship of Fools.* None of the stories is new

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The Collected Stories of Katherine Anne Porter has been published following the success of her long novel, *Ship of Fools.* None of the stories is new

although she includes three "lost" stories and has finished a fourth from an early manuscript. The resulting volume contains her earliest work, *Flowering Judas,* the three short novels in *Pale Horse, Pale Rider,* plus the stories published in *The Leaning Tower and Other Stories,* all written between 1922 and 1944.

Katherine Anne Porter is acclaimed as one of our most important living writers, not because of the volume of her work, which has been modest, but because of her stylistic accomplishment. She follows the manner of Henry James and Edith Wharton. Like James, Miss Porter focuses each story on a central character through whose eyes the reader gradually discovers the situation and its meaning. Her style is less involuted than James's, and when she is symbolic, her symbols are large — a landscape, a house, or a train of thought that illuminates the mind of her character. Other writers can learn much from her precise description, her careful structuring of events and conversations, her exact vocabulary, and her exploration of moral issues without moralizing.

Her work should be especially interesting to Mormon readers — and writers — because she comes from a religious background, although her feeling for family and for the traditions of the South and Mexico seems to be stronger than her Catholicism. More than James or Wharton, she celebrates a section of the country and its people. She is a local-color writer turned psychologist and an objective and poetic stylist who does not avoid moral issues. She writes some of her best work about herself and her family, who were Kentucky plantation aristocracy that had moved to Texas, or about her experiences among Mexicans and Germans. But she demonstrates that lands and people can provide source material without limiting an artist's perspective on personality. For all her careful laying of setting — a farmhouse kitchen, a country lane, a cafe — she never succumbs to mere description. The center remains the thinking, feeling, remembering mind of the character who lives in the setting and reveals a part of his life.

Mormon writers may profit more from studying Miss Porter's style than from observing her use of religious ideas. While her stories have the morality of individual life as their central concern, she is seldom articulate or resolute about the world view Catholicism should have given her. An absence of positive comment seems to express implicit criticism of the Church. Her characters take from religion only the strength and comfort of tradition, not any personal conviction of truth. Catholicism has little moral influence on the Mexican peasant, Maria Concepcion, knife-swinging wife of an unfaithful husband, whose purpose in life beyond faithful attendance at mass is to kill her rival and win back her man. When Miss Porter confronts moral problems head on, as in "Noon Wine," she responds to these crises with primitive and suicidal solutions, rather than mature or philosophical ones.

Among Katherine Anne Porter's more sophisticated characters, interest in social reform for the most part has taken the place of religious allegiance. Laura, the heroine of "Flowering Judas," is an American school teacher in Mexico who carries messages for the revolutionary underground. From time to time she surreptitiously enters a church to try to pray, but neither her old religion nor the philosophy of revolution satisfies her. When a young political prisoner dies of an overdose of sleeping drugs she has smuggled to him, Laura dreams she is eating the blossoms of the Judas tree as they are transubstantiated

into his flesh and blood and awakens in terror. That is the end of the story; the Church provides symbols for guilt but no return route for the lost soul.

In her introduction to the 1940 edition of *Flowering Judas,* Katherine Anne Porter says that because she found the world sick and society dislocated, her energies have been spent in trying "to understand the logic of this majestic and terrible failure of the life of man in the Western world." Her writing probes the reasons for failure without offering much hope for change and correction.

Here I must take issue with Miss Porter's approach to reality. Her people have no sense of purpose to raise them beyond the vortex of their own pasts. Parents and children, friends and lovers, never reach deep personal understanding of each other, with the result that nothing in life means much. No one saying what he believes is understood by another. No purpose — neither art, politics, religion, or love — gives ultimate meaning to life. Only in the death coma of Granny Weatherall in "The Jilting of Granny Weatherall," or in the feverish delirium of Miranda in "Pale Horse, Pale Rider" comes some epiphany, some visionary reconciliation of past desires with present suffering and future hopes.

Like the young Miranda of "Old Mortality," Katherine Anne Porter refuses to understand the world in conventional terms. Fleeing distortions, she vows to see life for herself, to find truth through her own experiences. Such a declaration of independence both frees and limits a writer. She is free to create observing, sensitive, analyzing spirits who can study human failure, but she also divorces herself from systems of thought that might lead her characters to positive action or hope.

Only the domineering, horseback-riding grandmother in "The Source" has the moral strength to give meaning to the world around her. The grandmother, once a Southern belle, has become matriarch of a clan and holds together her family, homes, farm, and servants by her will to work and her power of command. Her authority and sense of duty provide security for the whole family. When she dies and the Negro nanny who has been her life-long companion retires, the family begins to disintegrate. A counterpart of this grand dame appears in "Holiday," where absolute obedience to the mother and father brings stability to a German immigrant farm family. In both these households, feelings of affection are subjugated to the larger interests of work, increase, and solidarity. When individual members separate themselves from the family group, the authority that defined their identity loses its force, and they face the world alone, confused by its injustice, falsehold, and misery.

There, too, Miss Porter's readers are left without hope; they are philsosophically, as she said of herself and the deformed sister in "Holiday," "equally the fools of life."

THE CHURCH AND THE LAW

by Thomas G. Alexander

"The Suppression of the *Nauvoo Expositor.*" By Dallin H. Oaks. *Utah Law Review,* IX (Winter, 1965), 862-903.
"The Mormons and the Law: The Polygamy Cases." By Orma Linford. *Utah Law Review,* IX (Winter, 1964, and Summer, 1965), 308-370 and 543-591. Thomas Alexander is Assistant Professor of History at Brigham Young University and has published a number of articles on Utah history in various historical quarterlies; he is a member of the bishopric of his L.D.S. ward.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the Church and its leaders were regularly involved with federal and state law. The recent article by Professor Dallin H. Oaks[1] is a prudent, well researched attempt to deal with one incident, the abatement of the *Nauvoo Expositor,* in which legal matters seriously affected the Church.

Oaks discusses the legality of subsequent actions in the Municipal Court of Nauvoo and in Justice Robert F. Smith's court in Carthage, but the central



issue is the legality of the abatement by the Nauvoo City Council. Newspaper statements against the Church fell into three categories: political, religious, and moral. Oaks concludes that the city council had no right to abate the newspaper on the basis of its political and religious allegations, but on the charges of immorality, the city could have made a case. Precedents from Illinois courts and from Blackstone justified the abatement of nuisances without trial.

Calling a newspaper a nuisance was unusual, but the Council may have been on good grounds because of the fear of mob action and the scurrilous and defamatory character of the paper's articles. There was, however, no legal justification for the destruction of the press, and the proprietors might have sued the council for recovery of the machine's value.

[1] Dallin H. Oaks is Professor of Law at the University of Chicago.

In the nineteenth century, Oaks points out, the only generally recognized guarantee under freedom of the press was protection against prior restraint in the form of licensing or censorship. The city could have either brought the newspaper's proprietors to trial for criminal libel or abated the paper by injunction. To assume that the city would have lost the case on its legal merits is to attribute to the Illinois courts a civil-libertarian attitude characteristic of the period since 1930, rather than the attitude of the nineteenth century, which Leonard W. Levy has characterized as a *Legacy of Suppression.*[2]

Oaks does not discuss the probable attitude of the Illinois courts had the Mormons been brought to trial in 1844. They could have made a good case for the abatement, but would they have won the suit? Mr. Dooley (Finley Peter Dunne) long ago commented that the Supreme Court follows the election returns. The Illinois Constitution allowed the legislature by a two-thirds vote to remove judges "for any reasonable cause which shall not be sufficient ground for impeachment."[3] A case could be made that public pressure would have influenced the court and that the Church would have lost despite its strong position.

It was not Oaks's purpose to deal with problems beyond the legality of the city's case, and here he accounts himself well. But other studies have made it abundantly clear that from a practical point of view the action of the council proved disastrous and, of course, led to the murder of the Prophet.[4]

If Oaks's article describes conditions as they actually existed in the nineteenth century, the opposite is true of recent articles by Professor Orma Linford dealing with the anti-polygamy prosecutions and the civil disabilities imposed on Church members in the 1870's and 1880's.[5] The general purpose of the articles is to determine how the federal and territorial courts interpreted the First Amendment while prosecuting cases under the various federal anti-polygamy acts. Linford argues that the polygamy cases were the Supreme Court's first "direct encounter with first amendment provisions regarding religion." Her general thesis is that both the United States and Utah Territorial Supreme Courts disregarded the limitations on government under the clause separating church and state. What she fails to state, however, and this is the major failing of the articles, is that the Utah situation was the federal government's only major confrontation with a theocracy.

By telling only part of the story, she gives a distorted picture of what the government was trying to do. Polygamy is discussed as if it existed in a vacuum. Opposition to plural marriage was not confined to moral and traditional arguments as she assumes. Though such objections were important, many were convinced, as Angie F. Newman said in her testimony before a Congressional committee, that the "foundation, the perpetuity of this government [the Mormon Church] is based upon the subjugation of women."[6]

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[2] *Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1960).

[3] State of Illinois, *Constitution* (1818), Art. IV, Sec. 5.

[4] See for instance B. H. Roberts, *Comprehensive History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints* (6 vols.; Salt Lake City: Deseret News Press, 1930), II, 221-308.

[5] Orma Linford is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Kenosha Center.

[6] U. S. Congress, *Senate Report 1279,* 49th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 10, Serial 2361.

Those who drafted the anti-polygamy legislation were convinced that they were attacking the foundation of church domination of political and social life in Utah. Linford could have seen this had she looked more closely at some of the arguments from the *Congressional Record* which she supplies in the article.[7] A similar limitation appears in the discussion of the naturalization decision of Justice Thomas J. Anderson.[8]

The main value of the articles is the excellent summary of the polygamy cases themselves. But the argument suffers from the implicit assumption that the courts then should have known the direction in which the law has developed since. In the Reynolds case, for instance, Linford seems to expect the courts to expound a sociological jurisprudence, such as Louis D. Brandeis developed in *Mueller* v. *Oregon* a quarter of a century later. Linford claims that "the Court never quite explained *why* plural marriage was a threat to the public well-being." This is hardly fair to the Court, which said that plural marriage was a threat because it had traditionally been held to be such. The Court's pronouncement that polygamy led to despotism also was in line with the prevalent belief that plural marriage was part of the basis of Church control in Utah.

As Linford points out, the courts changed the definition of unlawful cohabitation and used other means to make it difficult for people who continued plural marriage to support their families. The courts in Utah also went far beyond the bounds of propriety in allowing segregation of offenses into small time periods, and judges failed to observe strict rules of evidence. Contrary to what Linford asserts, however, judges sometimes did tell polygamists "how to remove themselves from the operation of the law." Utah Chief Justice Charles S. Zane on numerous occasions said they could simply renounce the practice of plural marriage. Where Mormons such as Bishop John Sharp tried to obey these injunctions, however, they were charged with disloyalty and ostracized by their coreligionists.[9]

To argue, as Linford does, that plural marriages "were not civil contracts amendable to the ordinary processes of civil law; they were spiritual unions recognized and regulated by ecclesiastical law," is to approach naivete. Were these simply spiritual unions, this reviewer, together with many others who descended from polygamous families, would still be in the spirit world. As far as the law was concerned, plural marriages were unrecorded civil and religious contracts. Probably to protect plural marriages, the territorial legislature passed no laws for recording any marriages until the passage of the Edmunds-Tucker Act made their recording mandatory.[10]

Moreover, the contention that juries in unlawful cohabitation and polygamy cases were packed is specious. It would be just as reasonable to argue that people who believe in theft should sit on the juries trying persons accused of stealing as to say that those who believed in polygamy had a right to judge persons accused of that crime.

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[7] *Utah Law Review,* IX, 315, 319.

[8] See *Deseret Evening News,* December 12 and 14, 1889.

[9] *Salt Lake Tribune,* November 4, 1884 and July 22 and September 18, 1885; Charles S. Zane. "The Death of Polygamy in Utah," *Forum* XII (November, 1891), 368, 370.

[10] Jacob Smith Boreman, "Crusade Against Theocracy: the Reminiscences of Judge Jacob Smith Boreman of Utah, 1872-1877," ed. Leonard J. Arrington, reprinted from The *Huntington Library Quarterly,* XXIV (November, 1960), 17-18; *22 U. S. Statutes at Large,* 635.

The author is on much firmer ground when she discusses disfranchisement and disqualification from office. It is clear, as the United States Supreme Court decided, that the Utah Commission had no right to disfranchise all who believed in polygamy. In Idaho, where Mormons were in a minority, the Idaho test oath was nothing short of reprehensible. The law there punished mere adherence to a powerless minority group.

The L.D.S. Church escheat cases present a thorny problem because they involved much more than the mere practice of polygamy. One might well conclude from the evidence which Linford presents that in "abolishing the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Congress overstepped the legitimate bounds of its obligation to preserve the separation of church and state, and infringed upon the religious freedom of the Mormons." Again, however, Linford fails to take into account the temporal as well as spiritual power of the Church and the dual view which Gentiles held of polygamy — that it was immoral and the basis for the Church's political power.

As the Reynolds case made clear, separation of church and state is a two-edged sword. It imposes on the government the obligation not to interfere with religious beliefs and actions so long as they are not detrimental to the



general welfare. On the other hand, as Linford says, quoting Jefferson, the founding fathers proposed by the First Amendment to erect "a wall of separation between the church and State."[11] The church was not to interfere in state affairs. Even though the dividing line between religious and political questions may be narrow, the L.D.S. Church owed it to the government to try to observe the line.

The Church's position on its political role in building the Kingdom of God was summed up in a discussion of one of Utah's constitutional conventions in the *Millenial Star*. The article said that in

> . . . case of any dispute or dubiety on the minds of the convention, the Prophet of God, who stands at the head of the Church, decides. He nominates, the convention endorses, and the people accept the nomi-

[11] Jefferson's reply to an address sent to him by the Danbury Baptist Association, cited in *Utah Law Review*, IX, 581.

> nation. . . . So in the Legislature itself. The utmost freedom of speech free from abuse is indulged in; but any measure that cannot be unanimously decided on, is submitted to the President of the Church, who, by the wisdom of God decides the matter, and all the Councillors and Legislators sanction the decision. There are no hostile parties, no opposition, no Whigh[sic] and Tory, Democrat and Republican, they are all brethren, legislating for the common good, and the word of the Lord, through the head of the Church guides, counsels, and directs.[12]

On this basis, the Church tried to insulate itself from the rest of the United States and from Gentiles in Utah as much as possible. Members were urged to take their disputes to the Church rather than to civil courts. The legislature vested local probate courts with civil and criminal jurisdiction and created the offices of territorial attorney and marshal, the incumbents of which were elected by joint vote of the legislature. Even the commander of the Nauvoo Legion, who should have been responsible to the territorial governor as commander-in-chief of the territorial militia, was elected by joint vote of the legislature. The People's Party regularly ratified Church nominees, and, on occasion, economic sanctions were voted against Gentiles.[13]

What should the federal government have done in such a case? This reviewer is certainly not wise enough to say, but to view the problem simply as a matter of religious freedom for Church members is to rob the problem of its meaning. If, as Linford argues, the anti-polygamy campaign failed to take into consideration the total damage done to the L.D.S. community, *she* fails to take into account the damage done First Amendment guarantees which Gentiles in Utah had a right to expect.[14]

Finally, Linford argues, as others have, that the prosecution of polygamy may have delayed the dissolution of the institution.[15] This argument forgets that plural marriage was a divine principle believed devoutly by Church members who would not easily abandon it. In the Church service in which I reported on my mission, it was announced that another missionary, also a member of the ward, had been excommunicated for joining the Church of the First Born. She had not been coerced or persecuted; she was merely convinced that the principle of plural marriage was correct. At least one of her sisters and one other family from the ward joined with her. It is not

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[12] Cited in Klaus J. Hansen, "The Theory and Practice of the Political Kingdom of God in Mormon History, 1829-1890" (Unpublished Master's Thesis, Brigham Young University, 1959), p. 49.

[13] On these points see *Journal of Discourses*, I, 218; III, 238; Orson F. Whitney, *History of Utah* (4 vols. Salt Lake City: George Q. Cannon and Sons, 1892-1904), II, 549-551, 496-504; Robert N. Baskin, *Reminiscences of Early Utah* (n.p.: By the Author, 1914), pp. 23-27; Leonard J. Arrington, *Great Basin Kingdom: An Economic History of the Latter-day Saints, 1830-1900* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 248-249.

[14] The First Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment applied in Utah because Utah, as a territory, was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. U. S. Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 3.

[15] Stanley Ivins, "Notes on Mormon Polygamy," *Western Humanities Review*, X (Summer, 1956), 231-232. It should be noted that segregation in the South grew stronger rather than perishing when it was left alone: C. Vann Woodward, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow: A Brief Account of Segregation* (New York: Oxford University Press Galaxy Book, 1957), pp. 49-95.

obvious that plural marriage or Church domination of politics would have died out if they were merely left alone any more than that these people will give up polygamy simply because they are not prosecuted.

Some maintain that because Mormons were law abiding they gave up plural marriage after the Supreme Court declared the anti-polygamy acts constitutional.[16] But long after the 1879 Reynolds decision, Church members brought to the bar for sentencing told federal judges that the law of God was higher than the law of the land and deserved prior obedience. The Manifesto officially ending polygamy as Church practice was not issued until 1890, and excommunication for practicing plural marriage did not come until 1904. After 1891, however, the Church did cease to demand adherence to the political policy announced by Church leaders and, as a sign of good faith, broke up the People's Party and adopted the two-party system.

As an historian, I see the problems of the 1870's and 1880's as a conflict of two systems of law, tradition, and morality, which, because they were mutually incompatible, had to be reconciled in some way. As a devoted member of the Church, however, I see in the action of the federal government a manifestation of God's will. The Constitution, which the Church holds to be divinely inspired, demands the separation of church and state. The power exercised before 1890 to compel adherence to the Church's political and economical policies infringed upon that separation. The two principles, which were self-contradictory, could not both stand; and the Lord chose to have the Church abide by the Constitution.

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[16] This view is presented by James E. Talmage, *A Study of the Articles of Faith: Being a Consideration of the Principle Doctrines of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints* (Fortieth English Edition; Salt Lake City: The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 1960), pp. 424-425.

ECUMENICAL CINEMA

Rolfe Peterson

A former Utahn, who taught at Brigham Young University and became a successful radio and television movie critic, Rolfe Petersen now has his own television show in San Francisco and teaches at the College of San Mateo.

God is not dead in Hollywood. The phenomenal success of *The Sound of Music* means that nuns are in again, and two current movies give us a choice, according to side-by-side newspaper ads, of Rosalind Russell on a bicycle and Debbie Reynolds on a Vespa, both of them with their habits billowing behind them, and both of them obviously regular guys.

An interesting footnote to this cinematic stampede to the nunnery is that both *The Sound of Music* and Miss Russell's *The Trouble with Angels* feature a girl from Brigham City named Portia Nelson playing one of the nuns. I don't know if it's art, but it's certainly ecumenical.

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Despite its winning the Academy Award, *The Sound of Music* is really not a very good movie. It charms audiences, me included, because Julie Andrews is such a winning performer and because Ted McCord's photography is a constant delight to eye. But these fragmentary excellences cannot disguise the intrinsic stupidity of its story and characters. And Robert Wise, who won the director's Oscar for this, has served up a romantic sub-plot involving the eldest daughter and a village lad which, for sheer clumsiness and sticky sentiment, rivals the worst of MacDonald and Eddy. Richard Haydn lurks in several scenes, like the deliverer of epigrams in a play by Shaw or Wilde, but when the moment comes for his witty line, it doesn't turn out to be very witty. Peggy Wood, as a wispy old Mother Superior, borrows the wrong singing voice when she suddenly bursts into "Climb Every Mountain," and the incongruity of this young and powerful mezzo-soprano, the kind that knocks down ushers in the third balcony at the Met, issuing from her frail image on the screen is the funniest cinematic moment of the year. Baron von Trapp's tyranny might have made a fascinating study in abnormal psychology, but treated sentimentally it is simply offensive. And any father who would fill his home with guests and then inflict upon them the cute little songs of his children ought to be horse-whipped.

The best choice for the Oscar was *Darling.* It's a hard, brittle story, peopled by the Godless, but by exposing the shallowness of their lives it does make a spiritual comment, one that is far more valid than the spurious sugar-pills we get in "religious" pictures.

Another Oscar nominee had great spiritual content for me when I read the book. But on the screen Dr. Zhivago is somewhat reduced. He is no longer every man of good will. Lara is no longer the very spirit of Russia. They are just a couple of ordinary little people caught in a trite love affair. Ironically, the one artisan who fell down on the job in the making of *Dr. Zhivago,* Robert Bolt, received the Academy Award for writing. The director and the photographer show genius in individual scenes like the funeral procession and burial and the massacre in the wheat field. But Bolt's failure to (1) pull the long time-span and chaos of incident and character into any kind of unity or focus or point and (2) give Dr. Zhivago and his friends some dialogue that made them living people instead of stereotypes makes the picture, on the whole, a failure. He even has a World War I soldier yell: "How about that!" — an idiomatic anachronism that would look bad in an MIA pageant. For this they give Oscars?

I was glad that *A Thousand Clowns* didn't win the big award, because it is a sloppily dubbed movie, and because Barbara Harris, who starts out promisingly, turns into a major liability. But it is worth praising in this discussion because one of its many funny lines mentions God:

"Murray, the trouble with you is you think you're God, and everybody has to audition for human being."

It's a superficial comedy, but Herb Gardner's witty lines often convey some fragment of philosophic or spiritual content that places it far above *The Sound of Music.*

AMONG THE MORMONS

A Survey of Current Literature

Ralph W. Hansen

> *. . . I have seen books made of things neither studied nor even understood. . . .*
> Montaigne. *Essays.*
>
> *"There is no book so bad," said the bachelor, "but something good may be found in it."*
> Cervantes. *Don Quixote.*

Continuing our bibliographical coverage of Mormon material, we turn our attention in this issue to dissertations and theses written to fulfill requirements for graduate degrees. It should be noted that with a few exceptions most of the authors included are new to the world of scholarship. Whether the quality of work is due to this newness to scholarly pursuits or to the limitations of doctoral studies in general, reading the abstracts available has been a discouraging affair – and this is particularly true of dissertations in the field of education. I do not intend to single out any particular shortcoming or author, but rather to join with others who have long recognized that the overall quality of doctoral dissertations leaves much to be desired. Furthermore, I do not intend to document this contention, which would be a rather formidable task; let me rather refer the skeptical to *Dissertation Abstracts* for an hour of incredulity and mirth.

That marvelous compendium of numbers, the *Statistical Abstract of the United States,* in its 1965 edition reported that students of American collegiate institutions earned 14,490 doctorates and 101,122 master's degrees in 1964. As far as I have been able to determine, twenty of the doctoral dissertations accepted during the academic year 1963-64 (as reported in *Dissertation Abstracts* and other sources) were concerned with subjects relevant to Mormonism or Utah. (This does not include dissertations written in the physical sciences.) Education provided the largest number of topics, with music a distant second. These select twenty are not be construed as representative of Mormon scholarship. There is no easy way of determining how many of the twenty authors are Latter-day Saints, and one can assume that some Mormons wrote dissertations on subjects not related to Utah or Mormonism. Our interest is in the subject, not the man.

Information on master's theses, other than selected subject indexes, is almost non-existent. Since there is no service similar to *Dissertation Abstracts* for them, we are obligated to limit our efforts to listing titles of theses reported to us by various readers. Therefore we trust that Ronald Quayle Frederickson's "Maud May Babcock and the Department of Elocution at the University of Utah" (University of Utah, 1965) was not the only master's thesis with a somewhat relevant subject, but rather the only one which has come to the attention of *Dialogue.*

At least one of the dissertations listed has been published as a book,* thus making it available to a much wider audience. Dr. Robert B. Flander's "Nauvoo: Kingdom on the Mississippi" (University of Wisconsin, 1964) claims this distinction deservedly. Another product of Wisconsin is "The Mormons and the Law: The Polygamy Cases" by Orma Linford, who has published much of her research in two recent articles in the *Utah Law Review.**

Mormon theology is the concern of two of the twenty dissertations considered in this report. Robert C. Patch of the Brigham Young University Department of Religious Instruction wrote "The Spiritual Connotation in the Scriptural Concept of Witness" for his dissertation. This quote from Dr. Patch's abstract succinctly sets forth his thesis:

> One of the distinctive teachings of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints is that each person may know for himself whether Jesus' doctrine is true or whether Jesus spoke only for Himself. The concept of testimony includes a general concept of the religious theme of Christianity, and what is more important, a personal conviction of its truth. Whether this conviction rises from the cultural milieu of a person, whether it is engendered by a hypersensitive emotion, whether it comes from a hardminded intellectualism, or whether it may be the counsel of an inspired conscience, this conviction constitutes one of the most fundamental religious problems. This study explores the scriptural evidence which may indicate a definite answer.

From the Iliff School of Theology, Denver, Colorado, comes word of a dissertation by William Richard Persons, "An Analysis of Changes in the Interpretation and Utilization of Revelation in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints." Unfortunately Iliff does not participate in the cooperative venture, *Dissertation Abstracts,* and we are unable to make a content note.

Except in significantly wealthy or exceptionally forward-looking institutions, libraries have failed to keep pace with the demands of present day educational needs. It would appear from the findings of Kenneth T. Slack, in "A Survey of Centralized and Cooperative Library Activities Looking to the Development of a Centralized or Cooperative Library Program for the Unified School System of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints," that services in the existing libraries in the Latter-day Saints Church schools are "below American Library Association standards." One can only hope that Dr. Slack's dissertation will promote some reform measures.

Calvin D. Lowe in his dissertation, "The Need for and Ability to Support a Program of Cooperative Vocational Business Education in the Salt Lake City High Schools," finds that "nearly 45 percent, or about 67,000 workers, in Metropolitan Salt Lake area were engaged in distributive and clerical occupations." On the other hand, "less than one percent of [Salt Lake's] high school students were enrolled in distributive education classes during the school year 1961-62." Would it be too much to assume that Salt Lake's students are receiving a good liberal arts background so that they may find the key to a fruitful life as well as a satisfying vocation?

Speaking of values, I should report that Thomas H. Metos of the University of Utah describes the values of Salt Lake City high school students in

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*Reviewed in this issue of *Dialogue.*

a dissertation aptly titled, "A Study of the Values of Salt Lake City High School Students." Dr. Metos's emphasis is on changes in value patterns between sophomore and senior years. One of Dr. Metos's corollary findings was "that the Salt Lake City group's value patterns indicated strong elements of conservatism, as well as being quite stable by high school entrance. . . ." Utah is indeed the home of a peculiar people.

PH.D. DISSERTATIONS

Alexander, Thomas Glen. The Federal Frontiers: Interior Department Financial Policy in Idaho, Utah and Arizona. Ph.D. University of California, Berkeley.[1]

Anderson, Grant Forsgren. Evaluation of the Music Preparation of Secondary School Music Teachers in Utah and Eastern Idaho. Ed.D. University of California, Los Angeles, 1964. #64-8564.[2]

Bluhm, Harry Pollei. Educational and Occupational Aspirations on the Mormon Educational Ethic.[1]

Carver, Julia. A Study of the Influence of the Philosophy of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints on Physical Education in Church Schools. University of Oregon, 1964.

Chugg, Melburne David. A Study of the Classroom Music Program in the Elementary Schools of Utah. Ed.D. University of Oregon, 1964. #64-12,151.

Flanders, Robert Bruce. Nauvoo: Kingdom on the Mississippi. Ph.D. University of Wisconsin, 1964. #64-13,874.

Holm, Floyd. Factors That Relate to Student Choice of a College in the Utah State University System. Ed.D. University of Southern California, 1965. #65-3108.

Hyatt, Norman F. Public School Expenditures Related to Selected Sociological and Economic Characteristics of Utah School Districts. Ed.D. University of Oregon, 1964. #65-2469.

Leavitt, Stanley A. Value Differences of Selected Groups of Junior High School Students in Utah County, Utah. Brigham Young University, 1964.[1]

Linford, Orma. The Mormons and the Law: The Polygamy Cases. Ph.D. University of Wisconsin, 1964. #65-1271.

Lowe, Calvin Dean. The Need for and Ability to Support a Program of Cooperative Vocational Business Education in the Salt Lake City High Schools. Ed.D. Utah State University, 1963. #64-13,746.

Metos, Thomas H. A Study of the Values of Salt Lake City High School Students. Ph.D. University of Utah, 1963. #64-3462.

Patch, Robert C. The Spiritual Connotation in the Scriptural Concept of Witness. Ph.D. Brigham Young University, 1964. #65-10,083.

Persons, William Richard. An Analysis of Changes in the Interpretation and Utilization of Revelation in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Iliff School of Theology.[3]

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[1] Not yet listed in *Dissertation Abstracts*. Information listed as obtained from the bibliography *Mormon Americana*. See this column in the first issue of *Dialogue* for a fuller description of *Mormon Americana*.

[2] University Microfilm order number.

[3] Iliff School of Theology does not participate in *Dissertation Abstracts*.

Prpich, Mike. An Analysis of the Teaching of Current Events in the Social Studies Curriculum in the High Schools of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1962-63. Ph.D. University of Utah, 1964. #64-10,535.

Slack, Kenneth Thurston. A Survey of Centralized and Cooperative Library Activities Looking to the Development of a Centralized or Cooperative Library Program for the Unified School System of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Ed.D. University of Utah, 1964. #65-1784.

Slaughter, Jay Leon. The Role of Music in the Mormon Church, School and Life. Music Ed.D. Indiana, 1965. #65-423.

Smith, Duane Allan. Mining Camps and the Settlement of the Trans-Mississippi Frontier, 1860-1890. Ph.D. University of Colorado, 1964. #65-4272.

Tucker, Melvin LeRoy. A Study of the Salary-supplementing Activities of Utah Public School Teachers.[1]

Vorkink, Joseph Paul. Graduation Requirements for the Public High Schools in Utah, Arizona and Idaho. Ed.D. University of California, Los Angeles, 1964. #65-10,485.

MASTER'S THESIS

Frederickson, Ronald Quayle. Maud May Babcock and the Department of Elocution at the University of Utah. University of Utah, 1965.

RECENTLY RECEIVED

As a regular feature of this column we will print short notices of various publications of a somewhat miscellaneous nature which we receive in the mail or otherwise have brought to our attention.

Marcellus S. Snow, Comp. *An English-German L.D.S. Dictionary.* Privately printed by the compiler. 1966.* Written by a returned missionary, this volume attempts to bridge the gap between common terms found in the regular English-German dictionary and the needs of Mormon missionaries in German speaking lands and converts wishing to comprehend L.D.S. literature. Already in use at the Language Training Mission at Brigham Young University, this successful work will hopefully be followed by similar efforts in other languages. There will be more understanding on Sunday when the German Saints gather at *die Priesterschaftsverersammlung* with Brother Snow's dictionary in hand.

The California Star, Vol. I. 1847-1848. Howell-North Books, 1050 Parker Street, Berkeley, Calif. 94710. $20.00. Sam Brennan's contributions to the development of California are legion. Not the least of these contributions was the publication of California's first newspaper, *The California Star.* Original copies of the *Star* are difficult to locate, but this reprint edition of Vol. 1 with an introduction by Fred Blackburn Rogers rectifies this lacuna. Although the *Star* was not Church oriented, Mr. Blackburn's introduction relates the events surrounding the paper's establishment to the Mormon migration on the ship *Brooklyn* under Brannan's leadership.

Norma Baldwin Ricketts. *Mormons and the Discovery of Gold.* The Pioneer Press, Placerville, Calif. 1966. 2nd Edition. 43 pp. $1.50. Available from the author at 2398 Fair Oaks Blvd., Sacramento, Calif. 95825. This

* To be fully reviewed in a future issue.

pamphlet was prepared for the 118th Anniversary celebration of the discovery of gold; the author's intention is to give further recognition to the role of members of the Mormon Battalion who were with Marshall when gold was discovered and in other ways contributed to the early development of California. The second edition, which was received at press time, contains an interesting short treatise on "What happened to Henry Bigler's diary?"

Hymns at Home, 33⅓, 12" L.P. Hi-Fidelity. Available from Hymns at Home, 1574 24th Avenue, San Francisco, California. $3.25. Standard L. D. S. hymns sung by the Morningside Park Ward Choir, Inglewood, California, Stake. From the blurb this record is described as having "special appeal . . . to children learning L.D.S. songs, [and] filling lonely hours of the elderly and shut in. . . ." Large quantities are available at discount rates for fund raising purposes.



Notes and Comments

Edited by Joseph Jeppson

Notes and comments are not merely short articles or long letters; they are varied, informal glimpses of Mormon thought and life. The Editors welcome news, profiles, opinions, accounts, speeches and other items that seem appropriate.

Concerned inquiries have reached me regarding the nature of certain brilliant and inspired articles which I previously reported had been rejected by all the other members of the staff of this journal. In every instance these articles were written by me. They concerned Mormon history, L.D.S. theology, and Mormons and civil rights and were respectively entitled "The Uncovered Wagon," "Questions to Gospel Answers," and "A Marvelous Shirk and a Blunder."

ON MORMON THEOLOGY

Sterling M. McMurrin, Provost and E. E. Ericksen Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of Utah, has written the following note in response to the Roundtable in the Spring issue, which reviewed his The Theological Foundations of the Mormon Religion.

Professors Brown, Bennett, and Anderson were most gracious in giving attention to my essays on Mormon theology and were both generous and helpful in their comments. I am pleased that Professor Brown sees the essays as a step toward serious discussion between Mormons and non-Mormons, that Professor Bennett correctly observed that the essays were not an argument that Mormon theology is true, and that Professor Anderson appears to agree with my thesis that Mormon theology is grounded in a positive conception of man. I especially appreciate the fine ecumenic spirit of Professor Brown's comments, though I must frankly confess that he attributes to me a motive more lofty than the facts justify. My motive was simply to describe comparatively the distinctive character of Mormon theology, though I hoped in doing so to show that Mormonism has more intellectual strength than most of its critics suppose and than most of its adherents seem willing to admit.

It is true that in Mormonism certain philosophical concepts function very importantly, but I should not have conveyed the impression, to quote Professor Brown, "that Mormonism is a highly intricate and subtle philosophical system." Viewed from the standpoint which Professor Anderson recommends in his emphasis upon scripture and revelation, Mormonism is highly dogmatic and authoritarian, though it has traditionally made an admirable effort to be reasonable. I intended to give only a partial description of Mormon theology, getting at the basic ideas, but I had not supposed that this would produce distorted conceptions of the religion.

It seems to me that Brown and Anderson both assume that in these essays I am expressing my own theological views. I made no attempt to stay out of the picture, and I have no illusions about the possibility of genuine objectivity. And in the supplementary essay on the idea that God is a person, which is not specifically about Mormon theology, I definitely got into the act. But I would like to make it clear that, whatever judgments were made along the way, my interest was simply in giving a description of Mormon theology. Professor Brown is quite sure that I must belong to the "liberal wing" of Mormonism. My Mormon attachments are very genuine, but my personal views incline toward naturalistic humanism with some flavor of positivism. Mormon liberalism, which showed some life in the thirties, never quite made the grade. The liberals talked a great deal, but they had no courage of decision or action. Their sentiments always got in their way. They are still around, but in influence they have been displaced by a breed of noisy and deceptive irrationalists who give the appearance of orthodoxy while denying its spirit.

Professor Brown raises the question, "Does Professor McMurrin speak for what might be called 'normative' Mormonism?" The answer to this is a simple "No." I have here spoken for no one — not even for myself if this means expressing my personal religious views. I have attempted, however, to describe the basic facets of what I would regard as "normative Mormonism." To Professor Brown's question, How would one "determine the content of 'normative Mormonism'?" I would say, "In the same way by which one would determine the content of normative Protestantism." Whether I have described normative Mormonism reliably, I must leave to others to judge. But I should say to Professor Brown that it is just as obvious that the denial of original sin, for instance, is a characteristic of normative Mormonism as that Paul, Augustine, and Luther belong to the mainstream of Christianity.

Professor Brown asks such questions as by what criterion I am able to say that earlier generations of Mormons exhibited greater intellectual acumen than do their present successors. This seems to me to be in principle a strange question. Something like my asking for the criterion on which he grounds his statement that Schleiermacher is "one of the seminal thinkers of recent Protestant history." Just as his statement is supported by what he regards as seminal thought taken together with his estimate of Schleiermacher, in my case it is simply a matter of what I regard to be good intellectual acumen taken together with my estimate of certain Mormon writers. At one point Professor Brown seems to confuse the question of who is the ecclesiastical authority in Mormonism with the question of who has the competence to comment responsibly on the character of Mormonism. This is a very strange confusion. There is no problem of determining where the ecclesiastical

authority resides. It is in the hierarchy, and ultimately in the President of the Church. But to speak *for* Mormonism is one thing. To speak *about* it is something else.

Professor Brown's complaint that some of my generalizations are too sweeping is well taken. I should say, perhaps, that I did not intend them to be taken as sweepingly as he has apparently done, but I appreciate his criticism. It is true that my theological foil was fundamentalistic Protestantism, but not conceived narrowly, as Professor Brown suggests. Though all too brief and sketchy, my descriptions were based especially on the greatest of the theologians, Augustine, Luther, and Calvin, and on the major creeds. Though this is only a part of the story of Protestantism, it is the part that is important if a person is to understand Mormonism. I used fundamentalism as a foil not arbitrarily but because in fact it was the actual foil of the historical rise and growth of Mormonism. Mormonism is fundamentalism turned against itself.

I have no desire to contend with Professor Brown over which is the central dogma of traditional Christian orthodoxy. I certainly respect his opinion. He says "grace" and I say "original sin." My point is simply that the grace is necessary for salvation because of the sin, which gives the latter some logical priority. I would not accuse Calvin and Luther of revelling in man's vileness, to paraphrase Professor Brown, but as theologians and ecclesiastics they were probably rather grateful for it. Each had an inordinate preoccupation with the issue of sin. Chesterton may have found the good news of grace in the doctrine of original sin, but this hardly changes the fact that original sin is bad news to begin with. He simply made the best of a bad situation. I suspect that I can see Professor Brown's own liberalism shining through this discussion. But Augustine, Luther, and Calvin, whatever their virtues, were not liberals in their theologies. I here exhibit my distaste for the dogma of original sin, of course, but I can assure Professor Brown that my essays were written not around my personal views in this matter, but rather to describe the belief of the generality of Mormons and their theologians. I personally believe that Mormonism, like most liberalism, has been quite superficial in its treatment of the problem of sin. Mormonism has been plagued at this point with an excessive legalism and with a superficial optimism in its estimate of man and its conception of human history. Moreover, it has usually managed to misunderstand the traditional concept of original sin and few Mormon writers have any acquaintance with the psychological subtleties that have surrounded the discussion of that doctrine in recent decades.

And the matter of the privative conception of evil. I agree that no one can describe evil more positively than Augustine. He knew it at first hand. But the point is what happens when he and others attempt to *explain* its reality. My discussion of evil had to do with the problem of theodicy. I could have approached the subject on the broader base which Professor Brown proposes, but this would not change the fact that for classical theology evil, while often *described* as if it were positive, has more often than not been *explained* as negative.

Professor Brown remarks on the absence from the essays of any discussion of revelation and authority. His point here is well taken. This will come in a piece on the Mormon religion if I can ever get around to it. He quite graciously suggests a future Protestant-Mormon dialogue on such issues. On

the concept of revelation he would find much confusion in Mormon literature and discussion. Most Mormons are not even aware that there are others today who believe in revelation. Though they talk much about it and declare their belief in it, the Mormons do not have a clear and articulate doctrine of revelation. But they are themselves an impressive exhibit of a people who were once moved, and moved profoundly and dramatically — even tragically and heroically — by what they heard as the word of God. Today, engrossed in the prosperity and conservative respectability against which their own prophets warned, and anxious for the condition of their own faith, they engage in a loud and excited conversation among themselves and no longer listen for the voice of God.

On the matter of authority, the Mormon views, like the Mormon institutions, are better organized. But here again is the exhibit — the tragic exhibit — of a vital, prophetic, free religion come all too soon, even prematurely, to its churchly form, deceived by an authoritarianism that has destroyed much of the adventure, vitality, and creativity of its people, a religion that now stands certainly as the strangest American anachronism — an authoritarian religion and rigidly authoritarian church born and nourished in the land of the free.

I appreciate Professor Bennett's warning to my readers that I did not intend to convey the notion that the "theological foundations of Mormonism are philosophically sound." My intention was to describe the foundations. Whether they are or are not sound is another story. In my opinion, Mormonism has far more intellectual strength than is commonly supposed, even by most Mormons. I frankly wanted to exhibit that strength, just to set the record straight — not to argue for or against the truth of the doctrines. It may be, for instance, that the finitistic conception of God is not true. But that this idea can be forcefully set against an absolutistic conception is of importance for any theological discussion that rises above the level of tradition and sentimentality.

I have found Bennett's discussion of analysis in theology very rewarding. My own inclination at this point, however, is to favor logical over linguistic analysis as providing a better access to the question of whether theology is meaningful. I have already confessed to something of a positivistic bias. I suspect that most metaphysical and theological discourse has been meaningless if empirical criteria are to be respected. But I am not ready to say that it is not possible to construct a meaningful statement in theology, or that the Christian theologians have not done so.

As a sample of the problem of the source of theological knowledge, Bennett asks, "But how do we get our knowledge of the eternal intelligences of Mormon theology?" Most Mormons would say, no doubt, "By revelation." My answer, of course, is that this is a simple instance of dogmatic speculation and I suppose that there is not the remotest possibility of any empirical evidence bearing upon its truth or falsity. It may be a meaningless concept. Now some may ask how I could write about concepts which I believe may be meaningless. But as Bennett has pointed out, I was writing about the Mormon beliefs about God and the soul — not whether these beliefs are meaningful or true. Certainly they are not less likely to be meaningful than the concepts of the classical theism. The strong physiocalistic propensities of Mormon theology might even find favor with some positivists — at the point of meaningfulness, not of truth.

Since Professor Anderson and I are on less common ground, I am sensitive to his generosity toward my essays. I doubt that I would have been as gracious in commenting on his position. He describes me as following the tradition of B. H. Roberts. I don't see myself as belonging in any particular tradition, but, as my essays indicated, I have much admiration for Roberts's intellectual strength and integrity. Mormonism has had no theologian of the first order and there is none on the horizon. But the Mormons have an avid if undiscriminating taste for theology, and in the past their theologians played a major role in their lives. Of these, Roberts was far and away the most forceful and talented and the one who most effectively grasped and articulated what can be called the living spirit of Mormonism. His death in 1933 marked the beginning of a severe decline in the intellectual quality of the Mormon religion, a decline from which it has not even begun to recover.

I have the impression that Professor Anderson agrees with most of my description of the Mormon conceptions of God and man, though at certain points we may be farther apart than his comments would suggest. I see no point in commenting on our large areas of agreement except to say that I am pleased by them. A few observations on our differences may be of interest.

If I understand Professor Anderson correctly, I am disappointed that he apparently finds no meaning for Mormonism in the problem of universals. Assuming the cognitive legitimacy of metaphysics, which Mormonism must and does, any failure of the Mormon theologians to find meaning in the issue of universals is simply their failure to think profoundly on the most crucial and inescapable problem in metaphysics. Present-day Mormon theologians should not be circumscribed by the failures of their predecessors. I hope Professor Anderson will reconsider this matter. (He mentions that Truman Madsen and I argued over this issue of Mormon doctrine and universals some time ago in the *Brigham Young University Studies*. I have the impression that neither Madsen nor Anderson realizes that I won the argument.)

Professor Anderson seems to hold that evil is simply a product of the environment, while man is innately good. This may be the case, but it certainly is not the accepted Mormon position. The emphasis on the freedom of man in Mormonism is clearly intended to mean that he may be either good or evil in his choices — not that goodness comes from within and evil from without. I think Professor Anderson misuses the books of Mosiah and Moses at this point, though in the next paragraph he seems to see the matter clearly. The Mormon scriptures treat the fact of evil on a more basic level than he credits them. It is interesting to me that while Brigham Young didn't hesitate to take issue with the apostle Paul on the matter of man's nature, Professor Anderson seems determined to demonstrate that there is no issue between them. Some of the creators of Mormonism were willing to take on all comers — even when they came out of the Bible. But, sad to say, that kind of magnificent independence is gone. Now it's agreement and harmony at any cost: Brigham Young, who thought he was disagreeing with Paul, is seen as simply rounding out the picture.

I can see only confusion for Mormon theology if it follows Professor Anderson's technique for treating such issues as the divine omnipotence and omniscience. The typical Mormon discussion of God as evolving or progressing is a superficial attempt to get at an idea that could be given a profound formulation. To talk about God as one might discuss the education

of a human being, as some Mormons often do, is to reveal the utter naivete that all too often characterizes Mormon thought.

I have trouble also with Professor Anderson's treatment of the Mormon doctrine of salvation, where I think he is in some difficulty. But basically the fault is not his. It seems to me that he is trying to make a confused idea appear to be simple and reasonable rather than admit that at this point typical Mormon doctrine is in serious difficulties. I hope that Mormon theology is able to offer a doctrine of salvation that is more than, to quote Professor Anderson, "the cumulative achievement of building a sin-free character." I agree with Anderson that Mormon theology, which is intensely moralistic, inclines strongly in this direction. But surely the Christian doctrine of Christ means more to the Mormons than this. Is the Church not more than a glorified ethical society? Has the Mormon theologian abandoned all sense of the tragedy of existence and the meaning of redemption?

Professor Anderson wants me to justify my references to Mormon theology as Pelagian. On page fifty-eight I reproduced the most important extant description of Pelagianism and I'm sure the basic similarities to Mormonism are entirely evident. The differences are equally obvious, but I take them for granted. I do not mean that Mormonism and Pelagianism are identical, but that it is especially the Pelagian qualities of Mormonism which distinguish it from the classical forms of Christian orthodoxy.

Finally, Professor Anderson chides me for not getting at Mormon theology through the scriptures. I appreciate the force of his argument. But to describe the scriptural grounds of the theology was not the purpose of my essays. Moreover, the Mormon theology is not as thoroughly grounded in scripture as its surface appearance indicates and as Anderson seems to suggest. For one thing, the Mormons generally have not been reliable readers of scripture. They have been users of it, and often their uses have been abuses and should best be forgotten.

The worst thing that could happen to any theology is now happening to the theology of the Mormons — by the default of the prophets it has been appropriated by the academics. The chief theological atrocities are currently committed at the Brigham Young University, where there is a studied irrationalism and a sophistical effort to square the doctrines with ancient and esoteric lore, scriptural and non-scriptural, rather than with the facts of life. This is the strangest aberration that has yet appeared in the implausible history of Mormonism, a kind of philologizing of religion. The real strength of Mormon theology has not been in its scriptural foundations any more than in its logical or metaphysical discriminations. Its strength has been in its concreteness, its sincerity, its humane integrity, its genuine relevance to the life of the Mormon people, a people who were once powerfully moved by it but for whom it has now become too often an instrument for rationalization and an object of petty dispute.

The following anecdote is taken from a letter written by Juanita Brooks, distinguished Mormon historian and editor, who is presently working on a history of the Jews in Utah. Next there is note on play production at Brigham Young University by Harold I. Hansen, Chairman of the Dramatic Arts Department, and finally two notes by Stanford medicine men, J. Robert Griffin, M.D., who just began his internship, and Hal Cole, a senior medical student who has recently been serving on the hospital ship Hope *in Nicaragua.*

RIDING HERD (Excerpt from a Letter)

Juanita Brooks

My statement regarding my father's idea of "riding herd" is, like most analogies, subject to question because any analogy is bound to be faulty in some respects. But for whatever it is worth, here it is:

My father early recognized my tendency to question, to disagree, to refuse to take many of the Old Testament stories at face value. I could not admire Jacob's ethics in stealing his brother's birthright; I did not believe that the wind from tin horns would blow down the walls of Jericho, but insisted that they "fell" figuratively when the guards panicked and ran; if bears came out and devoured the children who called Elijah "old bald-pate," I didn't think God sent them, etc., etc.

One day Dad said to me, "My girl, if you follow this tendency to criticize, I'm afraid you will talk yourself out of the Church. I'd hate to see you do that. I'm a cowboy, and I've learned that if I ride *in* the herd, I am lost – totally helpless. One who rides counter to it is trampled and killed. One who only trails behind means little, because he leaves all responsibility to others. It is the cowboy who rides the edge of the herd, who sings and calls and makes himself heard who helps direct the course. Happy sounds are generally better than cursing, but there are times when he must maybe swear a little and swing a whip or lariat to round in a stray or turn the leaders. So don't lose yourself, and don't ride away and desert the outfit. Ride the edge of the herd and be alert, but know your directions, and call out loud and clear. Chances are, you won't make any difference, but on the other hand, you just might."

PRODUCTION OF PLAYS WITH MORMON THEMES

Harold Hansen

The Dramatic Arts Department recently initiated a new program to encourage Mormon playwrights to write on Mormon themes for production at Brigham Young University. During the 1965-66 theatre season an "arena series" was held featuring such original Mormon dramas. The first production was a story of pioneer life; the second, a drama of the martyrdom of Joseph Smith; and the third, a musical play dealing with the theme of polygamy.

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Stark family, who, with other pioneers, were sent by Brigham Young to settle in the Nevada wasteland. Stark believes that in Nevada he has found the "significant thread" of his life. But the majority of the settlers decide to return to Utah. Even Stark's own family find numerous reasons for leaving Nevada. Finally, President Brigham Young sends word that the Saints are released from their "call" to the settlement. The climax occurs when Esther, Stark's wife, makes her decision to return to Utah with the rest of the Saints, and in so doing, she attacks the reasons behind Stark's resolute stand to remain in Nevada. Dr. Clinton Larson's review of the play states:

> Through [the play] the audience comes to believe the thesis of of Mormon stoicism: a spirituality so disciplined that it seeks the crucible in which it may be fairly tested, exhibiting an independence irrespective, even, of Church authority, like a personal witness of the divinity of Christ.

The second play, *No Greater Crown,* was written by Dr. Martin C. Nalder, a practicing psychiatrist of Los Angeles, California. Directed by Professor Charles W. Whitman, this drama played for two and one-half weeks to a full house. The play covers the last six months of the life of the Prophet Joseph Smith, the action taking place in and near Nauvoo, Illinois. The story concerns the apostasy of William Law, second counselor to Joseph Smith in the First Presidency, and his conspiracy with Robert Foster and Joseph Jackson to take the life of the Prophet. A secondary theme treats a conflict between Joseph Smith and his wife, Emma, who maintains that she is too tired to pack up and run again. The audience is made to see a more sympathetic Emma who, perhaps, has valid reasons for the stand she takes, although her disaffection from the Church is not justified in the play.

The Red Plush Parlor, a three-act musical play, book and lyrics by Christie Lund Coles, music by Larry Bastian, has been adapted and directed by Dr. Lael J. Woodbury. It is a light and lively play set in the late 1800's in a small Utah town and concerns the polygamous home of one Lars Knudsen. The action of the play takes place in a red plush parlor, reserved for state occasions, which is being made ready for the arrival of Sister Shaw, a recent French convert, who, Lars and his six wives believe, will be his seventh wife. The lilting quality of Mrs. Cole's lyrics is a delightful addition to an already charming story.

Scripts for the coming seasons are now welcomed by the Dramatic Arts faculty of Brigham Young University. Serious or humorous dramas on Mormon themes, either historical or modern, will be accepted. The scripts should not portray drinking or smoking and the language and action should at all times be in harmony with the highest standards of the Church. We hope that an original series can be presented each year, and therefore there is no specific deadline for completed manuscripts.

IMPROVING THE GOSPEL DOCTRINE CLASS

J. Robert Griffin

Traditionally, adult Sunday School classes in the L.D.S. Church have consisted primarily of a prepared lesson delivered by the teacher coupled with extemporaneous comments and occasional discussion by class members,

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who often make little advance preparation beyond peremptory perusal of the lesson manual. In an attempt to determine common attitudes towards this traditional method of instruction, a poll of gospel doctrine class members was undertaken several years ago by Lonne Heaton Nave, then gospel doctrine class advisor on the East Mill Creek Sunday School Stake Board, Salt Lake City, with assistance from Calvin Taylor of the Department of Psychology, University of Utah. A sixteen-item questionnaire was prepared and uniformly administered to the various gospel doctrine classes throughout the stake.

Three hundred and thirty-one persons answered the questionnaire. Two hundred and seventy-six had been or currently were teachers in various auxiliary oganizations; of these ninety-four per cent believed that the teacher learned more than the class members. Among the 331 respondents, eleven per cent considered their role in the gospel doctrine class fulfilled by being "consistent in attending my meetings and being found in my place" and twenty-nine per cent stated that they were "content to listen and enjoy the discussion"; thus, a total of forty per cent of the class members, including many experienced church teachers, expected to fulfill only a passive role in Sunday School classes. Nineteen per cent anticipated "a stimulating lesson." Thirty-eight per cent indicated a desire to be "actively engaged in an effort to make the subject matter my own knowledge," and suggested that they wished to be more active in the class than is commonly the case.

Although some ninety-eight per cent of the respondents felt that "a greater amount of the learning activity could be shared by class members," seventy-four per cent preferred the traditional approach of lessons from the manual plus varying degrees of teacher enrichment, and eighty per cent desired the customary lecture-discussion method of teaching. Only twenty-three per cent stated that they would like "outlines, references, and a bibliography to supplement the manual"; of these, only thirty-five per cent said that they would "make use of the further helps or share in providing them." When asked if the subject matter should be taught in a way to facilitate note-taking, "with a view to compiling a file of your own," sixty-three per cent answered "No." As to whether testing should be employed in Sunday School, only thirty-seven per cent felt that "such testing would be of value to me in learning the subject" and thirty-one per cent said that they "would resent this classroom activity."

Clearly, this study indicates that most class members preferred their customary passive roles even though a majority had at one time served as teachers and although fully one-third were then teaching in a church organization. In view of these results the question arises as to how well the Sunday School classes are fulfilling their purpose of teaching the gospel to adult members of the Church. Evidently many "active" members of the Church do not consider that Sunday School is the place to find stimulation and direction for personal study of the gospel. Perhaps other stakes could benefit from the example of the East Mill Creek Sunday School Stake Board in examining what attitudes prevail generally in their classes as a prelude to determining what can be done to promote greater learning in gospel doctrine classes.

AND WHATEVER HAPPENED TO SCRIPTURE?

Hal Cole

We are involved in a sub-culture fascinated by words. And rightly so, for do we not as a church claim to have the modern words of the Lord to His people? Is there not a prophet of the Lord who this day stands as His spokesman? We have come to deeply revere His words as recorded in our scriptures and as we receive them today.

But I note in university ward meetings and classes a tendency to quote the writings of wise men, especially those concerned with interpersonal relationships. In their emphasis on the beauty of contact between man and man they often confuse the first and great commandment with that which is like unto it. The conscious realization that through our relationship with the Lord we learn the basis of love for our literal spiritual brothers is essential to our identity as Christians.

> "Beloved, let us love one another: for love is of God; and every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God. . . . We love Him, because He first loved us . . . and this commandment have we from Him, that he who loveth God loveth his brother also."
>
> I John 4:7, 19, 21

Thus we can love another because He first loved us, giving us the example of His son's life and sacrifice.

Each of us is alternately troubled and amused by his relationships with others, but from what sources are we to gain the greatest understanding? Might we not most benefit by reading of relationships made beautiful by the Lord's presence in them — of David and Jonathan, Boaz and Ruth, Alma and the four sons of Mosiah, the man and woman in the Song of Songs? When Jonathan parts from David with the words, "Go in peace, forasmuch as we have sworn both of us in the name of the Lord, saying, 'The Lord be between me and thee, and between my seed and thy seed forever . . . ," this is the tender promise of a man who knows the Lord's place in his love for David, who knows the meaning of solemn and eternal covenants kept before the Lord. Certainly the excitement of facing the Lord together in the mutual humility of prayer or covenant is neither old-fashioned nor saccharine, but an adventure requiring genuine oneness and a single hand reaching for the Lord.

It seems the four standard works of the university wards are becoming *I and Thou, The Prophet, The Art of Loving,* and *The Brothers Karamazov,* When did we last in church hear words from Titus, Second Peter, First Thessalonians, Nahum, Zechariah, Omni, or Jerom? Note the doctrinal and literary importance of these words of the Lord to His prophet Zechariah:

> "Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Zion; shout, O daughter of Jerusalem; behold thy King cometh unto thee: He is just, and having salvation; lowly, and riding upon an ass, and upon a colt the foal of an ass . . . and He shall speak peace unto the heathen; and His dominion shall be from sea to sea, and from the river even to the ends of the earth. As for thee also, by the blood of thy covenant I have sent forth thy prisoners out of the pit wherein is no water." Zech. 9:9-11

Tillich and Kierkegaard were good and humble men, but they based their beliefs and writings on assumptions which are very different from our own. They would have smiled at the idea of a God with a physical body like ours who endured a life like ours toward His exaltation. Neither of these men claimed to have increased his height a cubit by taking thought. Each wrote many perceptive things, carefully watching the syntax and logic or illogic, depending on his mood. But never did they write, "Thus saith the Lord God unto His people."

The same of course is true for the writings of men of station in the Church, which are too often quoted as quasi-scriptures, and for the books of sermonettes and the *Golden Nuggets of Thought* variety of popular guides.

I cannot stand apart from my own observations. I have certainly been known to teach classes which were a homogenate of Dostoevsky, T. S. Eliot, and Thomas a Kempis. Much of what I have enjoyed in the writings of these men is their striking personification of basic Christian truths and their vivid portrayal of struggle, which I hadn't the energy to appreciate in their simpler, scriptural form.

There are differences between the writings of men through whom the word of the Lord comes and those of others. It seems that if one is in the midst of scaling a cliff face with shabby equipment which threatens to plunge him into the dark abyss below, one's thoughts tend to focus on the cliff, the struggle, the uncertainty of success, and the everpresent alternative of the abyss. But if one has finally pleaded for help, relinquished his equipment, and sought an outstretched hand which helps pull him over the top, his thoughts are quite different. He praises the view and the helper, proclaims the reality and deliciousness of success, and encourages others to follow. Only at that point is he in a position of sufficient confidence to be able to hear whatever words might be spoken to him. Almost all of us remain on the cliff face, perhaps discussing how thrilling it is to let go of our handhold for a few seconds, but not seriously seeking or wanting the responsibility of grasping the helper's hand or reaching the top.

Dialogue seems to be an attempt to describe in words the dynamics of the cliff-dweller's existence and the effects on our actions and thinking of our intermittent relationship with the Lord. Being written almost entirely by men on the cliff, much consideration of abyss and conflict is to be expected. I believe *Dialogue* will be of great use to its audience and will convey wisdom and understanding. But it will contain no new doctrine — a more vivid portrayal of struggle, perhaps — but no new truths. It has missionary potential among the intellectually oriented, it is worthy of support, but it will never declare, "Thus saith the Lord God unto His people. . . ."

The words of the Lord are sacred to us; let us explore them and use them in reverence and order. Let us not confuse them with the words of men or dissect them for sport or pride. May we remember that they have brought us out of darkness.

For any church, country, nation or other group to believe that it is the only people in whom God is interested, or that it has special merit because of color, race, or belief, that they are inherently superior and loved by God, without regard to the lives they live, is not only a great and dangerous fallacy, but is a continuing barrier to peace. . . . Let us steadfastly avoid such demoralizing arrogance. The most important problems facing us in working on a long range program for peace is a tolerant and sympathetic understanding between races and creeds.

Hugh B. Brown
L.D.S. Conference
April, 1966