

# Lions, Brothers, and the Idea of an Indian Nation: The Mexican Revolution in the Minds of Anthony W. Ivins and Rey L. Pratt, 1910-1917

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IN 1915 MORMON APOSTLE JAMES E. TALMADGE published *Jesus the Christ*. Speculating on what Pontius Pilate must have been thinking when Christ stood before him, Talmadge concluded it “was clear to the Roman governor that this wonderful Man, with His exalted views of a kingdom not of this world, and an empire of truth in which He was to reign, was no political insurrectionist.”<sup>1</sup> Sixty-two years later, church president Spencer W. Kimball, speaking in Bogota, Columbia, echoed Talmadge: Christ was not a revolutionary. The Messiah acknowledged the existence of class strife, Kimball admitted, but “his was a way of teaching equalities the slow, free-agency way rather than by revolutionary force.”<sup>2</sup> These pronouncements by Talmadge and Kimball surprised no one familiar with the LDS church’s conservative reputation. Less known is the degree to which the shapers of Mormon policy in Mexico during the 1910-1917 upheaval would have disagreed with them.

Revolution undergirded the turn-of-the-century Mormon view of

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1. James E. Talmadge, *Jesus the Christ* (Salt Lake City: The Deseret News, 1915), 634.

2. Spencer W. Kimball, Area Conference, Bogota, Columbia, 6 March 1977, in Edward L. Kimball, ed., *The Teachings of Spencer W. Kimball* (Salt Lake City: Bookcraft, 1982), 409-10.

history.<sup>3</sup> To those early members, an omniscient god projected his power in the medium of time through the agency of man in accordance with laws and stages of history, similar to the dialectical inventions of George Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx. Thus, world events became a source of canon. From Puritan and Presbyterian theology, Mormon leaders inherited “just revolution” theory: If the overthrow of unrighteous authority was possible, then it was God’s will to pursue it.<sup>4</sup>

Mormon millenarian fervor and anger against their enemies joined with profane philosophy and Calvinist justification to produce a rhetorical line paralleling the discourse of secular revolutionaries. Both waited for conditions to ripen that would midwife their epiphanies into worldwide reality. Whereas Michael Bakunin and Karl Marx believed the working class would shake the earth from below, Mormons looked for fire from above. In either scenario, universally transformative events would obliterate all contradictions. In the secular versions, the world would either undergo a process of devolution into anarchist communes or be recast in the socialist state. The millenarian alternative would install the Saints as rulers in a sacred thousand-year kingdom.

#### MORMON POINT MEN IN MEXICO

Two Mormon officials dominated high-level LDS leadership analysis of the Mexican Revolution: Apostle Anthony Woodward Ivins and Mexican Mission President Rey Lucero Pratt. Both spoke Spanish. Between them they had 43 years of experience in Mexico.

Anthony Ivins (1852-1934) was one of the most respected general authorities the church has ever known. His death marked the only time in the history of the *Deseret News* that the paper was distributed free of charge.<sup>5</sup> In 1895 the First Presidency appointed him to preside over the Mormon colonies in Chihuahua and Sonora. Ivins moved to Salt Lake City in 1907 when the First Presidency called him to the Council of Twelve Apostles.

Ivins was active in politics and business. In a state generally dominated by Republican Senator Reed Smoot’s “Federal Bunch,” he was the figure around whom the Democratic Party rallied. By profession Ivins

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3. Craig Livingston, “From Above and Below: The Mormon Embrace of Revolution, 1840-1940,” Ph.D. diss., Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa., 2002.

4. Michael Walzer, *The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 108-09; Kevin Phillips, *The Cousins’ Wars: Religions, Politics, and the Triumph of Anglo-America* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 179. For the Mormon adaptation, see Livingston, “From Above and Below,” 14.

5. Wendell Jeremy Ashton, *Voice in the West: Biography of a Pioneer Newspaper* (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1950), 311.

was a rancher, although his interests intersected with college trusteeship, mining, banking, and other enterprises.<sup>6</sup> He was the New West type: tough, intellectual, and practical.<sup>7</sup> He was described by Noble Warrum, a member of the Mexican Claims Commission during the 1920s, this way: "There is no man more dedicated to justice—he is [the] triple combination of the Spartan, the Stoic, and the Christian."<sup>8</sup> Ideologically, Ivins's views toward Mexico were echoed in the works of Ernest Gruenig, the liberal editor of the *Nation* and later a senator from Alaska who endorsed the national activism of Mexico's post-revolutionary state.<sup>9</sup>

The other Mormon analyst for Mexico, Rey Lucero Pratt (1878-1931), was the grandson of murdered Apostle Parley P. Pratt. Church work and a family of thirteen children kept Pratt busy. In 1907 he succeeded Ammon M. Tenney as president of the Mexican proselytizing mission, a post separate from Mormon colonial administration but loosely supervised by the north Mexico stake president at Colonia Juarez under the broader direction of the Twelve. Pratt headed the mission until his death. In 1925 he became a general authority, moving into the position on the First Council of the Seventy left vacant by the death of Seymour Bicknell Young. Pratt listed himself as a Republican. The party's organ in Salt Lake City, the *Herald Republican*, often consulted Pratt on Mexican affairs. Church officials, recognizing his talents as editor, commentator, and Spanish language translator, appointed Pratt to head the Zion's Printing and Publishing Company, a church press in Independence, Missouri.

Pratt was a real people person. Slightly swarthy looks and fluent Spanish allowed him to travel incognito throughout Mexico and gather

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6. For biographical information on Ivins see "Anthony W. Ivins," box 1, fdr 2, Anthony Woodward Ivins collection, Utah Historical Society, hereafter cited as Ivins collection; D. Michael Quinn, *Mormon Hierarchy: Extensions of Power* (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, in association with Smith Research Associates, 1997), 662-63; Richard S. Van Wagoner and Steven C. Walker, *A Book of Mormons* (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1982), 131-34; Thomas Cottam Romney, *The Mormon Colonies in Mexico* (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1938); Nelle Spilsbury Hatch and Blaine Carmon Hardy, *Stalwarts South of the Border* (El Paso: Texas Western College Press, 1985); Bryant S. Hinckley, "President Anthony W. Ivins," *Improvement Era* 35 (November 1931): 5-8, 39; "History of Anthony W. Ivins," *Utah On-Line*, <[http://www.onlineutah.com/anthony\\_w\\_ivinshistory.shtml](http://www.onlineutah.com/anthony_w_ivinshistory.shtml)>, June 2002.

7. In 1958 Ivins was inducted into the Cowboy Hall of Fame. See National Cowboy and Western Heritage Museum, Oklahoma City, Okla., Herman Hoffman Birney, *Zealots in Zion* (Philadelphia: Penn Publishing Company, 1931), 215-18, 293-310. "Hall of Great Westerners," <[http://www.cowboyhalloffame.org/fs1\\_i.html](http://www.cowboyhalloffame.org/fs1_i.html)>, June 2002.

8. Noble Warrum to W. W. Armstrong, 17 September 1926, box 11, fdr 5, Ivins collection.

9. John Britton charts American intellectual attitudes toward Mexico in *Revolution and Ideology: Images of the Mexican Revolution in the United States* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1995), 17. For Gruenig's statism see pp. 72-73. Gruenig's most important work was *Mexico and Its Heritage* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1928).

information in regions penetrated by few Americans. Admiration for Indian communalism put Pratt into an intellectual camp staked out by his contemporary, Frank Tannenbaum, the widely known Mexicanist scholar representative of the old "Independent Left."<sup>10</sup> Rhetorical skill and genuine concern for the welfare of others magnified his influence in church and public circles. Mexican members adored him.<sup>11</sup>

#### MORMON ECONOMIC ELITISM IN MEXICO, 1886-1910

By the time Francisco Madero launched his revolution in 1910, nearly 4,500 Anglo Mormons lived in eight colonies in Chihuahua and Sonora—between 11 and 25 percent of all Americans living in Mexico.<sup>12</sup> The colonies had prospered, but relations with their Mexican neighbors had suffered because of the way in which Mormon settlers, land companies, and mercantile cooperatives had obtained their wealth. Mormon émigrés had benefited from land laws enacted in 1856, 1883, and 1905. Under each of these laws, local *hacendados* (the big landowners), with the blessing of Mexican president Porfirio Díaz and the oligarchal *científicos* who guided his regime, had expropriated the lands of Indian communities and free peasants. The Mexican government also leased or sold other large sections of the national domain to foreigners. Such changes in land

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10. Britton, *Ideology and Revolution*, 17, 122-23, 161-63. Tannenbaum's most important work on the value of *ejido* development was *Peace by Revolution: Mexico after 1910* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933).

11. Biographical information on Pratt includes the Rey Lucero Pratt collection, Church Archives, Salt Lake City, Utah, hereafter cited as Rey L. Pratt collection; Quinn, *Mormon Hierarchy: Extensions of Power*, 679; Dale F. Beecher, "Rey L. Pratt and the Mexican Mission," *BYU Studies* 15 (Spring 1975): 294-95; Mary Pratt Parrish, "Look to the Rock from Which Ye are Hewn'" (Springville, Utah: unpublished manuscript, copy in author's possession, n.d.), 54-112; Elizabeth Hernandez, *Mormonism Comes of Age in Mexico* (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Scholar Project, 1975), 17-18; "A New Member of the Council of Seventy," *Improvement Era* 28 (June 1925): 762-63; Melvin J. Ballard, "President Rey L. Pratt," *Improvement Era* 34 (June 1931): 451.

12. Mexican census data are subject to conjecture, but available impressions show that Mormons made up a large part of the American presence in Mexico. Helen Delpar relies on Mexican national census data to arrive at the figure of about 21,000 American residents. See *The Enormous Vogue of Things Mexican: Cultural Relations between the United States and Mexico, 1920-1935* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1992), 1. Atkin estimates 75,000 Americans lived in Mexico. Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson put the figure at 70,000, and John Mason Hart uses the same figure in his study. However, President William H. Taft put the figure at 40-50,000. See Ronald Atkin, *Revolution! Mexico! 1910-1920* (New York: The John Day Company, 1970), 20; Hart, *Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 281; "Message to the Senate and House of Representatives," 3 December 1912, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1912* (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1919), XIV; Henry F. Pringle, *The Life and Times of William Howard Taft*, Vol. 2 (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1939), 701. If the compromise figure of 40,000 is accepted, then 4,500 Anglo-Mormon colonists accounted for 11.25 percent of Americans in Mexico.

tenure hit Mexican merchants hard. Native middle-class businessmen were forced out of business as their old customers—the independent peasants and ranchers—disappeared. Into the void moved Mormon agents, backed by capital from Salt Lake City, who bought the alienated tracts and Mexican-owned businesses. Mormons soon controlled water access and major commercial, agricultural, and industrial enterprises in Chihuahua and Sonora.<sup>13</sup> By 1910, Mexican lands under Mormon title totaled over half a million acres.<sup>14</sup>

The growing Mormon presence in northwestern Mexico worried state officials. In 1905 the political authority of the Galeana District, Chihuahua, observed: “Mormons are constantly broadening property and purchasing land tracts to the point that it has become alarming. Soon, all those who had shown them hospitality will themselves become tributaries.”<sup>15</sup> Nonetheless, state authorities counted on Mormon support. Resentment grew as Mormon militia consistently mustered in defense of the status quo.<sup>16</sup> Emilano Kosterlitzky, the hated German-born commander of the Sonora constabulary known as the *rurales*, offered to kill any

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13. On Mormon commercial success see *Journal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints* (chronological scrapbook of typed entries and newspaper clippings, 1830-1972, microfilm, 246 reels), 18 June 1890, 7, 8; 5 April 1903, 3, Church History Library, Salt Lake City, Utah, hereafter cited as *Journal History*; Blaine Carmon Hardy, “The Northern Colonies in Northern Mexico, A History, 1885-1912,” Ph.D. diss., Wayne State University, 1963, 115-17; Frederick Katz, *The Life and Times of Pancho Villa* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 90-91; Jane-Dale Lloyd, *El Proceso de Modernización Capitalista en el Noroeste de Chihuahua, 1880-1910* (Mexico: Universidad Iberoamericana Departamento de Historia, 1987), 87, 90, 123-24, 141; Mark Wasserman, *Capitalists, Caciques, and Revolution: The Native Elite and Foreign Enterprise in Chihuahua, Mexico, 1854-1911* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 98, 112; F. Lamond Tullis, *Mormons in Mexico: The Dynamics of Faith and Culture* (Logan: Utah State University Press, 1987), 57-60; Clarence F. and Anna Tenney Turley, comp., *History of the Mormon Colonies in Mexico: The Juarez Stake, 1885-1980*, 2nd ed. (Mexico?: Publishers Press, 1996), 296; U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Investigation of Mexican Affairs, Report and Hearing Pursuant to Senate Resolution 106, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, Document 285*, 2 vols. (Washington D.C.: USGPO), 2:3254. Ivins wrote in 1912 that Mexican investments returned good dividends to Mormon leaders and estimated the colonies’ worth at \$1 million. See Ivins diary, 1912, 4, box 3, fdr 6, Ivins collection, hereafter cited as Ivins diary; “Believed at Church Offices that Mexican Colonists Leaving,” *Deseret News*, in *Journal History*, 30 January 1917, 3.

14. I added up the total acreage of land in Mormon hands and came up with a conservative figure of 509,600 acres (see Livingston, “From Above and Below,” 290, 329n48). Lloyd puts the 1907 Chihuahua holdings alone at 445,000 acres (see *El Proceso de Modernización*, 89-90). For the land companies involved and their activities see Hardy, “Mormon Colonies in Northern Mexico,” 150-58.

15. Lloyd, *El Proceso de Modernización*, 90. For other local sentiments see Tullis, *Mormons in Mexico*, 89.

16. “‘Mormon’ Settlers in Mexico Aid the Government,” *Deseret News*, in *Journal History*, 19 January 1892, 6. In 1893, inspired by the Tómochi rebellion the previous year in Chihuahua, Celso Anaya and Simon Anaya called for the overthrow of Díaz. Government

Mexican whom Mormon settlers found bothersome.<sup>17</sup> "Thus the Mormon position was ambiguous," wrote F. Lamond Tullis. "Ideological commitment to Mexican spiritual liberation" clashed with "political support of an oppressive and economically ambitious regime based on foreign capital and foreign technicians."<sup>18</sup>

Dazzled by the positivism<sup>19</sup> of the *científicos*—the "scientific ones" who managed Mexico's economy—Ivins overlooked the revolutionary conditions brewing in Mexico. Instead, he imbibed the axioms of legalism and gradual reformism. Personal wealth and access to church credit made him the archetypal new Mormon merging into the mainstream of corporatist America. In a 1901 article, Ivins praised Díaz: "Life, property, and personal liberty [were] as secure in Mexico as in any country in the world." The absence of sustained opposition had proven the dictator's ability to make "Mexican sentiment the incarnation of his own master mind."<sup>20</sup>

During the Second Yaqui War (1899-1909), Ivins revealed how far he was willing to go to support Mexico's oligarchs. The Yaqui had assimilated Spanish ways but resisted taxation and mineral extraction on their lands. Ivins admired them, but ruled they were not playing their part in Díaz's "master mind." The slaughter and deportations, sad though they were, taught a lesson: History and nature had combined to ensure Mexico its due progress under the mandate of Díaz.<sup>21</sup>

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troops crushed the uprising. Survivors rallied in the United States, then recrossed the border and occupied Palomos, north of the Mormon colony zone. Mormons joined with government troops to contain this proto insurrection. See Orson P. Brown Autobiography in Taylor Oden MacDonald collection, 1857-1980, 21-23, item 15, typescript, microfilm, Church Archives; "Mexican Rebels and 'Mormon' Colonists," *Millennial Star* 56 (8 January 1894): 21-23, Romney, *Mormon Colonies in Mexico*, 310-14; Turley, *History of the Mormon Colonies in Mexico*, 82. On the Anaya and Amaya revolt see Katz, *Life and Times of Pancho Villa*, 26. Loss of land and elite posturing for power triggered other uprisings during the same decade. See *ibid.*, 21-26; Hart, *Revolutionary Mexico*, 360-61; Paul J. Vanderwood, *The Power of God against the Guns of Government: Religious Upheaval in Mexico at the turn of the Nineteenth Century* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

17. Hatch and Hardy, *Stalwarts South of the Border*, 313. For a biography of Kosterlitzky and his relations with Mormon settlers, see Cornelius C. Smith, Jr., *Emilio Kosterlitzky: Eagle of Sonora and the Southwest Border*, Military History Series VII (Glendale, Calif.: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1970).

18. Tullis, *Mormons in Mexico*, 89.

19. The *científicos* were informed by positivist ideas. Positivism was a quasi-science pioneered by French philosopher August de Comte. Scientific principles would underwrite invitations to foreigners to invest in Mexico. Ordered economic growth under European tutelage would bring stability to Mexico; the power and initiative it gave would enable elites to suppress the lower classes and convert them and their lands into adjuncts of the economic order. On positivist philosophy, see Marylin S. Smith, *Living Issues in Philosophy* (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1946), 482-83.

20. Anthony Ivins, "Porfirio Díaz," *Improvement Era* 4 (April 1901): 437.

21. Anthony Ivins, "The Yaquis and the Yaqui War," *Improvement Era* 4 (March 1901):

## THE MADERO REVOLUTION

Friedrich Katz argues that Chihuahua's role in the Mexican revolution of 1910 was similar to that of Boston in 1776, Paris in 1789, and Petrograd in 1917.<sup>22</sup> Despite evidence of Madero's widespread appeal, Ivins declared for Díaz at the outset of the revolution. The colonists were well armed with 30-30 Winchesters and plenty of ammunition, the Mormon apostle said, and "will fight for the government against the *insurrectos*."<sup>23</sup> Church leaders had considered arming the colonies, then rejected the move as adventuristic, but determined Mormon colonists, with permission from the U.S. government, had guns smuggled in anyway.<sup>24</sup>

Back in Salt Lake, Mormon sources studied the seriousness of the revolutionary surge. In March 1911 the church's monthly *Improvement Era* called the situation in Mexico a "social revolution" of the landless masses against the *hacendados* and declared that the peasants were in a mood to embrace anyone who offered hope of progress and liberty.<sup>25</sup> The article anticipated the potential for civil war. However, the editors warned, the peasants' desire for land might threaten the less radical agenda of the revolution's middle and upper-class leadership since the Anti-Reelectionists supporting Madero were "wealthy and intelligent" men who had not previously been numbered among Mexico's power brokers.<sup>26</sup> At root their grievances were constitutional, but Madero—educated in France—was "strongly imbued with the extreme democracy that characterizes French socialism."<sup>27</sup> General Pascual Orozco was iron-

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333-36. Ivins's views were typical. See Arturo Warman, "The Political Project of Zapatismo," in Friedrich Katz, ed., *Riot, Rebellion, and Revolution: Rural Social Conflict in Mexico* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 321-22. Juxtaposed to Ivins's imperialistic view was an article from the Mormon press sympathetic to Mexican miners in the wake of the Cananea, Sonora strike of 1906. See "Race Troubles in Sonora, Mexico," *Juvenile Instructor* 41 (15 July 1906): 435-37.

22. Katz, *Life and Times of Pancho Villa*, 57.

23. "Colonists Are Armed," *Deseret News*, in *Journal History*, 28 November 1910, 7.

24. Livingston, "From Above and Below," 299-300; Blaine Carmon Hardy and Melody Seymour, "The Importation of Arms and the 1912 Mormon 'Exodus' from Mexico," *New Mexico Historical Review* 72, no. 4 (October 1997): 297-318.

25. Editor's Table, "Revolution in Mexico," *Improvement Era* 14 (March 1911): 452-54.

26. The Anti-Reelectionist party, headed by Madero associate Abraham Gonzalez, opposed the unconstitutional extension of Díaz's presidency and demanded fair elections, constitutional reform, independence of the judiciary, and freedom of the press.

27. Editor's Table, "Revolution in Mexico," 455. Some suggest that Madero's contact with spiritualism outweighed his interest in political philosophy during his 1901-1902 stay in France. Others conclude that French equality and democracy impressed Madero. Compare Enrique Krauze, *Mexico Biography of Power: A History of Modern Mexico, 1810-1996* (New York: HarperPerennial, 1997), 246-47, to Stanley R. Ross, *Francisco I. Madero: Apostle of Democracy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), 7-8, 10, 224-25.

ically identified as the "soul of the revolutionary movement in Chihuahua."<sup>28</sup> A year later, Orozco would bring the revolution to its fullest meaning for the Mormon colonists.

On 10 May 1911, Orozco and Pancho Villa captured Ciudad Juárez. Fifteen days later Porfirio Díaz resigned. The new governor of Chihuahua, Abraham Gonzalez, vowed to dismember the huge landed estates called *haciendas*. The announcement scintillated Mormon landholders. They hoped the implementation of revolutionary policies might break the *hacindado* control over vast territories that had blocked an outright Mormon takeover of northwest Chihuahua.<sup>29</sup> In November 1911 colony resident Ammon M. Tenney informed Ivins that the revolutionary government of Chihuahua had abrogated certain municipal taxes on livestock, land, and farm products. His predictions for the future under Madero were reassuring: "Anticipated changes in the laws of this country under the present administration is [sic.] certain to give a great impetus to agriculture in this country, and. . . we are already beginning to feel the benefits of the change in government."<sup>30</sup>

Ivins agreed. He now linked personal profit and increased church revenues to Madero's assumption of power. First, Ivins advocated the revival of Indian colonization on church lands in the colonies. The communitarian aspects of Mormonism would replace the *ejido* (Indian communal lands) as the organizing principle but would absorb its spirit. Idle lands would become productive, community cooperation and the incentives of freeholding would increase tithing transfers to Salt Lake City, and the down-trodden Lamanites could rise to yeoman respectability.<sup>31</sup>

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28. Editor's Table, "Revolution in Mexico," 455.

29. Mormon expansion was limited unless large landowners offered to sell at reasonable prices. See Anthony Ivins to James G. Bleak, St. George, Utah, 19 February 1898, "Letter from Mexico: Impressions from a Mormon," edited by Stanley S. Ivins, *Utah Historical Quarterly* 26 (April 1958): 179; Harold W. Taylor, comp., *Memories of Militants and Mormon Colonists in Mexico* (Yorba Linda, Calif.: Shumway Family History Services, 1992), 122. On the policies of Gonzalez, see Katz, *Life and Times of Pancho Villa*, 127-30; William H. Beezley, *Insurgent Governor: Abraham Gonzales and the Mexican Revolution in Chihuahua* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1973), 4, 97-99, 103-11.

30. Ammon Tenney to Anthony Ivins, 10 November 1911, box 11, fdr 1, Ivins collection. Tenney was noted for his friendly relations with the Indians. See Winn Whiting Smiley, "Ammon M. Tenney: Mormon Missionary to the Indians," *Journal of Arizona History* 13:2 (1972): 82-108.

31. Anthony Ivins to Hyrum S. Harris, 4 August 1911, box 10, fdr 2, Ivins collection. Previous efforts to promote Indian and *mestizo* settlement had failed. See "Meeting of the First Presidency In Salt Lake City Temple," *Journal History*, 20 January 1909, 4; Tullis, *Mormons in Mexico*, 60-65, 83; Agrícola Lozano Herrera, *Historia Del Mormonismo en México* (Mexico, D.F.: Zarahemla, S.A., 1983), 41-42; Thomas W. Murphy, "From Racist Stereotype to Ethnic Identity: Instrumental Uses of Mormon Racial Doctrine," *Ethnohistory* 46, no. 3 (Summer 1999): 463-64.



Tenney and Ivins had discerned another dimension of the revolution: the spiritual rescue of the Indian. "Indianism" struck a familiar chord. As recipients of the Abrahamic covenant, Native Americans were to work in partnership with the Latter-day Saints to establish God's kingdom on earth. The apparent inability of North American Indians to play their ordained role, however, had confounded their self-appointed benefactors. Revolution in Mexico offered a new venue. Perhaps the descendants of the Aztecs and Maya would succeed in their divine role where the Indians of North America never had a chance.<sup>32</sup>

The relatively easy Madero revolution and the Mormon hope for a peaceful extension of Zion southward both faced a new challenge beginning 2 March 1912 when General Pascual Orozco—Madero's most successful military leader—decided that the new government had reneged on reform promises and revolted against Madero.<sup>33</sup> One month later Ivins addressed the Mormon faithful at the church's semi-annual general conference in Salt Lake. His speech showed cautious tolerance for the revolutionary processes. Revolution and civil war, he reminded the audience, had produced the liberties enjoyed by France, England, Germany, and the United States. Struggle—not consensus—marked the modern world though he lamented that it was not reason and logic. Ivins upheld the example set in 1789: "The French revolution with all its horrors, its injustice, and the barbarous things which characterized it, nevertheless, made for the betterment of the French people."<sup>34</sup>

Although Ivins sanctified the supremacy of law, a close reading qualifies this devotion. He referred to universal rights: freedom of worship, representative government, and physical security. He disdained laws

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32. On Mormon disappointment with North American Indians see David J. Whitaker, "Mormons and Native Americans: A Historical and Bibliographical Interpretation," *Dialogue* 18, no. 4 (Winter 1985): 38.

33. Historians are divided over the issues motivating the leaders of the anti-Maderista revolt. The Orozco revolt originated in the antecedent revolt of Emilio Vázquez Gómez, the brother of the Francisco Vázquez Gómez, the provisional vice-president. Madero's order in June 1911 to demobilize the revolutionary forces before promised land and labor reforms were completed, and the replacement of radical F. Vasquez Gómez with moderate José Pino Suárez in the 1910 election, turned Emilio against Madero. Orozco supported Emilio Vázquez Gómez, but the Ciudad Juárez garrison viewed Orozco as its true leader. Sympathetic historians argue that Orozco sincerely sought deeper reforms similar to Zapata's Plan de Ayala. See Michael C. Meyer, *Mexican Rebel: Pascual Orozco and the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1915* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967), 7, 17; Hart, *Revolutionary Mexico*, 255. Others conclude that Orozco aligned himself with oligarchal factions that would advance his rise to power. See Katz, *Life and Times of Pancho Villa*, 143; Krauze, *Mexico: A Biography of Power*, 265.

34. Anthony W. Ivins, in *Report of the Semi-Annual Conference of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints*, April 1912, Salt Lake City: Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, semi-annual), 63, hereafter cited as *Conference Report*.

that preserved special privilege. The antagonists in his speech are Catholics, high church Protestants, royalists, and monopolists—the same identified by Kevin Phillips as the coalition defeated by low churchmen and emergent social and economic groups in each of the civil wars and revolutions which swept Britain and America between the 1640s and 1860s.<sup>35</sup> Ivins rebuked southern politicians in the United States who had attempted to inhibit free labor from following the flow of capital into the West. He did not predict how the Mexican revolution would resolve itself at this time, but he suggested that *Creole* elites (Spaniards born in Mexico) had provoked a social uprising: “Whenever a government or an administration shall assume to pervert the law, shall entrench itself with power, and disregard the cries of the masses it cannot expect but that confusion will result.”<sup>36</sup> Ivins accepted temporary dislocation and uncertainty in Mexico and praised President William Howard Taft’s commitment to non-intervention.<sup>37</sup> Anti-foreigner agitation among Orozco’s Red Flaggers posed a real threat to the colonies, Ivins said, but it would take 100,000 troops to “pacify” the country. Furthermore, the Mexican government would naturally tax the prosperous Mormon settlements to defray reconstruction costs incurred by war and occupation.<sup>38</sup> Ivins expanded his commentary to contemporary problems. Industrialism and imperialism had agitated labor and caused destructive international competition, he said. He understood the appeal of socialism, anarchism, and armed struggle, yet rejected their panaceas. He embraced the idea of a “universal brotherhood,” but denied its attainment except through Christ’s teachings.<sup>39</sup>

#### EXPULSION AND RECALIBRATION, 1912-1913

In July 1912 the halcyon era of the Mormon colonies ended. General Victoriano Huerta, commissioned by Madero, smashed Orozco’s army at the Battle of Bachimba on 3 July. Orozco’s remnants diffused throughout the Mormon settlements of the Galeana district, northwestern Chihuahua.<sup>40</sup> After Bachimba, the anti-American elements within Orozco’s army could no longer be contained. Inez Salazar (an Orozco lieutenant)

35. Phillips, *Cousins’ Wars*, 163.

36. Ivins, *Conference Report*, October 1912, 62.

37. P. Edward Haley, *Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico, 1910-1917* (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1970), 31-32.

38. Ivins, *Conference Report*, April 1912, 61; Anthony Ivins to O. M. Strafford, 11 May 1912, box 11, fdr 2, Ivins collection; “Mexico,” *Young Woman’s Journal*, 24:5 (May 1913): 260-61.

39. Ivins, *Conference Report*, April 1912, 65.

40. Alan Knight, *The Mexican Revolution*, 2 vols. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 1:327-29.

confiscated provisions, horses, and livery items from the Mormons. An attempt by Salt Lake authorities to mollify Orozco with a tribute of \$5,000 in gold failed.<sup>41</sup> Finally, Salazar disarmed the settlers. In exchange for the surrender of token guns, Salazar let the Mormons retreat unmolested north of the border.

Beginning 28 July 1912, over 4,000 Mormons fled by train or wagon. Few ever returned. The property losses and emotional anxiety scarred the Mormon popular psyche for decades to come. A disconsolate Ivins admitted to a friend that the revolution had completely wiped out his financial interests.<sup>42</sup> As the revolution dragged on, however, property questions concerned Ivins less. Pragmatism replaced his earlier praise for the *Porfiriato*, a term applied to the Díaz years between 1877-1911. He recommended that the colonists accept their losses, counseling that by "cheerfully" doing so lives would be protected and they would have a better claim for protection and good faith in the future. The high-profile murder of William S. Benton, an English *hacendado*, drew no sympathy from Ivins. He condemned the Englishman for his stand on property rights: "[Benton] should have known better. It is another case of the bull trying to butt the locomotive off the track. I trust that we may learn wisdom from such experiences."<sup>43</sup>

In February 1913 General Victoriano Huerta killed Madero and seized control of the government. The Consitutionalists—Pancho Villa, Emiliano Zapata, and Venustiano Carranza—marched on Mexico City. Their hatred of Huerta united them; each would claim the mantle of the revolution in his own way. Mormon leaders never accepted Huerta's coup, but because a return to the *Porfiriato* was impossible, a new paradigm replaced the old emphasis on privilege and order. Key Mormon leaders experienced what Michael Walzer has called the "ideology of transition," where heightened awareness of human needs arises "whenever traditional controls give way and hierarchical status and corporate privileges are called into question."<sup>44</sup> By expelling the Mormon settlers, Orozco's *Colorados* had actually liberated Ivins and Pratt. Freed from concerns over the colonists' physical safety, their minds soared to the more rarefied air of nation making and scriptural fulfillment.

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41. Anton Hendrik Lund Journal, 23 July 1912, typescript, microfilm, LDS Church Archives.

42. Anthony Ivins to George S. Spencer, 13 December 1912, box 11, fdr 3, Ivins collection.

43. Ivins diary, 21 February 1914. Benton was a ruthless Chihuahua landowner. In 1910, backed by twenty armed guards and a contingent of the Chihuahuan *rurales*, he annexed *ejido* lands belonging to the village of Santa Maria de las Cuevas (see Wasserman, *Capitalists, Caciques, and Revolution*, 111-12). For an account of the Benton affair see Katz, *Life and Times of Pancho Villa*, 326-330; Atkin, *Revolution, Mexico!*, 170-71; Knight, *Mexican Revolution*, 2:109-10.

44. Walzer, *Revolution of the Saints*, 312.

In March 1913 Pratt publically joined the discussion on Mexico's ongoing revolution. In an article for the *Improvement Era*, he detailed the same horrors John Kenneth Turner had described in his popular book, *Barbarous Mexico*.<sup>45</sup> Pratt confirmed stories of 25,000 Indians living on *haciendas* comprising 15 million acres, of unfair labor contracts, of laborers paid low wages and 500 percent mark-ups in company stores, of debt peonage, and of the dreaded threat of military conscription, or worse: deportation to plantations in the Yucatan. Pratt identified the disturbances in Mexico as a social upheaval: "The present revolution. . .has as its basic cause the world-old desire for freedom, the desire of the oppressed to throw off the yoke of the oppressor."<sup>46</sup> Pratt also opposed U.S. intervention. He saw the United States as a potentially counter-revolutionary force that would reinstate the *científucos* who catered to foreign capitalists. In 1913 Pratt was in Mexico City where he acquired intimate knowledge of events leading to Madero's overthrow. U.S. ambassador Henry Lane Wilson incurred Pratt's unvarnished contempt. Pratt averred—correctly—that the American ambassador had conspired to depose Madero.<sup>47</sup>

Many of Pratt's observations from this period were recorded in a chronicle kept between February and August 1913. The manuscript reveals a man even more class conscious than his public writings and speeches suggest. Pratt indicted the rich, the Catholic church, and the army for being in league against the poor. With historical dialecticism on his mind, he recognized the motive force of class contradiction in a way that might have pleased Mao Zedong: "When the poor native comes to a point to sufficiently know his own interests. . .then will come the redemption of the native of the land. The time is ripe for that class that had been held down to rise and be on top."<sup>48</sup>

Pratt's sense of inevitable triumph rivaled the optimism of Karl Liebknecht: "We are used to being thrown from the heights to the depths," Liebknecht said after the failed Spartacist revolt, "But. . .our

45. John Kenneth Turner, *Barbarous Mexico* (Chicago: C. H. Kerr and Co., 1910), 1-108.

46. Rey L. Pratt, "The Gospel to the Lamanites," *Improvement Era* 16 (April 1913): 582-85.

47. Rey L. Pratt, "Account of What Happened in Mexico City," 26-27, 48, box 3, fld 2, Rey L. Pratt collection.

48. *Ibid.*, 27. This side of Pratt can be seen in his influence on Margarito Bautista, an organizer of the Third Convention movement during 1936 that established a nine-year independent Mormon church in Mexico. Bautista's *La evolucion de Mexico sus verdaderos [sic] progenitores y su origen: el destino de America y Europa* (Mexico: Talleres Gráficos Laguna, 1935) reflects a strong class-consciousness, fostered and encouraged by Pratt. Another Third Conventionist, Isaia Juárez, was a founder of the national farmworker's union (*Confederación Nacional Campesina*). On the Third Convention, see F. Lamond Tullis, "A Shepard to Mexico's Saints: Arwell L. Pierce and the Third Convention" *BYU Studies* 37, no. 1 (1997-1998): 127-57; ch. 3, "The Third Convention," in *Mormons in Mexico*, 137-68.

program will live on; it will rule over the world of redeemed humanity."<sup>49</sup> The death of Madero had stalled national progress, Pratt conceded, but he urged continuation of the class struggle: "Whether it comes now or whether the people again submit to long years of slavery and serfdom at the hands of the rich. . .there must and will come a time when the native people of this land will rise up and throw off the yoke of slavery and raise [sic.] above the condition that now holds them down."<sup>50</sup>

Pratt grouped Indians, workers, and the liberty-minded *mestizos* (a segment of the middle-class which included those of mixed Indian and European ancestry) into a single revolutionary unit. The bourgeoisie of Mexico City who spoke well of Madero were the "best people" of their class. After a visit to Madero's grave, Pratt venerated the displays of working class solidarity in his special journal. Of the Indians Pratt wrote, "Years of preaching. . .among them has taught me that the best people in the nation are those that are now suffering the most." Pratt cheered the exploits of the Morelos-based Zapatistas. As long as they and Carranza's coalition refused to acknowledge Huerta, the revolution lived.<sup>51</sup>

#### A MESSIANIC REVOLUTION?

During 1914 Pratt and Ivins increasingly accepted radical measures in Mexican issues. On 3 February President Woodrow Wilson decided that Huerta had to go and lifted the arms embargo. As U.S. arms poured into Veracruz, Pratt's optimism rose. At the Latter-day Saint University in Salt Lake City, Pratt lectured students on the "social uprising" in Mexico. It must continue unabated, he said. Pratt castigated "the aristocratic, estate-holding tyrants, the rich and well born, the politicians of the country." This class that abused Mexico and enslaved the Indians had to be "removed." Once the people had overthrown the elite, Pratt theorized, teachers, ministers, and Indian leaders would "rejuvenate Mexico" and restore the sophistication of pre-conquest civilization.<sup>52</sup>

Pratt glowed as Villa slugged his way toward Mexico City. After the Division of the North mauled Huerta at the Battle of Zecatecas on 23 June 1914, Pratt wrote, "Who can doubt that out of the present struggle will grow a great and better Mexico with an absolute liberty, based on human rights, for all her people [and] the way be prepared for the

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49. Quoted in Helmut Trotnow, *Karl Liebknecht (1871-1919): A Political Biography* (New York: Archon Books, 1984), 203.

50. Pratt, "Account of What Happened in Mexico City," 11.

51. *Ibid.*, 9-11, 35, 36. Pratt also expressed his sentiments in verse. See Rey L. Pratt, "The 'Cuartelazo,'" *Just Thinking* (Independence, Mo.: Press of Zion's Printing and Publishing Company, c.1928), 40-46.

52. "Revolution Marks Social Uprising Is Pratt's Statement," *Herald Republican*, in *Journal History*, 11 Feb 1914, 4.

teaching of the true Gospel unto the people [and] their redemption?"<sup>53</sup> Pratt was restating the "Mexican spiritual dialectic." The degraded condition of the Indian was symptomatic of their ancient loss of faith in the one true god, but glory would follow the fall. This narrative—the Lamanite people favored of the Lord, dwindle in unbelief, are conquered, then await salvation from the gentiles—was Pratt's way of explaining how Mexico had gone from an empire of 30 million to an impoverished population of 15 million ruled by a dictator. With nine-tenths of the Indian population wiped out, Pratt announced, the time had come to reverse the process. The revolution, therefore, was a dialectical step in the cultural return of the Indian.<sup>54</sup>

Other church officers followed Pratt's lead. In a speech to the Associated Collegians of Brigham Young University, Charles McClellan, formerly a counselor in the Juarez stake presidency, registered his preference for gradual change, but—given that Madero was "butchered" when he tried it—the Mexican people must be pardoned for relying on the "power that a 30-30 gives them." Then McClellan came to the point: "[I]t is not a question of this man or that man in Mexico. It is a question of principles, of human rights; and you and I, under the same circumstances, would take up arms. Our fathers did for even less provocation in the days of Bunker Hill, and we honor them for it." In Mexico, McClellan argued, class revolt would weaken the old order. Once accomplished, Mexico must develop a "national spirit" and receive training in constitutional government to overcome *cientifuco* and *hacendado* influence, class division, and the ethnic differences that would hinder further development.<sup>55</sup>

Ivins began to reconstruct his image of Mexico after the shock of expulsion and financial loss subsided. Previously he had related to Mexico based on the model of "Arielism." Frederick Pike describes Arielism as an alliance of elites in the Western Hemisphere who would band together to limit "barbarous" democratic influences and to advance economic pros-

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53. Rey L. Pratt, "The Book of Mormon Prophecies and the Mexican Situation," *Young Woman's Journal* 25 (September 1914): 539.

54. *Ibid.*, 539-40. Pratt reviewed the population devastation suffered by other Latin American countries to underscore his point. For the unfolding Mormon racial doctrines toward Mexico's inhabitants, see Thomas W. Murphy, "From Racist Stereotype to Ethnic Identity: Instrumental Uses of Mormon Racial Doctrine," *Ethnohistory* 46, no. 3 (Summer 1999): 458-61. For a discussion of Mormon historiography and Indian identity, see Murphy, "Other Mormon Histories: Lamanite Subjectivity in Mexico," *Journal of Mormon History* 26 (Fall 2000): 179-214.

55. Charles E. McClellan [McClellan], "Bird's-Eye View of Mexico's Troubles," *The Improvement Era* 17 (March 1914): 441-44. McClellan later studied at Stanford and Columbia, and became a full professor at Utah State University. See Hatch and Spilsbury, *Stalwarts South of the Border*, 422-25.

perity.<sup>56</sup> However, the heat of revolution melted the old *Porfirio*-Mormon "alliance-for-progress" combination, and Ivins ultimately repudiated the Arelilian model and began to seek community with the masses.

The advance of the southern and northern armies invigorated Ivins's thinking with prospects of scriptural fulfillment. Just days before Villa and Zapata culminated the revolution with a dramatic entry into Mexico City on 5 December 1914, Ivins met with the Twelve Apostles and the First Presidency of the church in the Salt Lake Temple. He reviewed the situation in Mexico and referred to a verse in 3 Nephi of the Book of Mormon. The Mexican people, he averred, "having been trodden down by the gentiles, will become like a lion among a flock of sheep, so plainly set forth by the Savior himself."<sup>57</sup> The trope of peasants and workers embodied as lions united in a flailing fight to eradicate their overlords marks another step in the reinvention of Ivins. At a chapel dedication in San Diego he concluded that liberty would be established in Mexico but only after the conflict that pitted "servants against pitiless masters" had been won.<sup>58</sup> Violence, the apostle said, was purging Mexico. Both he and Pratt now dismissed the colonists' expulsion from Mexico as a sidebar in a much bigger event. The fighting spreading across the country was but the antithesis to Spanish imperialism and Creole exploitation. Missionary work, redemption of the Lamanites, and the possibilities of an Indian nation embossed the revolution with the imprimatur of divine approval. The upheaval had assumed scriptural and social proportions that exceeded the legalisms of American property holding in Mexico.

#### CARRANZA AND THE CONSTITUTIONALISTS

Inevitably, revolution became civil war. Huerta resigned 15 July 1914, and the Constitutionalist alliance fell apart at the Aguascalientes Convention the following October. The Carranzistas wanted to defuse revolutionary radicalism and re-align Mexican politics along upper-class lines. To enlist urban and rural support, Carranza offered the return of illegally seized *ejido* lands and the recognition of labor unions.<sup>59</sup> The

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56. Fredrick B. Pike, *The United States and Latin America: Myths and Stereotypes of Civilization and Nature* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992), 194, 218-20.

57. "Minutes of Meeting of the First Presidency," *Journal History*, 25 November 1914, 8. Compare to 3 Nephi 20:16; 21:12 in *Book of Mormon* (1977, published at Salt Lake City in various editions).

58. Speech delivered in San Diego, 21 May 1916, reported in "Conditions in Northern Mexico," *Improvement Era* 19 (July 1916): 843. See also Ivins, speech given at the Citizens Military Training Camp Committee on 30 March 1916 reported in "War with Mexico is on, Says Ivins," *Salt Lake Tribune*, in *Journal History*, 31 March 1916, 2.

59. City workers believed that Carranza's formation of "Red Battalions" to fight the Conventionists and his endorsement of the *Casa del Obrero* indicated his acceptance of

Zapatistas, suspicious of Carranza's elitism and sincerity, insisted on the more wide-sweeping agrarian reforms called for in the Plan de Ayala. Personal rivalry and class divided Carranza and Villa, but on a deeper level their incompatibility is explained by the historic division over the nature of Mexican federalism. While Carranza would centralize the government in Mexico City, Villa personified the regionalist view that political power should remain in the states.<sup>60</sup> The delegates at Aguascalientes chose Eulalio Gutiérrez, a general with agrarian proclivities, to succeed Carranza. The Constitutionalist "First Chief" refused to accept the choice, evacuated Mexico City, and formed a second government in Veracruz. On 19 November 1914 General Alvaro Obregón, acting under Carranza's order, declared war on the "Conventionists," Villa and Zapata.

Woodrow Wilson now believed that Carranza personified the intent of the Madero revolution. This new policy was pinned on the belief that if Carranza could be induced to concentrate on those land reform issues which had attracted the people to Villa and Zapata, the threat to foreign interests in Mexico would diminish.<sup>61</sup> Subsequently, Carranza assured Wilson that he would muzzle revolutionary nationalism in exchange for U.S. recognition. He received it 19 October 1915.<sup>62</sup> A month later Plutarco Callés, an Obregónist general, annihilated Villa's Division del Norte at Agua Prieta. Villa, maddened by U.S. recognition of Carranza, raided Columbus, New Mexico, on 9 March 1916. He hoped that American columns streaming across the border in pursuit would galvanize Chihuahuans against Carranza.<sup>63</sup> In the scenario of renewed desert warfare,

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anarcho-syndicalism, an ideology that championed unions as the basic organizing dynamic of society. To the dismay of workers, Carranza defined the Constitutionalist party in terms of his upper-class background and nationalist sentiment and viewed the proletarian alliance only as a temporary expedient. See Hart, *Revolutionary Mexico*, 306-07, 318-19; Knight, *Mexican Revolution*, 2:433.

60. On Zapata versus Carranza see Krauze, *Mexico: A Biography of Power*, 291; Hart, *Revolutionary Mexico*, 267-69. In *Life and Times of Pancho Villa*, 388-96, Katz reviews the hagiography of the Villa-Carranza split. He concludes that the long-standing dispute in Mexican politics that centered on "centralization versus regionalism [issue] is probably the least controversial" explanation for the onset of civil war between the former Constitutionalist allies (391). Hart insists that the civil war pitted agrarians and laborers (Villa and Zapata) against the foreigners and the *hacendados* (Carranza). See *Revolutionary Mexico*, 276-77, 327.

61. Lloyd Gardner, *Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913-1923* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 61-65.

62. Thomas F. O'Brien, *The Revolutionary Mission: American Enterprise in Latin America, 1900-1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 263; Lloyd C. Gardner, "Woodrow Wilson and the Mexican Revolution," in Arthur S. Link, ed., *Woodrow Wilson and a Revolutionary World, 1913-1921* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 28.

63. Clarence C. Clendenen, *Blood on the Border: The United States Army and the Mexican Irregulars* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1969), 199-200; Katz, *Life and Times of Pancho Villa*, 566.



the Mormon colonies were again strategically located. Juarez and Dublan served the logistical needs of both General John J. Pershing's Punitive Expedition and Villa's Division del Norte.<sup>64</sup>

Despite the unraveling of the Constitutionalist alliance and Villa's cross-border attack, Ivins and Pratt adhered to the idea of revolution. After the Columbus raid, however, Ivins chose to institutionalize revolutionary gains in the government that Carranza was forming. On this point he was now in harmony with Wilson's commitment to Carranza, and the statism that would become a hallmark of Ivins's defense of the Mexican government's nationalization of church properties in 1926 began to take shape.<sup>65</sup> Ivins told a citizens' military preparedness group that the revolution should continue until equal rights for all Mexicans were assured, but since no faction had gained a clear advantage, leaving Mexico mired in unproductive violence, Ivins revised his earlier disinclination to invade. The "turbulent elements" in Zapata's and Villa's armies, he reasoned, had to be quelled long enough for constitutional reforms to proceed. The risk of provoking war with Mexico was worth taking if the presence of U.S. forces allowed Carranza to consolidate his government under the influence of American democratic principles.<sup>66</sup> Invasion, however, did not imply general war. In Dublan, General Pershing invited Ivins to address his troops. Standing on a makeshift platform, Ivins reflected on the army's mission. The objective of the Punitive Expe-

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64. Villa, who hoped the U.S. would not believe he had ordered the Columbus raid, was trying to avoid a two-front war, one against Pershing's expeditionary force and the other against General Francisco Murgruía advancing from the south. Accusations of another attack on a property center with ties to the United States (like a Mormon colony) would be ruinous to Villa's policy of gaining the "good will" of his neighbors while he liberated his people from the "slavery and evil condition that had been brought on by the tyrants of his country." See Report to General John J. Pershing, 16 December 1916, quoted in Katz, *Life and Times of Pancho Villa*, 604. On the strategic location of Colonia Dublan, see Clendenen, *Blood on the Border*, 220. Villa refitted his army in Casas Grande, Dublan, and Juarez in September-October 1915 preparatory to his attack on Auga Prieta. A colorful description of Villa's Division del Norte is found in Grace Zenor Pratt, "Glimpses of Villa's Army," *Improvement Era* 19 (March 1916): 395-401. Several Mormons were dragooned into to service as teamsters on the Division del Norte's fateful march over the Sonoran mountains. See Raymond J. Reed, "The Mormons in Chihuahua: Their Relations with Villa and the Pershing Punitive Expedition, 1910-1917," M.A. thesis, University of New Mexico, 1938, 73.

65. Ivins told a Conference audience: "The state controls the church absolutely, controls your property, controls your lives. It takes your property from you if it wishes, it presses you into service, it declares war or makes peace and you cannot avoid it. . . After all the finality is that the state controls us." See *Conference Report*, April 1916, 59.

66. "War with Mexico Is on, Says Ivins," *Salt Lake Tribune*, in *Journal History*, 31 March 1916, 2. For Ivins's reluctant support of Carranza, see also Anthony Ivins, "On Villa's Trail," *Improvement Era* 19 (September 1916): 1015-1016.

dition, Ivins told them, was not to demonstrate imperial power, menace Mexico, destroy Villa, or to redeem American honor. On the contrary, the army was to contain Villa in order to assist a sister republic.<sup>67</sup>

Ivins was ready to believe that the damage done to the old ruling class in Mexico had been sufficient enough to begin the process of rebuilding, but he remained emotionally tied to Francisco Villa. The dashing image he harbored of Villa's 1913 raid on Casas Grande at a time when Villa was an aspiring revolutionary commander remained in Ivins's mind.<sup>68</sup> A series of articles authored by Ivins in 1916-1917 entitled "On Villa's Trail" reads like a western adventure.<sup>69</sup> Ideology was subordinated to drama as harrowing Villista escapes to mountain hideouts thrilled the reader as much as U.S. cavalry marksmanship and riding skill. His description of Villa's plan for the Columbus raid was highly complimentary: "The details of the enterprise were carefully worked out, and executed with boldness and dispatch, which illustrate the intelligence and natural genius of this uneducated leader of men."<sup>70</sup> In these narratives, Villa executes Americans without condemnation. The rape and murder increasingly condoned by Villa was indicative of the "moral decline" which biographer Frederick Katz says began in 1915.<sup>71</sup> American and Mexican adherents lost faith in Villista methods and purposes, but Ivins continued to nurture the image of Villa as a romantic bandit.<sup>72</sup>

Ivins shared his attraction to certain Latin personalities with other well-known Americans. For example, Army Chief-of-Staff Hugh Scott found common ground with Villa in the "cowboy code of honor;"<sup>73</sup> Theodore Roosevelt viewed Argentinean and Chilean elites as potential cowboy-aristocrat presidents who, like himself, possessed "to a very high degree, the stern, manly qualities that are invaluable to a nation."<sup>74</sup>

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67. Mary Foster Gibbs, "General John J. Pershing," *Relief Society Magazine* 6 (June 1919): 22-23; Ivins, *Conference Report*, October 1916, 66. That the U.S. should exercise caution to avoid full-scale war also suggested in "The United States and Mexico: Shall we have War or Peace with Mexico our Neighbor?" *Improvement Era* 19 (May 1916): 584-90.

68. Ivins to Joseph C. Bentley, 28 June 1913, box 9, fdr 3, Ivins collection. On Villa's first raid as a Maderista see Katz, *Life and Times of Pancho Villa*, 204-213.

69. Anthony W. Ivins, "On Villa's Trail," *Improvement Era* 19 (September 1916): 1014-19; 20 (October 1916): 1095-97; 20 (February 1917): 355-59; 20 (March 1917): 397-400; 20 (April 1917): 500-04.

70. Ivins, "On Villa's Trail," 1018. Bishop Joseph Bentley of Jaurez, a friend of Ivins, touted Villa as "the greatest fighter of them all." See "Some Mexican Revolutionists," *Juvenile Instructor* 55 (October 1920): 488.

71. Katz, *Life and Times of Pancho Villa*, 623-25.

72. Ivins's reference to Villa as a bandit of honor is similar to the definition found in Edward S. Farrow, "Bandit," in *Military Encyclopedia: A Dictionary of Military Knowledge*, 3 vols. (New York: Author, 1885), 1:135-36.

73. Katz, *Life and Times of Pancho Villa*, 319.

74. Quoted in Pike, *United States and Latin America*, 203-04. For a pre-revolution

Ivins, himself the consummate frontiersman, saw in Villa a self-made rebel. As late as December 1918, he defended the old renegade, saying that incessant visits to the Mormon colonies and spectacular yet brief occupations of Chihuahua City were Villa's way of embarrassing the Mexican government.<sup>75</sup> Still, as John Reed had concluded, Villa could not "fuse creatively with the masses," and Ivins deferred to Carranza.<sup>76</sup>

Carranza, in the meantime, tightened his grip. In the south, Zapata's revolution—in the words of John Womack—was slowly dying in "a ragged, bitter and confused giving way."<sup>77</sup> Carranzista general Pablo Gonzalez was executing people indiscriminately and laying waste to Morelos. Suddenly, fortunes changed. The Zapatista high command shifted its headquarters to Tochmilco, at the foot of the Popo volcano, and launched raids against Mexico City. The Zapatista counter-offensive was so potent that Gonzalez withdrew from Morelos in November 1916.<sup>78</sup>

In the midst of these events, Pratt spoke at the Fall 1916 General Conference in Salt Lake. The revolution must continue, he averred. The people thirsted for political representation and for land. Madero would have realized these dreams, but counter-revolutionaries Orozco and Huerta, "bought off by the millions of the privileged and wealthy classes," had temporarily squashed Mexican aspirations.<sup>79</sup> Unlike Ivins, Pratt peremp-

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Mormon reflection on the benefits of Spanish and middle-class rule in South America see "Chile," *Juvenile Instructor* 27 (1 May 1892): 265-71.

75. *Journal History*, 26 December 1918, 6. Bishop Arwell Pierce of El Paso stated that the loss in horses and grain and forced loans levied by Villistas had cost the settlements \$7,210. Pierce was sympathetic, adding that the Villasta's did it because it was their only source of income. The raiders had also been "cordial to the women." See *Journal History*, 30 March 1919, 1.

76. Pike, *United States and Latin America*, 218-19. Villa's revolutionary elitism is discussed in Jim Tuck, *Pancho Villa and John Reed: Two Faces of Romantic Revolution* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1984), 214-15.

77. John Womack, Jr., *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), 247.

78. The Zapatista high command had organized the Defense of Revolutionary Principles to resist violent federal pacification policies. See Womack, *Zapata*, 302; Knight, *Mexican Revolution*, 2:368-69. Evidence suggests that while Mexican Mormons were caught between government and revolutionary forces, many—especially in the Indian villages—sided with the Zapatistas. Several paid the price of deportation, arrest, conscription, despoilation, and execution. Pratt personally intervened in several cases. See "Mormon Mexicans are Persecuted," *Salt Lake Telegram*, in *Journal History*, 5 April 1918, 11; Livingston, "From Above and Below," 311-12; Tullis, *Mormons in Mexico*, 96-103; Parrish, "'Look to the Rock,'" 78-79; Beecher, "Rey L. Pratt," 299-300; Mark Grover, "Execution in Mexico: The Deaths of Rafael Monroy and Vincente Morales," *BYU Studies* 35, no. 3 (1995-1996): 7-28. When two other Mormons were executed for alleged Carranzista collaboration, Pratt was so upset that he permitted a family member to participate in a government firing squad in retaliation. See Pratt diary, 19 May 1917.

79. R. Pratt, *Conference Report*, October 1916, 146.

torily rejected Mexico's new president: "General Carranza is. . . an aristocrat—one of the privileged classes of Mexico, and he is a man who cannot inspire in the Mexican people any confidence."<sup>80</sup>

Pratt voiced the resolve of peasant soldiers in the south. He never publicly identifies sufferers and fighters during this period; they remain a collective abstraction, and yet Pratt personifies the revolution with a sensitivity derived from his intimate relationship with Mexico. On the slope of a Puebla volcano, ragged Zapatistas had told Pratt: "We. . . shall inherit something besides the misery that we have had to live in, and we never again will lay down our arms until there is established for the humble class of Mexico liberty."<sup>81</sup> Pratt drew from a mystic religious faith in revolution. James Billington argues that half-secular, half-religious epiphanies of a luminous future had fired the minds of men during the nineteenth century when the revolutionary idea was untested by actual achievement. Pratt's discourse was Mormon, religious, and revolutionary—"a language in the making; a road sign pointing to the future."<sup>82</sup>

Pratt interwove the mission of the church, revolution, and tolerance for Mexico in his conclusion. He spoke directly to Mormon colonial hardships: "[The revolutionaries] may have committed against us depredations, and if it were only a political issue, if it were only a national issue, if we were only Americans, we might have resentment toward them, but we have received the word of the Lord that they are our brethren." Pratt broke the barriers that had distinguished the colonists from the Mexican masses. He prayed that the light of a new age would shine, and that "when the clouds of war rolled by. . . the servants of the Lord will be permitted to come again and carry the gospel to their brethren and to their sisters who are yet in darkness."

This "They Are Our Brothers" speech employed the discursive technique of *enthymeme*. An enthymeme is the unstated portion of a rhetorical argument. The speaker relies on the audience to fill in the gaps based on shared historical experience or commonly held mental references. In the enthymematic shadow, the speaker reveals his philosophy of history, politics, or religion.<sup>83</sup> For Pratt, the Mexican revolution tested Mormon doctrine against his own authorization of raw social forces at work in Mexico.

From an enthymematic standpoint, Pratt achieved reconciliation. The

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80. *Ibid.*, 147. Carranza's outlook, despite his nationalist goals, remained tied to the upper-class; he was also friendly to foreigners and offered the Catholic Church salutary indifference, according to most scholars. See Hart, *Revolutionary Mexico*, 333.

81. R. Pratt, *Conference Report*, October 1916, 147.

82. James Billington, *Fire in the Minds of Men: The Origins of the Revolutionary Faith* (New York: Basic Books, 1980), 7.

83. Teun A. van Dijk, *Discourse as Structure and Process*, vol. 2 of *Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction* (London: Sage Publications, 1997), 171-72.

Mormon audience could decode a message confirming that the Mexican Revolution was an extension of their own sacred history. The Mexican people were not alien malefactors or barbaric rebels: they were brothers, co-agents in redeeming mankind. The reclamation of the Indians reminded the saints of their commission to proselytize the remnants of Israel before the Second Coming. Mexico's suffering masses conjured the Missouri and Illinois persecutions; the armies of Villa and Zapata were figments of the 1834 march of Zion's camp to take back Jackson County, a symbolic rehearsal of the mythical return to Missouri. Incipient, revolutionary Mexico, emerging into a brighter future, intoned the literal advent of Zion—the New Jerusalem—Christ's future terrestrial capital.

Pratt's oratory animated his audience. Conservative church President Joseph F. Smith followed Pratt to the pulpit and rejoined: "I do not want war; but the Lord has said it shall be poured out upon all nations. I would rather the oppressors should be killed than to allow the oppressors to kill the innocent."<sup>84</sup> An editorial in the *Herald Republican* recapitulated some of the themes in Pratt's conference address.

The topic of Pratt's October 1916 speech had been selected at the request of Apostle and U.S. Senator Reed Smoot, who wished to counter the support Ivins had displayed for Wilson's Mexico policy and the League of Nations.<sup>85</sup> Pratt obliged but could not be co-opted to Smoot's purposes. The Mexican mission president scorned the *Republican's* endorsement of Huerta (d. January 1916) and his retainers as a means of restoring stability in Mexico, but believed for more than partisan reasons that, in recognizing Carranza, Wilson had betrayed the people. Had Pratt known of Wilson's private views prior to October 1915, he would have discovered he was in agreement with Wilson's earlier initiatives, which had called for a "provisional government essentially revolutionary in character" that "should institute reforms by decree before the calling of a constitutional convention."<sup>86</sup> The disappointment Pratt felt toward the U.S. policy shift in favor of Carranza suggests agreement with the *Republican* (though for very different reasons) that Wilson had failed as the "president of humanity."<sup>87</sup>

The passion with which Pratt opposed Carranza outdistanced the

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84. J. F. Smith, *Conference Report*, October 1916, 154. At the April 1916 General Conference, Pratt gave a speech similar to his October "They Are Our Brothers" address. George Albert Smith, apostle and president of the church from 1945-1950, followed Pratt at the pulpit and voiced his desire to overthrow "the oppressors" in Mexico. See G. Smith, *Conference Report*, April 1916, 123-24.

85. Kristen Smart Rogers, "'Another Good Man': Anthony W. Ivins and the Defeat of Reed Smoot," *Utah Historical Quarterly* 68 (Winter 2000): 61.

86. Wilson to Robert Lansing, 11 August 1915, quoted in Gardner, "Mexican Revolution," in Link, ed., *Woodrow Wilson and a Revolutionary World*, 28.

87. "Concerning Two Pictures," *Herald Republican*, in *Journal History*, 10 October 1916, 2.

revolutionary ardor of Kenneth Turner, one of Pratt's closest ideological companions. Turner defined "liberty" as Pratt did: "A tangible thing that means to [the people] not only the broader liberties of the mind but the more pressing needs of the body."<sup>88</sup> However, while Turner thought Villa was a "scoundrel" manipulated by reactionaries to force a U.S. intervention,<sup>89</sup> Pratt extolled Villa. A poem composed by Pratt in 1916 disdains the alliance between the U.S. and Villa's Constitutionalist foes. Seventeen American deaths resulting from the Columbus raid had been the price for allowing Carranza to transport troops across U.S. territory to re-inforce the garrison of Agua Prieta:

"Villa's Raid"<sup>90</sup>

1

So darker grew [Villa's visage]  
 And hatred filled his heart,  
 Against that foreign country  
 For their ignoble part  
 In aiding thus for money,  
 Against both nations' laws,  
 His foe, and brought disaster  
 To freedom's struggling cause. . .

2

He watched his ragged comrades,  
 Their blood-stained feet so sore;  
 He watched them march in silence,  
 Then in his wrath he swore:  
 "By those who died in battle  
 By those who march with me,  
 I'll take revenge on that proud  
 land, Their blood the price must be. . ."

3

With lives full many a thousand  
 And treasure yet untold,  
 The gringo army had to pay  
 To this marauder bold.  
 Nor did they ever take him back,

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88. John Kenneth Turner, "Mexico's 'Bandit Armies,'" *Collier's* 51 (5 April 1913): 11, 21, quoted in Britton, *Revolution and Ideology*, 38.

89. *Ibid.*, 39.

90. Pratt, "Villa's Raid," *Just Thinking*, 69-73.

As they at first had said,  
That they would bring him back alive,  
If not, bring him back dead. . .

## 4

But after months of fruitless toil  
Back home again marched they;  
Left Villa and his dauntless men  
The victors in the fray;  
His vow made good that pay they should  
Their act of perfidy  
For helping for a price of gold  
The foes of liberty.

Pratt's sympathies are clear. Pershing's withdrawal in 1917 demonstrated to him that progressive forces in Mexico would survive. Continued violence was preferable to premature consolidation, a position Pratt continued to embrace after the nation he admired most—the United States—endorsed Carranza. "Liberty," as Pratt envisioned it, could only be realized through the decrees of a proto-Indian state, and legitimacy rested on the inclusion of other still-fighting revolutionary constituencies. Pratt's independent leftist view would not allow him to ignore the contradictions he saw between the social origins of Carranzistas and the condition of the people, but neither would he admit defeat as the power of the state slowly began to reshape Mexican life.

## "FATHER LEHI'S CHILDREN"

With the promulgation of the 1917 constitution, the decline of Villa, and the subsequent assassination of Zapata, revolutionary activity subsided in Mexico. Ivins toured the colonies in November. He surveyed the devastated stores, the idle mills, the uncultivated fields, and the Mormon town of Díaz, destroyed for its namesake. While these scenes troubled Ivins as much as they did other American observers, he put the destruction into perspective: "Barbarous Mexico has proven herself childlike, humane, and merciful, when compared with the [world war] across the sea."<sup>91</sup> In the opinion of Ivins, Mexico had at least forged a new nation through armed struggle whereas conflict in Europe was tearing it apart. The futility of World War I contrasted sharply with the purposes for which Mexicans had fought.

Pratt and Ivins ended their lives with unshakable faith in what the Mexican Revolution had begun. In their speeches, articles, and letters, they fought to reconcile the tension between the spiritual and the secular

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91. Anthony Ivins, "Mexico After the War," *Improvement Era* 21 (June 1918): 715-719.

worlds, between individual salvation and social activism. They engaged in battles of discourse to promote their views on the utility and meaning of revolution. In the process, they often found themselves groping for self-discovery. When they struck the core, they found that they stood as brothers, fighting like lions for the idea of an Indian nation.

Pratt and Ivins sublimated the "American" in themselves and spoke a language of liberation. They made Mormonism fit in Mexico by drawing from a radical past that promoted a vision for society which could no longer be attempted in America. They hoped the example of Mexico would spread to the southern hemisphere. When Apostle Melvin J. Ballard and Rey Pratt opened the South American Mission in 1926, the language was distinctly revolutionary. Following the "Amen" to Ballard's dedicatory speech in Buenos Aires, the missionaries gave tearful expression to their emotions. They felt that "Father Lehi's children," were on the verge of a revolution that would break the "shackles, politically," and hasten the "day of retribution [and] deliverance."<sup>92</sup> Ballard was heartened by the political changes and violence that swept South America during the early 1930s as the global economic depression worsened. "These numerous revolutions," he wrote, would promote sociopolitical conditions conducive to missionary work. "The Latter-day Saints do not, therefore, see disaster in these political disturbances, but rather progress, growth, and development."<sup>93</sup>

Ballard had sounded the call. The destruction of the status quo in South America was linked to the extension of Zion. In a 1930 conference talk, Ballard asserted, "The [old] order of things cannot live."<sup>94</sup> He reviewed the progress made in Mexico, Argentina, and Chile toward the disestablishment of religion, then asked: "Now what shall we do?" His reply was militant: "Our sacred duty is to stand by the fires that have already been kindled, keep them ablaze that they shall never die, fight for right in the conflicts that will go forward. . . . For this is the age when truth shall be triumphant and victorious, when error, darkness, and superstition, whether in the church or in the state, shall perish."<sup>95</sup>

From Latin America Ballard hoped to reconstruct the world. Humanity would be elevated while obsolete political and social forms would yield to divine rationalism and millennial happiness. For nearly one hundred years, key LDS leaders had narrated this process by drawing from the rhetoric and talismen of the Left. This vision would slowly constrict, however, until the cold war closed it altogether.

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92. "Prayer: Dedicating the Lands of South America to the Preaching of the Gospel," *Improvement Era* 29 (April 1926): 576-77.

93. Melvin J. Ballard, "The Significance of South American Revolutions," *Improvement Era* 34 (April 1931): 320.

94. Ballard, *Conference Report*, April 1930, 157.

95. *Ibid.*, 155.