

# *Mormonism and Maoism: The Church and People's China*

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IN A RECENT ADDRESS to a Regional Representatives Seminar, President Kimball stated—

We asked last conference for all members to pray with increased sincerity for peace in all nations and especially China, and that we might make entry with our missionaries. Since then many people have been to China and much interest has been shown. Let us ask our Heavenly Father to grant our petition and permit this great neighbor, China, to join the great family of nations now bowing to the Lord Jesus Christ.<sup>1</sup>

In another address, President Kimball spoke favorably of many Chinese government policies. These policies, which encourage sexual morality, hard work, honesty, self-discipline and attention to personal cleanliness and public health measures, receive frequent favorable comment by visitors to China.<sup>2</sup>

In the past, LDS missionary work among the Chinese has been limited to areas adjacent to China—Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore—and to other countries with Chinese communities. The opening of diplomatic relations between China and the United States and political changes within China since the death of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) seem to have given new impetus to the desire of Mormon leaders to expand missionary work among the Chinese and into China proper.

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At present, however, the Chinese government is not favorable toward religious proselytism. Just two weeks before President Kimball's address the authoritative *People's Daily*, in response to a question about religion, observed—

All religions are hallucinatory and erroneous reflections among men which result from feelings of helplessness and fear in the face of natural and social forces. Processed and elaborated on by exploiting classes and religious professionals the negative role of religion has become more and more prominent, especially after mankind entered the class society. It causes the laboring people to abide by the will of heaven and endure all there is to endure in the face of the struggle against nature and class struggle. Marxism holds that religion is the opium paralyzing the people's will and the instrument of the exploiting classes for ruling the people. Therefore, Marxists consistently oppose any form of religion.<sup>3</sup>

By way of exposing the negative influence of religion on society, the Chinese media used the Jonestown massacre as a case study.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, an article in *Guangming Daily* on the historical approaches to truth contrasted the trial of Galileo before the Inquisition with the modern scientific method used in China today.<sup>5</sup> While the current attitude in China permits some toleration of religious belief as is guaranteed by the Chinese constitution (the constitution also guarantees the "right" to propagate atheism), religious belief and practice is strongly discouraged. Consequently, it appears that there is presently a wide gulf between the hopes of the Church to do missionary work in China and the attitude of the Chinese regime.

This article will consider the prospects for the spread of Mormonism in China and examine some of the problems involved with extending missionary work there. It is based upon my continuing study of China and on personal observations made during extensive travels with a delegation that visited China in April and May of 1979.

Missionary work among the Chinese people outside the People's Republic of China is flourishing. Stakes in Hong Kong and Taiwan have several thousand members, and in other parts of the world there are many other Chinese members. While there are some discordant elements between LDS doctrine and traditional Chinese beliefs and practices, the gospel obviously has appeal for many Chinese.<sup>6</sup>

Perhaps much of the reason for the gospel's appeal to Chinese and other Asians was suggested a few years ago by Paul Hyer.<sup>7</sup> He observed that revolution in Asia was tearing apart the fabric of traditional societies and suggested that Mormonism offered an alternative to "shallow materialism" or "totalitarian puritanism." Church programs could provide friendship and fellowship; the patriarchal order of the priesthood could provide a sense of continuity and stability; and LDS doctrines could feed the hunger for new values. It seems that Hyer's arguments, at least in the short view, have been borne out by events. If anything, Asia has become more revolutionary since he wrote; meanwhile the Church has grown rapidly.

Mormonism, however, like other forms of Christianity, has had little if any impact on the People's Republic. It would be easy to attribute this to the atheistic Communists in Beijing (Peking). But, in fact, the causes are more deeply rooted. This becomes more evident as we consider the limited, yet significant contact between Mormonism and the modern Chinese revolution.

The modern Chinese revolution had its beginnings about twelve years after the establishment of the Church and two years before the martyrdom of Joseph Smith. In 1842 the end of the Opium War ushered in China's "century of humiliation" at the hands of the West, during which the Western powers and Japan carved China into numerous spheres of influence; in these territories foreigners enjoyed substantial privilege. Meanwhile, as rapid population growth, famine and rebellion became constant features of this era, the last great Dynasty of China, The Quing (Ch'ing) or Manchu Dynasty, was collapsing from within.

The first LDS missionaries arrived in Hong Kong to begin missionary work in China in 1853; they lasted about four months—overcome by strange customs, language, food and climate. Efforts to attract Europeans were unsuccessful. China was being torn asunder by the Taiping Rebellion which lasted for more than a decade and in which millions perished. Thus, the beginnings ended in frustration and failure.

The next contact came in 1921, when China was again in a state of turmoil. The Ch'ing government which had collapsed in 1911, was replaced by the republic of Sun Yat-sen. However, there was no effective central government: China was torn among rival warlords all demanding unity with none willing to give up his own domain. China's ultimate humiliation had come during the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Since she had participated in the allied cause, China attended the conference expecting to be treated as a victorious member of the allied powers. However, the German concessions in Shantung were not returned to China but were given to Japan instead; this provoked rioting among young nationalistic students in China's major cities. The government did not sign the treaty; Japan continued its encroachments; the youths began the formation of new political organizations which would ultimately constitute the ruling authority in China.

When Elders David McKay and Hugh Cannon arrived in Beijing in 1921 to dedicate China to the preaching of the restored gospel, they observed the large numbers of Japanese soldiers along China's railways and the famine and unrest stalking the land. Cannon wrote—

Poor old China, the victim of intrigues among nations who covet her coal and iron deposits, the victim of floods and droughts, of famine and pestilence, and worst of all, the victim of her own inefficiency and helplessness! Assuredly she needs someone to plead her cause before the throne of grace. China is living in the dead past of two thousand years and has hardly begun to realize it.

And still her condition is not hopeless. She is as one passing through travail. A new nation, let us hope, is being born, a nation of great potential power, with leaders sufficiently wise to develop and properly

exploit her natural resources. Among this people are hosts of splendid individuals, men and women of stable character, of refinement and intelligence.<sup>8</sup>

McKay, in his dedicatory prayer, asked that China's burdens be lifted, and that the government would become stable, "if not by the present government, then through the intervention of the allied powers of the civilized world." He prayed also that the bonds of superstition would be broken.<sup>9</sup>

It is somewhat ironic that intervention by the allied powers of the "civilized world" had compounded China's difficulties. Equally paradoxically, the government which finally brought a measure of stability to China, after decades of turmoil and strife, captured the Chinese revolution by playing upon antiforeign nationalism more effectively than did the other political parties.

The Chinese Communist Party was formed within six months of the dedicatory prayer. Initially, it was composed of a handful of intellectuals influenced by the Russian Revolution of 1917 (a major factor was that the new Marxist government of Russia had renounced its unequal treaties with China). The Communists entered a brief alliance with the Chinese Nationalist Party headed by Sun Yat-sen, who also received Soviet support and made plans for a new revolution. Although initially successful, the Communist-Nationalist alliance fell apart in 1927 during a campaign to unify China. An energetic military officer, Chiang K'ai-shek, then seized control of the Nationalist Party and the Communists were driven underground.

For decades the two parties fought against each other and sometimes alongside each other as they united in the War of Resistance against Japan from 1937 to 1945, until the Communists finally achieved victory in 1949. The Nationalists fled to Taiwan where they continued to claim legitimacy as the government of all China. Mao Zedong, announcing the establishment of the People's Republic of China, declared: "The Chinese People have now stood up!"

Only a few months before the Chinese Communists came to power, Elder Matthew Cowley and a few other missionaries visited Hong Kong to initiate missionary work, but they were forced to depart because of the continuing Chinese revolution and the outbreak of the Korean War. A permanent mission was not established until 1955. The Southern Far East Mission, as the Church grew, was subdivided into separate missions in Taiwan, Hong Kong, the Philippines and other countries of Southeast Asia. The growing strength of the Church has accompanied the growing strength and prestige of China.

Since coming to power in 1949, there can be no question that the Chinese Communists have made substantial achievements. The political situation has not always been stable, as attested by the land reform campaigns of 1950-53, the Great Leap Forward of 1958-60, the Cultural Revolution of 1966-71 and the struggle against the "gang of four" in 1976-77. Yet, China has been able to redistribute wealth, solve problems of disease, improve education, expand national defense and otherwise improve the lives of its citizens.<sup>10</sup>

The post-Mao leadership is particularly concerned with economic devel-

opment. Recent Communist Party and government meetings have called for "four modernizations"—the modernization of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense by the year 2000. While some policies have encountered problems, the Chinese seem determined to achieve rapid modernization. It is this drive that has led some Church leaders to believe that China may soon be ready for missionary work. One General Authority told me that he was praying for the success of the current government's modernization program because he believed it would pave the way for preaching the gospel. Ten years ago it would probably have been unthinkable for a General Authority to acknowledge prayer for the success of a Communist government. Perhaps this is the beginning of the fulfillment of McKay's prayer nearly sixty years ago.

A major concern of McKay as expressed in his prayer and in subsequent writings was that "the bands of superstition be broken" in China, for this, he believed, was the greatest obstacle to missionary work. The traditional values and beliefs of the Chinese people were a principal target of the Chinese Communists who considered them an impediment to progress.

These traditional values did not distinguish clearly between religious beliefs and political, economic and social relationships. The beliefs of the traditional, elite, educated class were based on Confucianism which is more a social doctrine than an actual religion. The beliefs of the common people were a variety of watered-down Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, ancestor worship, local customs and a host of other traditions. These beliefs linked rulers and ruled and justified the existence of the social order. Thus, when the Chinese Communists embarked on their effort to revolutionize society, they also sought to transform the traditional beliefs and values of the people.

Through political indoctrination, a pervasive aspect of Chinese life, the Chinese Communists hope to break down previous traditions and values and replace them with those conducive to the goals of the party. The new Chinese value system is officially identified as "Marxism, Leninism and the Thought of Chairman Mao Zedong." Maoism is the civil religion of China.<sup>11</sup> Maoist ideology consists of two levels. At one level it is a fairly complex philosophical doctrine concerning social development which must be studied and mastered by those who wish to achieve party membership and thereby "get ahead" in the system. At another level it is a series of pithy slogans and homilies designed to motivate people to work harder and sacrifice more for the common good.<sup>12</sup>

Essentially, Maoism accepts the materialist formulation of historical development, but lends a subjective quality. Probably because China was an agrarian society not meeting Marx's qualifications for proletarian revolution, Mao argued that it was possible to create a socialist consciousness even though all material conditions might not be present. Thus, China could become a socialist nation if the Chinese people could become "new socialist men and women" through education and experience; then the people could transform the material base of society. Changing people's thinking is a fundamental tenet of Maoism.

Unlike Confucianism, which emphasized harmony, Maoism holds that the essence of social life is struggle. People must struggle against nature, against other people (class struggle), and against their own limitations. Maoism strongly advocates individual will and promotes sacrifice, hard work, dedication, zeal and patience. People who exemplify these values are constantly hailed in Chinese propaganda and are made the objects of emulation campaigns. Maoism also stresses self-reliance. All social and production units in China—families, production teams, communes, schools, factories—should become as self-sufficient as possible. China as a nation should rely as much as possible on its own efforts to restore greatness and to achieve comprehensive modernization.

All elements and nuances of Maoism cannot be delved into here. It is sufficient to say that Maoism constitutes a fundamental challenge to the traditional system of values and beliefs of Chinese society, inasmuch as there has been a tremendous effort to inculcate the values of Maoism in the masses of Chinese people. Perhaps the Cultural Revolution of 1966–69 epitomizes the best and worst of Maoism. Mao launched the Cultural Revolution against tendencies which he perceived were creating a new class of bureaucrats in China, were promoting inequality between urban and rural areas, and were turning China away from a correct path of social development. Millions of youths, captured by Mao's charisma, became involved in the political process and tried to emulate his "revolutionary" experience. There were efforts to make the political process more open, the education system more fair, and the society more egalitarian. Instead, what resulted was an outpouring of violent excess which only ended when the military seized control.

The fundamental problem of Maoism has been its inherent contradictions. For example, Mao argued that political leaders should listen to the people and should integrate with them. "Our God," said Mao, "is the masses of Chinese people." Yet Maoism legitimized a massive, bureaucratic, authoritarian party in the name of mobilizing the masses to achieve socialism.<sup>13</sup> It is not surprising that Mao's successors are trying to reinterpret his teachings and his policies. Mao remains a hero, and his ideas are treated as sacred writ. Yet everywhere in China there is evidence of change. Will and self-reliance are now interpreted to mean that individual effort will result in more status and better pay. Capitalistic incentives are condoned, even encouraged, in economic management.

During our visit to China there was ample evidence of discontent with the past. Many of the people we spoke with expressed the opinion that China was set back ten years by the Cultural Revolution. The visits of protesters to Beijing and the public airing of grievances of dissidents indicate that all is not well.<sup>14</sup> Maoism has been partly successful in accomplishing the goal sought by McKay, the breaking down of the traditional Chinese value system. The many movements and campaigns conducted by the Communists, together with attempts at social restructuring, have undermined many traditional beliefs. A lasting impression during my discussions with a variety of people, from top government leaders to ordinary people met while jogging along

country roads in early morning, was that the Chinese people have a strong sense that what they do makes a difference; that they have something to contribute to society. This is in sharp contrast to the sense of fatalism which characterized traditional Chinese beliefs.

Nevertheless, the comments, demonstrations and wallposters suggest a deep malaise; the new socialist consciousness so eagerly sought by Maoism has not been achieved. Since the destruction of traditional values has not been accompanied by gratifying replacements for those values, the present leadership hopes that the answer is a new materialism founded on economic modernization. There is little interest in finding it in religion, and particularly in Christianity.

As I have already noted, religion is officially discouraged in China. Official hostility toward religion, and Christianity in particular, stems not only from ideology, but from the somewhat mixed record of Christian churches in China in the past. The Chinese Communists identified them as an instrument of foreign imperialism. Christian missionaries had done much for China: They built schools, hospitals and churches. Yet they also took advantage of the special privileges granted foreigners under the unequal treaties. Some missionaries demanded the same courtesies from the Chinese people as did higher ranking Chinese officials.<sup>15</sup> Hosea Stout, one of the 1853 LDS missionaries, observed that Christian missionaries in China were "of the upper circles, luxuriating upon the cent society at home and the miseries of the people in that region."

Religious groups, and Christians in particular, were early targets of the regime. Church property was confiscated, and only a few leaders willing to cooperate with the Communist authorities were allowed to operate, mainly as token symbols that the regime officially practiced religious toleration. Many missionaries were imprisoned or expelled. Subsequently, there have been ups and downs in the relationship between the government and the churches. During the Cultural Revolution the remaining churches were closed and religious leaders disappeared. More recently, some religious leaders have reemerged. The government recently sponsored a conference on religion in Shanghai and sent delegates to a world religious conference held in the United States, but religious activities are still tightly controlled by the authorities. Much of the publicity accorded religions and their activities is propaganda designed to create a favorable international image.<sup>16</sup>

The practice of religion is usually associated with minority groups who comprise about six percent of China's total population. The Tibetans and Mongols are Buddhist, the *Hui* are Moslem, and many of the tribal minorities in Southwest China practice animistic religions. Before 1949 there were three million Catholics and about 800 thousand Protestants in China. There are now estimated to be about 500 thousand to one million Christians altogether, but no one knows for sure. During our visit I repeatedly inquired about the existence of religious groups, the study of religion or philosophy, or the attitude of people toward religion. I also carried a copy of the Book of Mormon and mentioned it to some of our hosts. There were no takers among the

Chinese; the subject of religion seemed embarrassing to our hosts, and they usually avoided discussions of it.

I asked my hosts whether or not there were any Christian churches open in China and was told that they were not aware of any (though it has been reported that churches are operating in some cities). I asked if there were any centers for the study of religion or the history of religion and was told that they were not aware of any (although the article on Galileo's trial cited previously demonstrated a good knowledge of the scriptures and medieval Christianity). They pleaded ignorance of the existence of churches, centers of religious study, or similar subjects, even though the Chinese press has favorably reported on these topics.

During our visit to Nanjing (Nanking) University, famous as one of the great missionary-founded institutions of China, I asked whether there were any remnants of the Christianity once found there. The response was that there were none. This is surprising since only a few months later it was announced that a research institute on religion was established at Nanjing University and that its work was to revise the Chinese edition of the Bible, and select and edit Western religious episodes and Christian literature. During our visit we were informed that even the Philosophy Department emphasized the study of Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong thought.

Toward the end of our visit we were taken to an Islamic Mosque in Guangzhou (Canton). According to the caretaker, a congregation of about 4,000 worshiped at the mosque, including Chinese and foreigners. In a gracious effort to be friendly to his American guests he said to us: "I understand that you also have Islam in America. I have heard of your Islamic leader Muhammed Ali!"

The previous paragraphs show that there are both positive and negative trends concerning the advancement of missionary work in China. I have noted the historical and ideological objections to religion on the part of the ruling authorities. But we are also witnessing an erosion of Maoist ideology and an increased searching for new values. The Chinese Communists hope to fill the void with new emphasis on materialism; their appeal hinges on the success of their modernization program. Assuming that the best prospect for missionary work exists when the society's values are under stress and question, the success of China's modernization thus holds both promises and pitfalls. As far as missionary work is concerned, the new materialism of China's current leadership is no less objectionable than the Maoist doctrines which preceded it. A more encouraging trend is that the Church, as demonstrated by President Kimball's recent sermons, is taking far greater notice of China. Moreover, as he has stated on several occasions, it is his belief that when the Church is prepared to do the work, the way will be opened.

Thus, the burden is on the Church to prepare to do missionary work rather than on the Chinese to prepare to receive missionaries. Some modest but significant steps have already been taken. Church materials are to be published in simplified characters (and the Church might well consider employing the *pin yin* Romanization now officially adopted in China for use in



missionary language instruction), and Mandarin classes are being taught for the Cantonese speakers of Hong Kong. Brigham Young University has received official delegations from China and is seeking to promote student exchange with the People's Republic. LDS businessmen, officials and tourists from various countries are going to China in increasing numbers. BYU had one entertainment group visit China, and presumably there will be more opportunities of this kind.

Beyond these efforts some other possibilities exist. For example, China's major economic problem is feeding a huge and growing population. In the opinion of most experts, Chinese agriculture has barely kept pace with population growth. The regime has declared agricultural production to be the most important of China's "four modernizations." Furthermore, the government has introduced strict population control measures, such as reducing rations for families with more than two children, to go along with less coercive and more widely used practices such as late marriage and other forms of birth control.<sup>17</sup> Studies of Chinese society indicate that there is still considerable pressure in rural China to have larger families as a form of economic security (and there is still a preference for male heirs). In some respects the redistribution of wealth and the organization of the rural work force has exacerbated rather than curbed this tendency.<sup>18</sup> Consequently, an improvement in agricultural production might also mean an accompanying decline in population growth.

The Church ought to encourage a program of "agricultural missionaries" who speak Chinese and can assist rural areas in improving production. Economic improvement would help to alter the precarious balance between food and population, and could also lead to a relaxation of some of the draconian methods of population control now pushed by the government in the countryside. Though this would result in a form of birth control, which the Church has traditionally opposed, any perceived liabilities could well be offset by the avoidance of famine, malnutrition, even starvation and a decrease of authoritarianism in rural China. Moreover, whatever benefits accrued to the modernization program by this assistance would be offset by the example of service and sacrifice by the missionaries, even though they probably would not be able to proselyte directly.<sup>19</sup> Similar contributions could be made by health and other kinds of missionaries.

The most fruitful areas of missionary contact are likely to be between Chinese members and their relatives, friends and associates in China. China badly needs the skills and talents of more educated and better qualified Chinese people from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and other countries. Taiwan is a special case because of the ongoing civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists that has built up an intense hatred over many years. Since normalizing relations with the United States the Chinese Communists have made numerous overtures to Taiwan, and even have gone so far as to promise that when reunification takes place, Taiwan can keep its own governmental system, military and police forces and capitalist economic systems. The government in Taipei, not without some justification, has re-

jected these initiatives. It would seem that the Church is best served by improved contacts between Taiwan and the mainland, though the Church must try as much as possible to remain aloof from the intense political question. Improved relations between the two governments would permit a greater number of Church members in Taiwan to have closer ties with people in China.

The political, economic and social forces at work in China will have great bearing on the ability of the Church to conduct missionary work. The Church has already shown some ability to adjust and operate in diverse societies, including Communist governments as in Poland and Yugoslavia.<sup>20</sup> Nevertheless, for reasons explained earlier there will be special challenges in China. Presumably the time will come when the Church, and all of its programs, will be able to function successfully in China. In preparation for that time the Church must mobilize its resources and be prepared to move creatively and flexibly. The "agricultural missionary" concept mentioned above would be such an innovative approach.

Another flexible and creative approach is demonstrated by President Kimball's sermons and comments. By identifying and focusing upon praiseworthy characteristics of Chinese society, he encourages Mormons of all nationalities to develop a positive sense of community with the Chinese. Many elements of the Chinese civil religion such as the Maoist emphasis on sacrifice, patience and self-reliance seem to be compatible with LDS teachings. On a more grand scale, Latter-day Saints can empathize with China's historical experience of rejection and humiliation and the determination of the Chinese people to achieve greatness.<sup>21</sup> Without forgetting obvious differences between Mormon theology and China's civil religion, Church members can promote and develop the common areas of history and doctrine. As more and more LDS "missionaries" have contact with the Chinese people, they can, if properly prepared, seize on these common bonds to share the gospel.

Given the hostility of Chinese ideology and policy to organized religion, and Christianity in particular, there is not likely to be a rapid boom in LDS proselyting in China in the immediate future. However, the changes occurring in China's civil religion may well cause an increasing number of Chinese people to reexamine their faith. If the Church and its members can find ways to reach these people, many of them will discover the gospel and see that it meets their spiritual needs. As this happens, the prayer of President McKay and the expectation of President Kimball will achieve gradual, but ever-increasing fulfillment.

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Remark before the Regional Representative Seminar, 30 March 1979; excerpts published in *Ensign* 9 (May 1979): 105.

<sup>2</sup>Spencer Kimball, "The Uttermost Parts of the Earth," *Ensign* 9 (July 1979): 7.

<sup>3</sup>*Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily), 15 March 1979.

<sup>4</sup>*Renmin Ribao*, 2 December 1978.

<sup>5</sup>Yen Jiaqi, "Religion, Rationality and Practice—Visiting Three Law Courts on the Question of Truth in Different Eras," *Guangming Ribao* (Guangming Daily), 14 September 1978, translated in United States Joint Publication Research Service #72219, 13 November 1978.

<sup>6</sup>For a delightful contrast of Chinese culture and some aspects of Mormonism, see Robert J. Morris, "Middle Buddha," *Dialogue* IV (Spring 1969): 41–50.

<sup>7</sup>Paul Hyer, "Revolution and Mormonism in Asia," *Dialogue* VII (Spring 1972): 88–93.

<sup>8</sup>Excerpts from Cannon's diary are included in Spencer J. Palmer, *The Church Encounters Asia* (Salt Lake City, Utah: Deseret Book, 1970), p. 38.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 36.

<sup>10</sup>Just how much has been accomplished by the Chinese Communists is a matter of intense debate among scholars. For a useful recent discussion, see Nick Eberstadt, "Has China Failed?" (two parts), *New York Review of Books* (Part 1: 3 April 1979), pp. 33–40; (Part 2: 19 April 1979), pp. 41–45.

<sup>11</sup>"Civil Religion" was a concept applied by French philosophers to Confucianism because it contained a system of morals and ethics without reference to a divine supreme being. Robert Bellah has defined it as a "set of beliefs, symbols, and ritual experiences that members of a society share and participate in that help to establish their identity as a group." For the application of this concept in China, see John B. Starr, *Ideology and Culture* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 32–34.

<sup>12</sup>The best work on the content of Maoist ideology is John Bryan Starr, *Continuing the Revolution: The Political Thought of Mao* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979).

<sup>13</sup>A very negative view of political authoritarianism in China may be found in Simon Leys, *Chinese Shadows* (New York: Penguin Books, 1978).

<sup>14</sup>For example see the conversations reported by David Finkelstein, "A Reporter at Large," *New Yorker* (September 10, 1979), pp. 127–50.

<sup>15</sup>For a recent view of missionary involvement in China from the Chinese Communist perspective see Wang Xi, "A Brief Talk on Several Quations Regarding the History of Sino-U.S. Relations," *Shijie Lishi* [World History], June 1979, pp. 12–19; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China*, 26 June 1979, p. B5.

<sup>16</sup>A recent example of the practice of religion in China is Wei Xiutang, "In a Catholic Church in Beijing," *China Reconstructs* (January 1980), pp. 48–50. For a statement of policy on religion see Xiao Wen, "Policy on Religion," *Beijing Review* (21 December 1979), pp. 14–16, 22. Xiao argues that the policy of the state has always been to tolerate religion. However, during the Cultural Revolution Lin Biao and the "gang of four" tried to abolish religious freedom. Thus, the current effort to reestablish churches and other places of worship and to rehabilitate religious personages are a "reimplementation" of policy that existed prior to the Cultural Revolution.

<sup>17</sup>On China's recent population control policies see the special feature section in *Beijing Review*, 22:46 (16 November 1979), pp. 17–27. The lead article "Controlling Population Growth in a Planned Way" is authored by China's ranking female member of the Communist Party, Chen Muhua.

<sup>18</sup>William L. Parrish and Martin K. Whyte, *Village and Family in Contemporary China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), *passim*.

<sup>19</sup>This is somewhat analogous to the experience of Ammon who began his missionary service by offering himself as a servant to the king of the Lamanites. Alma 17:35.

<sup>20</sup>A variety of essays on the ability of the church to function in diverse cultural situations is found in LaMond Tullis, ed. *Mormonism: A Faith for all Cultures* (Provo, Brigham Young University Press, 1978). While China is not discussed directly in this work, many of the insights are relevant.

<sup>21</sup>One author has compared the Long March of the Chinese Communists to the Western trek of the Mormon pioneers. See George S. Tate, "Halldor Laxness, the Mormons and the Promised Land," *Dialogue* XI (Summer 1978): 25–37, *passim*.

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乎曰有要一為要一者  
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